LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
RIVERSIDE 


AMERICA  IN  THE  WAR 

III 
HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 


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AMERICA   IN   THE   WAR 


HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 


BY 

NELSON  LLOYD 


ILLUSTEATED 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1919 


DS70 
L5G 


COPTBIGHT,   1918,   BT 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAO1I 

I.  INTRODUCTION 1 

II.  THE  TASK     19 

III.  THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM 26 

IV.  THE  CANTONMENTS     .   , 42 

V.  MILITARY  PREPARATION 64 

VI.  THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR 78 

VII.  NAVAL  PREPARATION  .    .    .^ 101 

VIII.  OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION 120 

IX.  THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN 139 

X.  HELPING  OUR  ALLIES 157 

XI.  THE  WAR  BUDGET 167 

XII.  LABOR 187 

XIII.  THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE   .    .  206 

XIV.  THE  RAILROADS 225 

XV.  THE  COLLEGE 237 

XVI.  CONCLUSION   .  247 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Ships  building  at  Hog  Island Frontispiece 

FACING  PAGE 

Marching  out  to  dine  after  short  period  of  training  at  one 

of  the  National  Army  cantonments 52 

Making  cartridge-shells  at  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Works  .    .       70 
Mess  at  the  Pelham  Bay  Naval  Station 136 

Selling  Liberty  Bonds  in  front  of  the  Sub-Treasury,  New 

York  City 178 

Patriotic  rally  for  ship-builders  in  hull  of  a  wooden  ship 

building  at  Seattle,  Washington 196 


HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 

'nr^HERE  is  nothing  finer  in  American  history 
•*•  than  the  way  in  which  the  American  peo- 
ple, as  a  whole,  responded  to  the  call  for  war 
with  Germany.  This  statement  might  seem 
too  broad.  Some  critics  might  take  issue  with 
it.  They  might  point  to  the  peace-at-any-price 
campaign  which  was  wide-spread  over  the  coun- 
try from  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  in 
1914  to  the  very  hour  when  America  was  forced 
to  take  up  arms.  They  might  point  to  sporadic 
outbursts  of  disloyalty  by  certain  foreign-born 
elements  of  our  population,  who  placed  the 
cause  of  the  lands  of  their  birth  above  the  wel- 
fare of  their  adopted  country.  They  might 
point  to  certain  members  of  Congress,  even, 
who  by  their  obstructionist  tactics  gave  evidence 
of  lukewarmness  for  the  war,  and  even  of  out- 
right lack  of  patriotism.  Every  community  has 


2  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

had  its  pacifists,  its  pacifists  with  honest  hearts 
and  weak  heads,  its  dishonest  pacifists  working 
in  the  interest  of  the  country's  enemy,  its  slack- 
ers, its  malcontents.  This  has  been  true  of 
every  nation  in  every  past  war.  But  certain  it 
is  that  when  on  April  6,  1917,  our  government 
accepted  the  German  challenge  to  our  rights 
and  liberties,  the  American  people  ranged  them- 
selves behind  their  leaders  with  a  steadfast  pur- 
pose to  meet  their  heavy  task,  to  make  every 
sacrifice  that  the  world  might  be  freed  from 
the  horror  of  German  militarism  and  Kultur. 

Look  at  their  record. 

In  the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  war  by  the 
volunteer  system  and  the  selective  draft  they 
raised  their  armies  from  hardly  250,000  men  to 
3,000,000,  of  whom  more  than  one-half  were 
moved  to  the  battle-front  in  France. 

Their  navy  was  increased  by  volunteers  from 
65,000  men  to  over  500,000,  and  ships  by  the 
hundred  were  added  to  their  sea  force. 

Starting  with  an  almost  negligible  number  of 
merchant  vessels,  they  had  laid  the  foundation 
of  the  greatest  merchant  marine  in  the  world. 

During  the  same  period  they  had  paid  to 


INTRODUCTION  3 

their  government  more  than  $4,000,000,000  in 
taxes,  and  had  advanced  to  it  in  loans  by  the 
purchase  of  Liberty  Bonds  and  War  Savings 
Stamps  more  than  $9,000,000,000. 

To  make  easier  the  lives  of  their  fighting  men 
and  to  heal  the  wounds  inflicted  on  the  world 
by  German  Kultur,  they  had  given,  through  the 
Red  Cross,  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  the  Knights  of 
Columbus,  and  other  philanthropic  agencies,  full 
a  half-billion  dollars.  But,  above  all,  they  had 
offered  the  lives  of  their  men  and  their  women 
and  stood  ready  to  bear  increasing  sorrows  and 
heavier  burdens. 

These  figures  are  not  to  be  read  in  a  spirit  of 
boastfulness.  America 'has  not  yet  had  to  drain 
the  very  dregs  of  the  cup  of  sorrow,  as  have 
France  and  Great  Britain,  Belgium,  Serbia,  and 
Italy.  America  has  not  had  to  stand  with  her 
back  to  the  wall  to  meet  the  onslaught  of  hordes 
of  modern  savages,  the  product  of  years  of  a 
system  of  perverted  education,  based  on  a  per- 
verted system  of  morality.  These  figures  are 
given  because  they  answer  the  charges  of  the 
Germans  abroad  and  the  Germans  at  home, 
that  the  American  people  were  not  whole- 


4  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

heartedly  in  the  war.  They  answer  the  old 
argument  of  the  pacifists  that  the  American 
people  would  not  suffer  themselves  to  be 
dragged  into  a  conflict  3,000  miles  away,  and 
would  endure  dishonor  and  outrage  rather  than 
fight  in  defense  of  their  own  and  the  world's 
liberty.  The  things  that  the  Germans  and 
pacifists  said  the  Americans  would  not  do  they 
have  done,  and  they  have  done  it  in  full  measure. 
It  is  true  that  following  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War  we  had  two  and  a  half  years  of 
divided  opinion  and  hesitation,  but  those  were 
years  of  education  and  they  brought  us  to  a 
common  opinion  and  a  common  purpose.  Had 
the  heads  of  our  government  been  less  idealistic, 
of  less  pacific  minds,  that  period  might  have 
been  briefer  and  we  might  have  faced  the 
conflict  better  prepared  for  it.  They  did  not 
lead  the  people  to  war.  They  did  not  even 
teach  the  people  to  prepare  for  war.  Their 
every  effort  was  to  keep  the  country  at  peace. 
But  they,  too,  were  learning.  Few  people  in 
the  United  States  at  the  beginning  of  the  World 
War  realized  the  peril  that  lay  in  Germany's 
aggression.  Few  had  ever  heard  of  the  Pan- 


INTRODUCTION  5 

German  movement.  Few  believed  that  Ger- 
many was  really  carrying  out  a  well-laid  scheme 
to  secure  the  rule  of  the  world  by  force.  The 
full  depth  of  Germany's  guilt  was  not  known. 
When  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  violated 
and  there  followed  a  series  of  excesses  that 
shocked  civilization,  some  public  men  and 
writers  did  proclaim  our  danger  and  warn  us  to 
make  ready  to  meet  it.  But  the  lesson  was 
learned  slowly.  The  rape  of  Belgium  shocked 
all  decent  people,  but  Belgium  was  three  thou- 
sand miles  away,  and  we  did  not  see  those  hor- 
rors close  at  hand.  It  took  time  to  reveal  them 
to  us.  Military  necessity  was  the  excuse  of 
Germany's  apologists,  and  with  some  it  found 
credence.  We  did  not  realize  that  the  Belgium 
horror  was  but  a  part  of  a  long-laid  plan  to 
bring  the  world  to  its  knees  under  the  lash  of 
frightfulness.  That  a  nation  supposed  to  be 
civilized  could  commit  such  crimes  seemed  in- 
credible. 

In  1915  blinking  eyes  began  to  open  wide. 
Clouds  of  poison -gas  were  rolled  across  the 
British  front,  dealing  a  hideous  death  to  gallant 
soldiers  who  were  fighting  fairly,  and  Germany 


o  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

| 
was  seen  again  violating  the  rules  of  warfare 

laid  down  by  The  Hague  conventions  to  which 
she  had  acceded.  While  men  still  had  faith  in 
her  honor,  her  scientists  were  experimenting  on 
cats  and  dogs  to  devise  the  cruellest  form  of 
weapon  for  her  army's  use.  Liquid  fire  followed 
the  gas,  and  then  began  the  murderous  career 
of  her  submarines. 

From  the  first  the  sympathy  of  the  great 
majority  of  Americans  was  with  the  Allies. 
Even  then  Germany  might  have  taught  us  to 
respect  her.  She  taught  us  to  despise.  Her 
declaration  of  a  war  zone  around  her  enemies' 
coasts  on  February  4,  1915,  gave  us  the  first 
real  warning  of  trouble  ahead.  The  right  of 
American  ships  and  American  citizens  to  tra- 
verse the  seas  in  time  of  war  was  firmly  estab- 
lished by  long-standing  principles  of  interna- 
tional law.  If  Germany  could  have  maintained 
a  blockade  of  enemy  ports  the  case  would  have 
been  different,  but  even  then  she  would  have 
had  to  safeguard  the  lives  of  passengers  and 
crews  of  both  enemy  and  neutral  merchant  ves- 
sels. This  she  could  not  do.  Her  navy,  except 
her  submarines,  had  been  driven  from  the  seas, 


INTRODUCTION  7 

and,  disregarding  President  Wilson's  warning 
that  she  would  be  held  to  "strict  accountability" 
for  her  acts,  she  sent  those  submarines  forth  on 
their  mission  of  piracy.  On  March  28  the 
British  steamship  Falaba  was  sent  to  the  bot- 
tom with  111  lives;  on  April  8  the  Harpalyce, 
carrying  food  to  starving  Belgium,  was  torpe- 
doed, and  fifteen  of  the  crew  were  lost.  Vessel 
after  vessel  was  sunk  without  warning.  It  was 
the  sinking  of  the  Cunard  liner  Lusitania  on 
May  7  that  fanned  America's  anger  into  full 
flame.  By  that  crowning  murder  1,154  men, 
women,  and  children  lost  their  lives,  and  of 
these  114  were  Americans.  This  alone  was 
enough  to  convince  the  unbiassed  of  the  sinister 
nature  of  Germany's  plans  and  the  peril  to  the 
world  in  the  victory  of  such  a  people. 

Had  the  German  Government  deliberately 
planned  to  open  the  eyes  of  America  to  Ger- 
many's intentions  and  to  the  danger  that  lay 
behind  those  intentions,  it  could  not  have  acted 
more  efficiently.  Slowly  the  whole  system  of 
frightfulness  was  unfolded,  and  the  perversion 
of  the  German  mind  laid  bare.  Despite  our 
warnings,  ship  after  ship  was  murderously  sunk. 


8  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

German  Zeppelins  and  airplanes  dropped  their 
bombs  on  open  towns,  dealing  death  to  hun- 
dreds of  innocent  men,  women,  and  children. 
There  was  no  respect  for  that  emblem  of  mercy, 
the  Red  Cross.  The  wounded  and  the  nurses 
of  the  hospitals  became  fair  game  for  any  Hun- 
nish  warrior  of  the  air,  and  hospital-ships,  with 
their  freight  of  wounded,  choice  marks  for  those 
that  lurked  under  the  sea.  Even  as  I  write 
comes  the  news  of  the  sinking  of  the  hospital- 
ship  Llandovery  Castle,  when  on  an  errand  of 
mercy,  and  258  persons,  including  14  women 
nurses,  were  killed. 

Future  historians,  reviewing  the  events  of 
these  times,  will  certainly  wonder  at  those  two 
and  a  half  years  when  America  endured  so 
many  wrongs  at  Germany's  hands,  and  took  no 
other  action  than  to  strive  to  bring  her  to  rea- 
son by  argument,  unsupported  by  even  a  show 
of  force.  They  will  wonder  why,  when  the 
threat  was  so  evident,  we  made  no  preparation 
to  meet  the  storm.  The  truth  is  we  had  a 
pacific  and  altruistically  minded  administra- 
tion ;  we  had  a  Congress  which  contained  a  large 
number  of  pacifists,  some  pacifists  from  sin- 


INTRODUCTION  9 

cerely  patriotic  motives,  and  others  for  rea- 
sons purely  selfish.  To-day  no  man  in  the 
world  is  more  hated  by  the  Germans  than 
President  Wilson.  They  charge  him  with  being 
a  tool  of  Great  Britain,  and  with  deliberately 
leading  us  to  war,  to  the  ruin  of  their  hope  for 
victory  and  world  dominion.  Nothing  could  be 
more  false.  He  strove  patiently  to  keep  us  at 
peace,  often  in  the  face  of  bitter  opposition  at 
home,  but  that  day  came,  when,  as  he  has  said: 
"The  right  is  more  precious  than  peace."  From 
that  day  he  has  been  for  "force,  force  to  the 
utmost,"  and  he  has  had  behind  him  a  united 
Congress  and  a  united  people.  But  they  were 
not  for  war  because,  as  a  German  has  written, 
"war  is  the  most  august  of  all  human  activi- 
ties"; they  were  for  war  because  only  by  war 
could  the  world  be  made  "a  decent  place  in 
which  to  live." 

"The  object  of  America  in  this  war,"  the 
President  has  said,  "is  to  deliver  the  free  peo- 
ples of  the  world  from  the  menace  and  the 
actual  power  of  a  vast  military  establishment, 
controlled  by  an  irresponsible  government, 
which,  having  secretly  planned  to  dominate  the 


10  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

world,  proceeded  to  carry  out  the  plan  without 
regard  either  to  the  sacred  obligations  of  treaty 
or  the  long-established  practices  and  long-cher- 
ished principles  of  international  action  and 
honor;  which  chose  its  own  time  for  the  war, 
delivered  its  blow  fiercely  and  suddenly,  stopped 
at  no  barrier,  either  of  law  or  mercy,  swept  a 
whole  continent  within  the  tide  of  blood — not 
the  blood  of  soldiers  only,  but  the  blood  of  in- 
nocent women  and  children,  also,  and  of  the 
helpless  poor,  and  now  stands,  balked  but  not 
defeated,  the  enemy  of  four-fifths  of  the 
world.  .  .  ." 

We  can  imagine  the  historian  puzzling  over 
the  question  as  to  why  we  were  so  long  in  dis- 
covering this  menace,  why  we  did  not  see  it 
when  Belgium  was  overrun  and  ruined,  and  the 
Lusitania  sunk.  His  perspective  will  be  better 
than  ours.  He  will  be  able  to  trace  the  whole 
series  of  great  events  from  their  beginning  to 
their  end.  He  will  find  the  germs  of  the  war 
in  those  days  fifty  years  ago  when  the  Germans 
overran  France  and  formed  the  German  Empire, 
with  Prussia  at  its  head.  He  will  review  Ger- 
many's fifty  years  of  military  preparation.  He 


INTRODUCTION  11 

will  study  the  outpourings  of  Germany's  states- 
men, her  educators,  her  publicists,  and  see  them 
all  tending  to  instil  in  the  German  mind  a  de- 
sire for  conquest,  and  to  prepare  the  people  for 
a  sudden  rush  that  would  carry  them  on  the 
first  stage  toward  world  domination.  He  will 
marvel  that  the  rest  of  the  world  was  so  blind 
as  not  to  foresee  what  lay  ahead  and  prepare 
for  it. 

There  were,  before  the  war,  in  France  and 
England  some  far-sighted  men  who  urged  their 
people  to  make  ready  for  a  German  attack,  but 
it  is  doubtful  if  even  these  realized  the  com- 
pleteness of  Germany's  preparations  or  her  con- 
templated barbarity  of  warfare.  It  was  incredi- 
ble that  a  great  modern  nation  should  have  been 
drilled  and  educated  into  a  race  of  barbarians. 

Lord  Roberts  warned  England,  and  England, 
lost  in  a  maze  of  party  squabbles  and  Irish 
quarrels,  did  not  listen,  so  that  when  the  Ger- 
man hordes  struck  into  France  she  could  only 
send  against  them  an  army  of  150,000  men.  A 
gallanter  army  never  went  to  battle,  but  it  was 
hopelessly  outnumbered  and  almost  wiped  out. 
For  our  own  lack  of  preparation  before  19  J  4> 


12  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

there  was  good  reason.  We  were  separated 
from  Europe  by  3,000  miles  of  sea,  and  it  did 
not  seem  that  we  could  ever  be  involved  in  a 
European  conflict  or  threatened  seriously  by 
a  European  Power.  For  our  policy  of  un- 
preparedness  after  1914  there  was  less  reason, 
for  we  had  before  us  a  lesson  to  study — the 
events  in  Belgium  and  France,  and  incident 
after  incident  which  betrayed  the  German 
method  and  true  purpose.  We  had  our  public 
men  who  foresaw  our  danger,  and  warned  us, 
even  if  we  did  not  go  to  war,  to  prepare  for 
eventualities.  We  did  not  listen.  We  did  order 
a  considerable  increase  in  our  naval  establish- 
ment, but  as  to  our  army  we  did  practically 
nothing. 

It  is  a  fact  that  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  we  had  many  pronounced  pacifists  in 
places  of  influence  in  the  government.  Our 
foreign  relations  were  in  the  hands  of  William 
J.  Bryan,  whose  hobby  was  peace  maintained 
by  treaty  and  arbitration,  an  excellent,  but  at 
that  time  an  unworkable,  plan.  When  war 
threatened  us  he  was  for  peace  at  almost  any 
price  and  against  military  preparation.  His 


INTRODUCTION  13 

declaration  that  a  million  Americans  would 
spring  to  arms  overnight  if  danger  threatened 
us  has  become  a  hackneyed  joke.  However,  he 
did  sign  those  two  able  notes  which  President 
Wilson  sent  to  Germany  on  the  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania,  and  then,  finding  the  American  peo- 
ple becoming  warlike  and  out  of  sympathy  with 
his  policies,  retired.  He  was  followed  by  Rob- 
ert Lansing,  who  has  conducted  the  State 
Department  with  dignity  and  courage,  and  in 
the  spirit  of  its  best  traditions. 

The  then  Secretary  of  War,  Lindley  M.  Gar- 
rison, seeing  trouble  ahead,  did  make  every 
effort  to  secure  some  measure  of  military  prep- 
aration, but  he  met  opposition  in  both  houses 
of  Congress,  and  he  did  not  seem  to  have  hearty 
support  from  most  of  the  other  members  of  the 
administration.  There  was  a  theory  that  to 
arm  thoroughly  would  be  a  threat  to  Germany 
which  might  disarrange  the  delicate  negotiations 
then  proceeding.  Besides,  Count  von  Berns- 
torff  and  his  army  of  propagandists  were  active 
in  holding  us  to  the  ways  of  peace.  Universal 
service  on  a  modified  scale  was  talked  of,  but 
the  politicians  declared  that  the  American  peo- 


14  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

pie  would  never  suffer  such  a  system.  Mr. 
Garrison  tried  to  obtain  a  compromise  with  his 
plan  for  a  " continental  army,"  an  army  of 
500,000  volunteers  serving  part  time,  but  this, 
too,  was  blocked,  and  on  June  3,  1916,  the  Na- 
tional Defense  Act  was  passed  which  made  the 
inadec  ately  trained  National  Guards  of  the 
States  a  second  line  of  national  military 

defense.  Under  this  act  the  government  was 
authorized  to  recruit  the  Guard  up  to  300,000 
men,  while  the  war  strength  authorized  for  the 
regular  army  was  raised  to  287,000.  Mr.  Gar- 
rison retired  and  was  succeeded  by  Newton  D. 
Baker,  who  had  been  mayor  of  Cleveland,  a 
man  generally  credited  at  that  time  with  hold- 
ing pronounced  pacifist  principles.  Certainly 
under  Mr.  Baker's  leadership  in  the  months 
preceding  our  entry  into  the  war  little  was  done 
to  strengthen  our  military  arm  in  any  large 
way.  There  began  a  wide-spread  agitation  for 
preparedness  all  over  the  country.  Mass-meet- 
ings were  held;  great  parades,  emphasizing  the 
demand,  marched  the  streets;  many  patriotic 
organizations  carried  on  a  campaign  of  educa- 
tion, but  little  effective  work  was  done  by  the 


INTRODUCTION  15 

government.  There  could  be  only  two  reasons 
for  this.  The  first  is  political.  The  men  of  all 
parties,  who  had  the  power  to  act  effectively, 
misread  the  character  of  the  mass  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  and  feared  for  their  political  future. 
The-r  second  is  ignorance  and  lack  of  foresight. 
Having  little  knowledge  of  German  history  and 
German  character,  they  sincerely  believed  that 
we  were  able  to  continue  honorably  at  peace. 
The  President  himself,  a  year  before  the  war 
broke  out,  declared  in  a  public  speech  that  we 
were  in  no  danger  from  any  quarter.  Some 
time  later  he  weakened  and  declared  that  this 
was  the  last  great  war  America  could  keep  out 
of.  One  conspicuous  man  who  did  see  the 
danger,  warned  us  of  it,  and  acted  to  the  best  of 
his  limited  power,  was  General  Leonard  Wood. 
By  establishing  a  series  of  camps  for  intensive 
military  training  he  secured  the  nucleus  of  the 
great  corps  of  officers  we  were  so  soon  to  need. 
Meanwhile  the  eyes  of  the  Americans,  from 
the  President  down,  were  being  opened  to  the 
true  menace  of  Germany.  Mr.  Wilson  worked 
patiently  to  bring  Germany  to  reason  and  to 
avoid  war  honorably,  but  he  and  the  whole 


16 

people  were  fast  losing  patience.  Those  who 
failed  to  see  in  Germany's  atrocities  in  Europe 
and  on  the  seas,  or  in  her  violations  of  inter- 
national law,  a  just  reason  for  our  entering  the 
war,  were  aroused  when  she  was  caught  carry- 
ing on  in  our  own  neutral  land  a  campaign  of 
violence  and  intrigue.  Factories  were  blown 
up,  infernal  machines  were  placed  on  our  mer- 
chantmen, strikes  were  fomented,  efforts  were 
made  to  destroy  our  rail  and  water  communica- 
tions. Two  attaches  of  the  embassy,  Captains 
Boy-Ed  and  Von  Papen,  were  caught  and  sent 
home.  Still  we  were  patient  and  the  arch- 
plotter,  Count  von  Bernstorff,  remained.  The 
Germans  fooled  themselves.  It  was  a  common 
argument  of  theirs  that  the  Americans  were  a 
people  sunk  in  the  sloth  of  prosperity,  who 
thought  of  nothing  but  the  dollar,  and  were 
deaf  to  the  calls  of  honor  and  justice.  Could 
they  clean  up  Europe,  the  German  supermen 
would  make  short  work  of  these  imbeciles. 
They  misread  President  Wilson — a  college  pro- 
fessor, they  said,  given  to  words,  not  action, 
especially  warlike  action.  Brazenly  they  broke 
all  their  promises,  and  tore  up  all  their  agree- 


INTRODUCTION  17 

ments  with  us.  It  was  on  January  31,  1917, 
that  their  government  announced  that  it  would 
sink  without  warning  the  vessels  of  any  nation- 
ality found  in  certain  areas  of  the  seas  surround- 
ing their  enemies.  The  one  thing  to  do,  the 
President  did  promptly.  On  February  3  he 
broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany. 

The  breaking  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
states  does  not  of  necessity  lead  to  war.  In  this 
case,  considering  the  temper  of  the  German 
mind,  war  seemed  inevitable,  and  yet  we  made 
no  great  effort  to  be  ready  for  it.  The  navy 
was  tuned  up,  and  work  was  rushed  on  the  new 
vessels  on  the  ways,  but  save  for  a  flurry  of 
recruiting  for  the  army  and  the  National  Guard, 
to  bring  them  up  to  their  full  peace  strength, 
our  military  forces  were  not  augmented.  For 
two  months  more  we  endured  with  fair  equa- 
nimity German  intrigue,  outrage,  and  insult. 
Ship  after  ship  was  sunk  without  warning,  with 
the  loss  of  many  lives.  Not  content  with  this, 
Germany  was  endeavoring  to  stir  Japan  and 
Mexico  to  war  with  us,  as  was  discovered  by 
the  intercepting  of  a  note  of  January  19  from 
the  German  Foreign  Office  to  the  German  min- 


18  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

ister  in  Mexico.  There  was  nothing  left  but 
war.  President  Wilson  met  the  issue,  and  Con- 
gress and  the  people  stood  ready  to  support 
him  to  the  utmost. 

"The  right  is  more  precious  than  peace,"  said 
the  President  in  his  address  to  Congress  on 
April  2,  "and  we  shall  fight  for  the  things  which 
we  have  always  carried  nearest  our  hearts — 
for  democracy,  for  the  right  of  those  who  sub- 
mit to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own 
governments,  for  the  rights  and  liberties  of 
small  nations,  for  a  universal  dominion  of  right 
by  such  a  concert  of  free  people  as  shall  bring 
peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and  make  the 
world  itself  at  last  free. 

"To  such  a  task  we  can  dedicate  our  lives 
and  our  fortunes,  everything  that  we  are  and 
everything  that  we  have  with  the  pride  of  those 
who  know  that  the  day  has  come  when  America 
is  privileged  to  spend  her  blood  and  her  might 
for  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth  and  hap- 
piness and  the  peace  which  she  has  treasured. 

"God  helping  her,  she  can  do  no  other." 

America  could,  indeed,  do  no  other.  She 
girded  herself  for  the  task. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  TASK 

OUCH  a  task !  To  accomplish  it  demanded 
^  the  co-ordination  of  all  the  energies  and  all 
the  industries  in  the  country.  Our  enemy  was 
3,000  miles  away,  over  a  sea  infested  by  his 
merciless  submarines.  He  had  overrun  nearly 
all  of  Belgium  and  a  goodly  part  of  northern 
France,  and  stood  intrenched  from  the  English 
Channel  to  *He  Swiss  border;  he  had  conquered 
Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  half  of  Rumania.  In 
the  east  Russia  still  held,  but  only  feebly.  On 
March  3  the  Czar  had  abdicated,  and  when  we 
became  Russia's  ally  she  was  in  control  of  a 
government  too  unstable  to  be  relied  on,  how- 
ever good  its  intentions.  Russia's  military  as- 
sistance had  become  even  then  almost  nil.  Our 
allies,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy,  were 
worn  by  more  than  two  years  of  the  cruellest 
war  in  history.  To  us  they  looked  for  food  to 
fill  their  depleted  larders,  for  raw  materials  and 
fuel  for  their  munition  factories,  for  finished 

19 


20  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

munitions  for  their  armies,  and  for  soldiers  to 
fight  with  those  armies  and  help  them  drive  the 
Germans  over  the  Rhine.  To  transport  the 
food,  materials,  and  men,  the  sea  had  to  be 
made  safe  and  ships  found.  The  food  had  to 
be  raised,  the  fuel  and  metals  mined,  the  armies 
drilled  and  equipped. 

Fortunately,  we  came  to  the  task  a  united 
people,  more  than  100,000,000  strong,  possess- 
ing the  richest  country  in  the  world.  It  has 
been  argued  in  some  quarters  that  had  our 
government  not  shown  such  patience  in  its  in- 
tricate dealings  with  Germany,  but  had  brought 
us  earlier  into  the  conflict,  it  would  have  found 
a  people  less  united  on  war,  and  in  their  purpose 
to  carry  that  war  to  a  victorious  end.  It  has 
been  contended  that  the  calm  which  the  Presi- 
dent preserved  in  his  two  years  of  difficult  ne~ 
gotiations  with  Germany,  his  efforts  to  secure 
peace,  even  "without  victory,"  his  admirable 
speeches,  and  his  strong  notes  to  the  German 
Government  served  a  purpose  to  prepare  us  for 
war  and  to  reconcile  us  to  it.  Undoubtedly 
they  did.  What  would  have  happened  had  we 
been  less  patient  and  long-suffering,  had  we 


THE  TASK  21 

supported  our  protests  against  German  barbar- 
ism with  a  great  preparation  for  military  move- 
ment, is  a  matter  on  which  opinions  differ.  War 
might  have  been  avoided — that  is  a  pure  sur- 
mise. Had  we  intervened  earlier  the  war 
would  be  over  to-day — that  is  another  pure 
surmise.  We  do  know  that  when  the  war 
came  to  them  the  American  people,  unprepared 
though  they  were,  accepted  it  with  a  surprising 
unanimity  of  purpose  to  cany  it  through. 

We  had  been  told  that  there  lay  a  possibility 
of  trouble  among  our  millions  of  citizens  of 
German  birth  and  descent,  and  the  aliens  in 
our  country.  The  great  number  of  them  have 
proved  absolutely  loyal.  It  is  true  that  in 
some  localities  largely  settled  by  these  people 
there  were  made  feeble  attempts  at  protest  and 
obstruction,  but  these  were  quickly  conquered 
by  the  general  outburst  of  patriotism.  Those 
at  heart  disloyal  were  quick  to  realize  their 
danger  and  to  shape  their  conduct  so  as  to  keep 
themselves  within  the  law.  Against  the  really 
dangerous  aliens  and  disloyal  citizens  the  gov- 
ernment was  quick  to  act,  and  within  twenty- 
four  hours  after  war  was  declared  thousands  of 


22  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

them  were  safe  behind  the  bars.  The  prompt 
and  effective  work  of  the  Secret  Service,  sup- 
ported by  local  police,  prevented  outbreaks  of 
any  kind.  The  hopes  and  plans  of  Germany 
for  wide-spread  disorders  blocking  our  prepara- 
tion for  hostilities  were  blasted,  and  to-day  it  is 
a  common  thing  to  see  in  German  newspapers 
bitter  comment  on  what  they  deem  the  supine 
attitude  of  the  Germans  in  America — traitors 
to  the  Fatherland.  If  there  were  dangerous 
efforts  at  obstruction  anywhere,  they  were  in 
Congress,  made  by  a  few  short-sighted  pacifists, 
who  could  not  see  that  America  had  to  fight  if 
she  was  to  keep  her  liberty,  and  by  timid  poli- 
ticians who  pandered  to  the  pro-German  senti- 
ments of  their  constituents.  Even  these  trimmed 
their  sails  when  they  found  how  the  wind  blew. 
The  administration  realized  the  danger,  and 
once  the  die  was  cast  set  itself  with  all  vigor  to 
meet  it.  For  the  fight  we  had  ready  a  navy  in 
weight  of  gun-power  rated  then  third  in  the 
world,  and  manned  by  a  personnel  than  which 
there  is  none  better.  But  in  a  military  force 
with  which  to  engage  effectively  in  so  great  a 
conflict  we  were  woefully  lacking.  Our  regular 


THE  TASK  23 

army  on  April  1,  1917,  consisted  of  5,791  offi- 
cers and  121,797  men;  the  National  Guard 
available  for  federal  service  numbered  3,733 
officers  and  76,713  enlisted  men,  and  there  were 
in  the  army  reserve  approximately  4,000  en- 
listed men.  This  made  a  total  armed  force  of 
approximately  212,000,  a  number  utterly  in- 
adequate for  the  conflict  ahead. 

The  problem  faced  by  the  country  was  a 
mighty  one.  Briefly  stated,  these  were  its 
main  elements: 

To  strengthen  our  navy,  that  it  could  meet 
and  whip  unaided  the  navy  of  Germany. 

To  raise  an  army  of  at  least  5,000,000  men, 
well  trained  and  equipped. 

To  bridge  the  sea  with  ships  that  we  might 
transport  these  men  to  the  battle-front  and 
maintain  a  steady  flow  of  food  and  munitions 
for  our  own  and  our  allies'  use. 

To  stimulate  the  production  of  food  and 
munitions,  that  we  might  fill  the  shortage  in 
our  allies'  lands. 

To  raise  by  taxation  and  loans  more  money 
than  had  been  spent  by  our  government  since 
the  beginning  of  its  history. 


24  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

Time  pressed.  The  collapse  of  all  orderly 
government  in  Russia  meant  a  threat  of  in- 
creased German  armies  on  the  western  front. 
Our  allies  were  calling  to  us  for  food,  money, 
men,  and  munitions.  Fortunately  for  us,  their 
armies  held  the  enemy  rigidly,  while  we  pre- 
pared to  send  them  succor  in  an  ever-increasing 
flow. 

In  a  military  way  we  had  one  great  asset,  our 
munition-factories.  During  the  years  of  our 
neutrality,  answering  the  demands  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Italy,  private  en- 
terprise had  developed  on  an  enormous  scale 
plants  for  the  manufacture  of  guns  of  all  sizes, 
shells,  and  high  explosives — everything,  in  fact, 
needed  for  the  equipment  of  an  army.  These 
were  at  our  government's  disposal,  and  those 
who  manned  them,  from  manager  and  engineer 
to  the  workmen  at  the  lathe  and  forge,  became 
a  part  of  our  great  patriotic  army  of  defense. 
Then,  too,  we  had  wisely,  by  government  and 
private  enterprise,  laid  the  foundations  of  a 
great  merchant  marine. 

Every  element  in  the  problem  was  vital  to  its 
solution — army,  navy,  food,  transport,  and  fi- 


THE  TASK  25 

nance — but  when  we  found  ourselves  at  war  the 
most  immediately  pressing  question  was  that 
of  shipping.  Manifestly  it  was  impossible  for 
us  to  conduct  a  war  overseas  if  we  did  not  have 
the  vessels  in  which  to  transport  the  soldiers 
and,  moreover,  our  allies  were  sorely  beset  by 
the  ravages  of  the  enemy  submarines,  and  were 
in  grave  danger  from  lack  of  food,  fuel,  and 
metal.  The  Germans'  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare  was  working  havoc  with  the  world's 
merchant  marine,  and  at  the  moment  when 
America  became  a  belligerent,  German  piracy 
was  on  the  high  wave  of  success.  Ships  were 
being  sunk  at  the  average  rate  of  more  than 
600,000  gross  tons  a  month.  In  the  month  of 
April,  alone,  893,877  gross  tons  of  the  world's 
merchant  fleet  were  sent  to  the  bottom.  There 
were  but  two  ways  to  overcome  this  menace:  to 
conquer  the  submarines  and  to  build  ships. 
The  first  warlike  act  of  our  government  was  to 
send  our  navy  to  help  our  allies  combat  the 
pirates  of  the  underseas. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM 

IN  discussions  of  the  shipping  problem  much 
misunderstanding  often  results  from  a  con- 
fusion of  the  terms  of  ship  register.  The  ton- 
register  of  a  ship,  used  by  all  maritime  nations, 
is  100  cubic  feet.  The  gross  tonnage  of  a  ves- 
sel is  the  sum  in  cubic  feet  of  all  its  enclosed 
spaces  divided  by  100. 

The  net  tonnage  is  the  gross  tonnage  less  cer- 
tain deductions  on  account  of  crew  quarters, 
engine-room,  water-ballast,  and  other  spaces  not 
used  for  passengers  and  cargo. 

The  dead-weight  tonnage,  or  carrying  capac- 
ity, is  the  number  of  long  tons  (2,240  pounds)  of 
cargo  and  bunker-coal  that  the  vessel  is  capable 
of  carrying  when  loaded  to  the  load  water-line. 

Displacement  tonnage  is  the  number  of  tons 
of  sea-water  displaced  by  the  vessel  when 
charged  to  the  load  water-line. 

The  dead-weight  tonnage  of  a  vessel  can  be 
obtained  by  multiplying  the  gross  tonnage  by  1.6. 

26 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  27 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  in  1914,  accord- 
ing to  the  best  available  figures,  there  were  in 
the  world  45,403,877  gross  tons  of  steam -ves- 
sels and  3,685,675  net  tons  of  sailing  vessels. 
Figuring  gross  for  steam  and  net  for  sail,  this 
gave  a  total  tonnage  of  49,089,552.  Of  the 
steam-vessels,  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  owned 
23,638,966  gross  tons,  and  of  the  sailing,  1,131,- 
463  net  tons,  a  total  of  24,770,429.  At  the 
same  date  the  United  States  had  on  the  seas, 
the  Great  Lakes,  and  in  the  Philippines  steam- 
ers of  a  gross  tonnage  of  4,330,078,  and  sailing 
ships  of  a  net  tonnage  of  1,038,116,  a  total  of 
5,368,194.  Of  this  American  tonnage  but  a 
small  part  was  fit  for  foreign  trade. 

It  must  be  remembered,  also,  that  of  the 
world  tonnage  not  a  little  part  consisted  of 
small  vessels  unfitted  for  overseas  carrying,  and 
in  reckoning  the  vessels  available  for  the  mer- 
chant service  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the 
tonnage  of  Germany  and  her  allies  must  be  sub- 
tracted, for  the  greatest  number  of  these  ves- 
sels had  found  refuge  in  home  and  neutral  har- 
bors. 

The  British  Isles  in  peace-times  depend  on 


28  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

the  world  for  more  than  one-half  of  their  food, 
and  this  has  to  be  carried  to  them  by  the  seas. 
Great  Britain  is,  in  fact,  dependent  on  her 
shipping  for  her  life.  When  millions  of  her  men 
had  to  be  taken  from  her  farms,  her  factories, 
and  her  mines  to  fight  her  battles,  this  condi- 
tion was  intensified.  She  had  to  import  from 
every  quarter  of  the  world  vast  quantities  of 
materials,  both  raw  and  manufactured,  to  be 
used  in  her  defense  against  the  Hun.  Increas- 
ing the  strain  on  her  shipping,  she  had  to  trans- 
port large  armies  to  the  battle-fronts  in  France, 
in  Mesopotamia,  the  Balkans,  and  South  Africa. 
France  was  in  like  case.  She  was  not  as  de- 
pendent as  Great  Britain  on  the  outside  world 
for  food,  but  the  greater  part  of  her  coal  and 
iron  deposits  were  lost  to  her  in  the  first  rush  of 
the  Germans,  and  these  losses  had  to  be  re- 
placed from  overseas.  Italy's  entrance  into  the 
war  in  1915,  while  it  added  valiant  armies  to 
the  cause  of  the  Allies,  put  another  burden  on 
the  world's  carriers,  for  Italy  has  within  her 
borders  practically  none  of  the  raw  materials 
needed  for  the  prosecution  of  so  great  a  con- 
ilict.  Germany  was  quick  to  see  this  weak 
spot  in  her  enemies'  armor.  If  she  could  drive 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM 


theirs  and  neutral  merchantmen  from  the  seas, 
she  would  stop  the  flow  of  food  and  munitions 
into  their  countries,  and  quickly  bring  them  ta 
a  disastrous  peace.  It  was  for  this  that  she 
began  her  lawless  submarine  warfare,  and  risked 
the  hostility  of  America.  She  underestimated 
the  courage  of  America.  She  underestimated 
the  power  of  America.  Granted  that  America 
would  fight,  how  was  she  to  bridge  those  3,000 
miles  of  sea  ?  So  laughing  at  America's  protests 
against  her  barbarity,  Germany's  submarines 
began  the  destruction  not  only  of  her  enemy's 
shipping  but  of  the  shipping  of  the  neutral 
world. 

The  damage  done  to  the  world's  shipping 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  end  of 
1917  is  shown  in  the  following  table,  issued  by 
the  British  Government: 


BRITISH 

FOREIGN 

WORLD 

Losses,   in   gross  tons,   through 
enemy  action  and  marine  risks. 

7,097,492 

4,730,080 

11,827,572 

Gains  —  new  construction  

3,031,555 

3,574,72® 

6,606,275 

Enemy  tonnage  captured  

780,000 

1,809,000 

2,589,000 

Total  

3,811,555 

5.383,720 

9,195,275 

Net  loss  to  the  world  

2,632,297 

30  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

The  losses  in  the  first  quarter  of  1918  were 
1,123,310  tons.  Did  they  continue  at  that  rate 
the  yearly  loss  would  be  more  than  4,000,000 
tons. 

For  the  whole  period  the  figures  might  not 
seem  so  startling,  but  the  full  menace  is  clearer 
when  we  find  that  more  than  one-half  of  the 
sinkings  occurred  in  1917,  following  Germany's 
announcement  of  unrestricted  warfare.  By 
quarters  the  losses  in  that  year  were:  1,619,373; 
2,236,934;  1,494,473;  1,272,843.  It  is  seen  that 
the  apex  of  destruction  was  reached  about  the 
time  of  America's  entry  into  the  war. 

The  danger  was  great.  The  continued  loss 
of  more  than  5,000,000  tons  yearly,  if  not  offset, 
would  soon  separate  us  from  our  allies  and  leave 
them  in  dire  distress.  A  chart  issued  by  the 
British  Government  shows  graphically  how  the 
danger  has  been  met.  The  curve  showing  the 
world's  loss  of  ships  by  months  holds  fairly 
steady  until  the  third  quarter  of  1916,  when  it 
rises  with  startling  abruptness,  reaching  its 
highest  point  in  April,  1917,  in  which  month 
893,877  gross  tons  were  destroyed;  it  falls  away 
as  abruptly  to  December,  when  452,063  tons 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  31 

were  lost.  Struggling  after  it,  but  below  it,  is 
the  curve  showing  the  world's  output  of  new 
vessels.  At  the  close  of  the  last  year  there  was 
still  a  wide  gap  between  them.  But  America's 
new  shipyards  were  not  then  in  full  operation. 
They  are  to-day,  and  those  lines  will  cross,  to 
Germany's  discomfort. 

When  we  entered  the  war  there  were  under 
the  American  flag  hardly  2,000,000  gross  tons 
of  merchant  shipping  available  for  the  heavy 
overseas  work  required.  Nearly  all  of  this  was 
employed  in  the  Great  Lakes  and  coastwise 
trade.  We  had  to  send  great  armies  to  Europe. 
It  is  estimated  that  to  move  one  soldier  to  France 
and  to  keep  him  supplied  with  food  and  equip- 
ment requires  a  carrying  capacity  of  five  dead- 
weight tons  constantly  on  the  sea,  so  that  to 
transport  an  army  of  1,000,000  men  to  the 
battle-ground  and  keep  them  there  demanded 
a  carrying  capacity  of  5,000,000  dead-weight 
tons.  Little  wonder  that  the  Germans  made 
light  of  America  as  a  belligerent  and  predicted 
confidently  that  their  submarines  would  be 
able  to  keep  our  armies  at  home. 

When  it  became  evident  in  the  fall  of  1916 


32  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

that  because  of  the  demands  and  ravages  of  the 
war  there  was  threatened  a  dangerous  shortage 
of  merchant  vessels  for  even  our  ordinary 
peaceful  commerce,  our  government  acted  to 
overcome  the  difficulty.  On  September  17  the 
Federal  Shipping  Act  was  passed,  forming  the 
United  States  Shipping  Board,  with  two  func- 
tions— the  first,  in  time  of  peace  to  promote  the 
development  of  our  merchant  marine;  the  sec- 
ond, in  event  of  war,  to  meet  the  shipping  prob- 
lems that  might  arise.  To  carry  out  the  second 
task,  after  we  had  entered  the  war  the  Emer- 
gency Fleet  Corporation  was  organized  for  the 
purpose  of  constructing  the  needed  vessels. 
To-day  the  Fleet  Corporation  is  building  the 
vessels  and  the  Shipping  Board  is  operating 
them. 

The  early  history  of  the  Shipping  Board  is 
not  one  of  great  accomplishment.  Plans  were 
made  and  foundations  laid,  but  there  was  a 
great  deal  of  delay  in  the  pressing  work  caused 
by  disagreements  among  the  five  members. 
Valuable  time  was  wasted  in  controversies  over 
designs  for  the  ships,  and  the  frequent  changes 
in  the  personnel  of  the  board  by  resignations 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  33 

further  impeded  the  work.  Of  the  first  board 
the  chairman,  William  Denman,  a  San  Fran- 
cisco lawyer,  held  on  longest,  until  July,  1917. 
He  and  General  George  W.  Goethals,  of  Panama 
Canal  fame,  then  head  of  the  Fleet  Corporation, 
became  engaged  in  a  controversy  over  the  types 
of  ships  to  be  built  and  methods,  which  bid  fair 
to  delay  dangerously  the  whole  programme. 
President  Wilson  settled  the  matter  by  securing 
the  resignations  of  both  men.  General  Goethals 
was  subsequently  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
quartermaster's  department  of  the. army.  The 
early  experiences  of  the  board  made  it  plainly 
evident  that  if  its  great  work  was  to  be  carried 
on  successfully  it  must  have  at  its  head  an  able 
business  man  and  organizer.  One  of  the  cheer- 
ing things  about  the  conduct  of  the  war  has 
been  the  promptness  with  which  our  leaders  of 
industry  have  answered  the  government's  call 
to  service,  abandoned  all  other  pursuits  that 
the  country  might  have  the  benefit  of  their  ex- 
perience. In  this  case  the  President  sent  for 
Edward  N.  Hurley,  of  Illinois,  a  man  accus- 
tomed to  business  operations  on  a  large  scale, 
and  from  the  moment  he  took  charge  new  im- 


34  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

petus  was  given  to  the  work,  and  the  record  of 
the  board's  accomplishment  has  become  one  of 
the  marvels  of  industry. 

The  early  programme  .called  for  the  construc- 
tion of  vessels  of  an  aggregate  of  13,000,000 
dead -weight  tons.  This  meant  more  than  1,850 
passenger,  cargo,  refrigerator  ships  and  tank- 
ers of  between  five  and  twelve  thousand  tons. 
As  the  war  went  on  and  the  submarine  con- 
tinued its  ravages,  as  our  military  plans  were 
enlarged  and  it  was  seen  that  we  must  put 
immense  armies  in  the  field,  our  ship-building 
plan  had  to  be  greatly  increased  and  pushed 
with  a  vigor  well-nigh  superhuman.  To  con- 
duct this  operation  Charles  M.  Schwab,  the 
steel  manufacturer,  was  called  on,  and  under 
his  direction  as  head  of  the  Fleet  Corporation 
great  strides  have  been  made  in  the  construc- 
tion work. 

When  in  1916  the  Shipping  Board  began  its 
work,  there  were  in  the  United  States  only  37 
steel  shipyards,  with  162  ways,  and  these  were 
running  at  full  capacity,  70  per  cent  of  their 
work  being  on  naval  vessels.  We  had  24  wooden 
shipyards,  with  73  ways,  but  these  were  almost 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  35 

defunct.  The  number  of  men  employed  in 
these  yards  was  45,000,  and  in  that  year  600,000 
dead-weight  tons  of  ships  were  built.  But  it 
was  estimated  that  now  6,000,000  tons  a  year 
was  the  minimum  we  must  have.  To  secure 
them  existing  yards  had  to  be  enlarged,  new 
yards  built,  expert  ship  architects  and  operating 
heads  obtained.  More  difficult  was  the  labor 
problem.  Ship  mechanics  were  scarce  and 
wooden  ship-building  was  almost  a  lost  art.  A 
great  labor  army  had  not  only  to  be  enlisted 
but  trained.  The  carrying  of  material  from  the 
source  to  the  water-front  involved  great  traffic 
difficulties.  But  the  work  is  being  done.  The 
United  States  has  to-day  the  greatest  ship- 
building machine  in  the  world.  In  1917  it  pro- 
duced 1,400,000  dead-weight  tons  of  shipping. 
It  is  expected  that  in  the  current  year  nearly 
5,000,000  tons  will  leave  the  ways.  Between 
January  1  and  August  24,  535  vessels,  totalling 
2,923,973  dead-weight  tons,  were  launched. 

By  July,  1918,  there  were  in  operation  158 
shipyards  on  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts  and 
the  Great  Lakes.  The  ways  numbered  more 
than  750,  of  which  398  were  for  steel,  332  for 


36 

wooden,  and  10  for  concrete  and  composite  ves- 
sels. The  men  employed  were  over  300,000. 
Day  after  day  the  ships  were  slipping  into  the 
water.  On  the  national  holiday  the  world 
heard  "the  big  splash,"  when  nearly  100  steel 
and  wooden  vessels,  adding  a  dead-weight  ton- 
nage of  474,464  to  our  merchant  fleet,  were 
launched  with  patriotic  demonstrations.  By 
this  date  we  had  increased  our  merchant  marine 
to  a  carrying  capacity  of  nearly  10,000,000  dead- 
weight tons.  Of  these  730,176  were  obtained 
by  the  seizure  of  interned  enemy  ships.  They 
had  been  damaged,  but  were  quickly  repaired 
and  placed  in  service. 

This  is  fine  evidence  of  American  ingenuity 
and  energy.  Such  a  record  could  only  be  ac- 
complished by  wise  direction  and  the  whole- 
hearted co-operation  of  every  man  engaged  in 
the  task.  Hundreds  of  business  men  and  en- 
gineers left  their  peace-time  occupations  to  help 
the  government  in  this  vital  work.  Thousands 
of  workmen  gave  up  accustomed  labor  in  famil- 
iar surroundings  and  travelled  far  to  learn  a 
new  trade  and  do  their  bit  in  the  war.  Most 
of  these  men  were  unskilled  and  had  to  be 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  37 

trained.  To  train  them  it  was  necessary  to 
have  competent  instructors,  and  these  were 
lacking,  so  schools  were  established  where 
skilled  mechanics  fitted  others  to  go  into  the 
yards  and  teach  ship -building.  To  secure  whole- 
souled  work  a  campaign  of  patriotic  appeal  has 
been  carried  on  and  every  man  engaged  made 
to  feel  that  his  is  a  vital  part  in  the  cause  of 
liberty. 

The  speed  in  construction  that  has  been  at- 
tained would  not  have  been  possible  under  the 
old  methods.  The  government  had  to  resort  to 
the  standardization  of  designs,  and,  as  it  is 
called,  to  fabrication.  Under  the  old  method 
nearly  every  part  of  the  ship  was  made  in  the 
yard.  The  frames  and  plates  were  cut,  bent, 
and  fitted.  Under  the  new  system  the  parts 
of  the  ship  may  be  made  at  a  dozen  widely  sep- 
arated places.  They  are  of  standard  sizes  and 
are  shipped  to  the  assembling-point,  the  yard, 
and  are  fitted  together  with  great  rapidity.  A 
completed  hull  will  be  launched;  it  is  hardly  in 
the  water  before  the  cranes  swing  over  the 
empty  ways,  and  in  fifteen  minutes  a  new  keel 
will  be  in  place.  Neither  time  nor  motion 


38  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

are  wasted  in  our  shipyards.  The  steel  col- 
lier Tuckahoe,  of  5,550  dead-weight  tons,  was 
launched  on  the  Delaware  on  May  4,  twenty- 
seven  days  after  her  keel  was  laid,  and  ten  days 
later  she  was  ready  for  sea.  This  record  was 
later  broken. 

This  great  programme  of  ship  fabrication  of 
necessity  put  a  strain  on  the  mills  of  the  coun- 
try. These  mills  were  already  overcrowded 
with  war  orders,  and  to  meet  the  new  demand 
were  obliged  to  enlarge  their  production  ca- 
pacity. Coincident  with  the  construction  of 
the  new  yards  arrangements  had  to  be  made  to 
secure  a  greatly  increased  output  of  turbines 
and  engines,  and  this  meant  the  making  of  the 
special  tools  of  all  kinds  required  in  the  engine- 
shops.  The  work  was  done.  There  was  an 
early  shortage  of  engines,  but  now  this  has  been 
overcome.  The  existing  steel-mills  could  not 
supply  the  plates  fast  enough,  and  three  new 
mills  had  to  be  built  to  make  up  the  shortage. 
The  programme  for  building  each  year  604 
wooden  ships  of  the  Ferris  type,  of  3,500  tons 
dead-weight,  was  delayed  four  months  by  the 
difficulty  of  securing  proper  lumber.  When  the 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  39 

board  found  it  had  to  rake  the  country  to  get 
the  large  timbers  required,  it  stopped  the  build- 
ing of  additional  wooden  ways  and  contented 
itself  with  a  more  modest  programme. 

A  few  years  ago,  before  the  exigencies  of  war 
came  upon  us,  the  building  of  the  Hog  Island 
assembling-yard  would  have  been  considered  of 
itself  a  big  undertaking.  On  the  swampy  banks 
of  the  Delaware,  below  Philadelphia,  there  was 
built  in  less  than  a  year  a  manufacturing  city. 
The  major  part  of  this  work  was  done  in  the 
hardest  winter  we  have  known  in  a  long  time, 
when  not  only  bitter  weather  but  a  railroad 
blockade  and  a  fuel  famine  were  hampering  in- 
dustry. The  land  had  to  be  drained,  roads 
built,  ways,  shops,  and  even  homes  constructed 
for  thousands  of  workmen.  What  was  done 
there  has  been  duplicated  in  many  other  places, 
and  so  great  has  been  the  success  of  the  work 
that  in  three  of  the  new  assembling-yards,  those 
at  Hog  Island,  and  Bristol  on  the  Delaware, 
and  on  Newark  Bay,  more  vessels  will  leave  the 
ways  in  one  year  than  all  the  English  yards 
have  ever  been  able  to  build  in  the  same  time, 
and  hitherto  England  has  been  the  greatest 


40  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

ship-building  country  in  the  world.  Mr.  Hurley 
estimates  that  between  April  6,  1917,  and 
June  1,  1918,  the  Shipping  Board  had  added  to 
the  shipping  under  its  control  nearly  4,500,000 
dead-weight  tons.  This  was  done  by  new 
construction,  by  the  seizure  of  enemy  vessels, 
by  the  requisitioning  of  86  Dutch  vessels,  and 
by  the  charter  of  215  vessels  from  neutral  coun- 
tries. The  quantity  production  of  ships  did 
not  begin  until  January  of  this  year,  and  since 
then  the  output  has  been  increasing  month  by 
month.  He  estimates,  further,  that  in  1919, 
with  751  ways  in  operation,  averaging  each  three 
vessels  of  6,000  tons  a  year,  we  should  turn 
out  in  that  year  fully  13,500,000  tons.  This 
rate  of  construction  would  give  us  by  the  end 
of  1920  the  largest  merchant  marine  in  the 
world.  To  man  this  great  fleet  the  Shipping 
Board  has  established  schools  for  officers  and 
seamen.  In  this  work  of  training  it  spends 
monthly  $250,000. 

There  is  a  race  between  the  submarine  and 
the  shipbuilder,  but  the  figures  show  how  the 
latter  is  winning.  In  the  first  six  months  of 
the  present  year  2,089,393  gross  tons  of  Allied 


THE  SHIPPING  PROBLEM  41 

and  neutral  shipping  were  sunk.  In  the  same 
period  America  and  Great  Britain  constructed 
ships  of  2,133,591  gross  tonnage.  There  was 
still  a  wide  margin  to  overcome.  But  the 
American  output  of  shipping  in  May  was  three 
times  that  of  January,  and  was  steadily  in- 
creasing. By  the  middle  of  July  vessels  were 
being  delivered  to  the  Shipping  Board  at  the 
rate  of  nearly  four  for  each  working-day,  a  daily 
output  of  20,461  dead-weight  tons,  or  12,788 
gross  tons.  Moreover,  the  increasing  efficiency 
of  the  naval  fight  against  the  submarine  was 
telling. 

By  the  gallantry  of  our  navy  and  the  navies 
of  our  allies,  and  by  the  energies  of  the  ship- 
builders of  America  and  Great  Britain  has  been 
overcome  the  lawless  and  murderous  submarine 
campaign  on  which  Germany  staked  her  hopes 
of  victory.  To-day  a  steady  line  of  vessels 
travels  the  sea  lane,  bearing  our  thousands  of 
soldiers  to  the  battle-front,  and  carrying  succor 
to  our  hard-pressed  allies. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  CANTONMENTS 

THE  second  "contemptible  little  army"  that 
Germany  had  to  face  was  the  American. 
The  first  was  the  British.  England,  not  having 
heeded  the  warnings  of  Lord  Roberts  and  other 
men  of  his  vision,  could  throw  into  France 
hardly  150,000  men  to  meet  the  first  onslaught 
of  the  Germans.  Having  shown  like  lack  of 
vision,  despite  the  pleas  of  men  like  Theodore 
Roosevelt  and  Leonard  Wood,  and  in  spite  of 
the  tragic  events  in  Europe,  it  took  us  two 
years  longer  to  see  the  German  menace,  and  we 
were  unprepared  to  meet  it.  So  coincident 
with  the  vast  work  of  bridging  the  sea,  we  had 
to  find  the  men  to  send  across,  to  train  them 
into  soldiers,  and  to  make  the  arms  with  which 
they  were  to  fight.  On  the  declaration  of  war 
we  had  a  regular  army  of  some  127,000  men 
fit  for  the  battle-front,  and  about  80,000  na- 
tional guardsmen,  patriotic  men  who  had  vol- 
unteered for  service,  but  were  only  partly 

42 


THE  CANTONMENTS  .       43 

trained.  The  government  had  to  act  quickly 
and  wisely.  It  did  so.  First,  recruiting  was 
stimulated  by  a  patriotic  campaign  to  bring 
the  Regular  Army  and  the  National  Guard  up 
to  the  then  authorized  war  strength  of  287,000 
and  450,000  respectively.  But  this  did  not 
give  us  the  force  needed.  The  selective-draft 
act  was  passed  and  enforced,  the  industry  of 
the  country  was  speeded  up  to  make  the  arms 
and  equipment.  Within  a  year  we  had  under 
arms  1,652,725  officers  and  men.  Within  seven- 
teen months  1,500,000  of  these  were  in  France 
and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  soldiers  were 
in  the  front  line  of  battle,  conducting  themselves 
with  a  gallantry  that  stirred  the  heart  of  every 
American.  By  then*  bravery,  their  alertness, 
and  resourcefulness  they  had  won  the  unstinted 
commendation  of  the  war-tried  soldiers  of 
France  and  Great  Britain. 

We  have  heard  much  of  delays  and  mistakes 
in  the  conduct  of  the  military  administration. 
Undoubtedly  they  have  occurred.  It  took  time 
to  get  the  right  men  in  control  of  the  machin- 
ery. The  airplane  programme  broke  down  la- 
mentably. The  ordnance  programme  was  un- 


44  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

duly  delayed.  At  one  time,  as  a  member  of 
the  administration  said  recently,  our  war  ma- 
chinery almost  ceased  to  function.  The  mis- 
takes were  rectified,  many  new  and  able  men 
were  called  in  to  aid  in  the  war  administration, 
and  by  the  middle  of  this  year  the  machinery 
was  working  with  fair  smoothness.  Airplanes 
and  guns  were  coming  from  the  factories  in 
quantities,  and  our  armed  men  were  going  over 
seas  in  a  steady  flow. 

Our  Navy  Department  has  done  its  work  so 
smoothly  since  the  war  began  that  there  has 
been  a  tendency  to  compare  its  operations  with 
that  of  our  Department  of  War.  One  is  apt  to 
forget  the  difference  in  the  problems  presented. 
The  navy  was  a  going  concern.  As  our  first 
line  of  defense  it  had  always  been  a  pet  of  Con- 
gress. When  the  conflict  came  its  expansion 
was  necessary,  but  in  nothing  like  the  degree 
that  was  required  for  our  neglected  army.  The 
War  Department  was  organized  to  care  for 
about  250,000  men.  Suddenly  the  work  of 
handling  at  least  fifteen  times  that  number  was 
thrown  upon  it.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  that 
we  had  hesitation  and  trying  delays. 


THE  CANTONMENTS  45 

It  was  early  seen  that  for  the  conflict  an 
army  of  at  least  3,000,000  men  would  be  needed. 
It  was  seen,  too,  that  the  difficulties  of  raising 
such  a  number  by  volunteers  would  be  great. 
We  had  the  experience  of  our  own  Civil  War 
and  the  more  recent  experience  of  England  to 
study.  England  came  to  the  draft  late  in  this 
war.  Our  government  wisely  accepted  that 
method  at  once.  Some  members  of  Congress 
did  balk  at  the  selective-service  law,  but  they 
did  not  succeed  in  delaying  its  passage  for  any 
time.  The  American  people,  said  the  pacifists, 
would  never  accept  the  principle  of  compulsory 
service.  Under  pressure  of  the  administration, 
however,  the  selective-service  law  was  passed 
in  a  surprisingly  short  time,  considering  its 
drastic  change  in  our  historic  policy,  and  on 
May  18  the  President  signed  it.  The  Ameri- 
can people  accepted  it  willingly.  They  saw  the 
injustice  of  allowing  one  fit  man  to  stay  at 
home  in  security  while  another  volunteered  to 
give  his  life  in  the  country's  cause. 

Here  we  had  the  beginning  of  our  great  Na- 
tional Army,  which  within  a  year  of  its  forma- 
tion was  conducting  itself  gallantly  on  the  bat- 


46  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

tie-fields  of  France.  Its  success  was  due  to  the 
wise  policy  of  the  administration  and  to  the 
energy  of  those  officers  of  our  Regular  Army 
on  whom  fell  the  heavy  task  of  organizing  and 
training  it.  Under  the  law  all  men  in  the  coun- 
try between  the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  thirty- 
one  years  had  to  register,  that  their  fitness  and 
liability  for  military  service  might  be  deter- 
mined. On  June  5  nearly  ten  million  were  en- 
rolled by  the  boards  which  had  been  organized 
all  over  the  country  to  conduct  the  draft.  The 
efforts  to  obstruct  the  work  were  few  and  con- 
temptible. Of  this  great  number  of  registrants 
the  boards  classified  2,428,447  in  Class  A,  com- 
prising those  who  could  be  placed  in  the  mili- 
tary service  with  the  least  disturbance  to  the 
industrial,  agricultural,  and  domestic  interests 
of  the  nation.  Every  man  was  numbered,  and 
the  order  of  his  call  to  service  settled  by  a  lot- 
tery drawn  in  Washington.  Before  December 
15  there  were  in  the  army  897,061  of  these  se- 
lected men,  including  delinquents  reported  as 
deserters. 

Class  A  received  an  increase  on  June  5,  1918, 
of  about  400,000  men,  who  had  come  of  age  in 


THE  CANTONMENTS  47 


the  course  of  the  year.  By  August  1, 
1,347,512  of  these  men  were  in  the  National 
Army.  General  E.  H.  Crowder,  the  provost 
marshal-general,  who  had  charge  of  the  conduct 
of  the  draft,  estimated  that  875,000  more  would 
be  called  to  service  before  the  end  of  the  year, 
and  that  there  were  available  in  the  first  class 
for  fighting  material  877,359  registrants.  This 
narrow  margin  of  hardly  more  than  2,000  indi- 
cated the  necessity  of  either  increasing  the 
draft  age  or  of  raking  the  other  classes  already 
registered  for  the  men  sure  to  be  needed. 
Congress,  therefore,  in  August  amended  the 
law  so  as  to  make  all  men  from  18  to  45  years 
of  age  liable  for  military  service. 

When  the  National  Army  was  first  planned 
we  had  at  hand  not  enough  officers  to  train  and 
command  it.  The  problem  of  obtaining  them 
was  difficult.  Quick  steps  had  to  be  taken  to 
have  them  ready  by  the  time  the  men  were 
assembled.  Fortunately,  there  had  been  held  in 
the  two  summers  preceding  the  war,  through 
the  enterprise  of  General  Wood  and  a  group  of 
army  officers  and  private  citizens,  a  small  series 
of  training-camps  from  which  could  be  obtained 


48  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

the  nucleus  of  the  great  corps  of  officers  needed. 
Now  sixteen  of  these  camps  were  organized  in 
different  parts  of  the  country,  and  a  three 
months'  course  of  intensive  training  given  to 
volunteers.  From  them  came  nearly  50,000 
young  men  who  had  qualified  for  commissions 
in  the  various  arms  of  the  service.  Thus  was 
the  personnel  of  our  new  military  force  provided 
for. 

Coincident  with  this  great  work  there  had  to 
be  accomplished  one  of  the  most  difficult  tasks 
that  had  ever  fallen  to  the  War  Department. 
No  places  were  ready  where  the  new  armies 
could  be  trained.  We  were  embarked  on  an 
enterprise  of  unknown  possibilities.  Not  a  mil- 
lion but  millions  of  soldiers  might  be  needed, 
and  this  meant  the  organization  of  huge  and 
permanent  military  schools.  We  had  provided 
the  method  and  the  machinery  for  getting  the 
men.  Now  we  had  to  prepare  the  means  of 
training  them.  The  General  Staff  of  the  army 
had  foreseen  that  such  a  contingency  might 
arise,  and  had  prepared  before  the  war  a  gen- 
eral scheme  to  meet  it.  They  had  designed  a 
standard  cantonment  capable  of  sheltering  what 


THE  CANTONMENTS  49 

was  then  an  army  division,  36,000  men.  The 
plan  was  very  simple.  On  it  the  buildings  for 
the  various  units  were  stretched  along  in  a 
straight  line,  regiment  after  regiment,  with  their 
barracks,  officers'  quarters,  hospitals,  and  sta- 
bles arranged  on  a  single  street,  so  designed  that 
it  could  be  cut  and  twisted  to  suit  the  confor- 
mation of  any  site.  The  War  Department 
needed  thirty -two  of  these  cantonments,  sixteen 
to  house  an  increased  National  Guard,  and  six- 
teen for  the  coming  National  Army.  Congress 
promptly  appropriated  the  money  asked,  some 
$79,000,000,  but  when  the  work  of  letting  the 
contracts  began,  it  was  found  that  so  greatly 
had  the  price  of  labor  and  material  increased 
since  the  plan  was  made,  there  were  not  suffi- 
cient funds.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  place 
the  sixteen  National  Guard  divisions  under 
canvas  in  the  South,  and  to  construct  the  more 
permanent  quarters  for  the  National  Army.  To 
build  sixteen  cities,  with  every  house  provided 
with  electric  light,  running  water,  and  heat,  in 
the  three  months  allotted,  was  a  task  to  strain 
any  organization.  In  this  case  it  fell  to  the 
construction  branch  of  the  quartermaster's  de- 


50  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

partment,  consisting  of  a  colonel,  two  captains, 
and  a  stenographer.  That  useful  body,  the 
Council  of  National  Defense  (of  which  I  shall 
speak  later),  was  turned  to  for  aid.  The  coun- 
cil formed  an  emergency  construction  commit- 
tee and  sent  a  call  for  men  skilled  in  town- 
planning,  for  engineers,  for  experts  in  water- 
supply  and  sewage-disposal,  landscape-archi- 
tects, and  builders.  The  best  in  the  country 
hurried  to  Washington  and  rendered  patriotic 
service.  Many  of  them  served  without  pay. 
Others  received  commissions  in  the  army.  All 
worked,  without  ceasing,  to  have  the  canton- 
ments ready  by  September  1,  and  with  few  ex- 
ceptions they  succeeded. 

After  the  work  was  authorized  the  choosing 
of  the  sites  took  time.  Consideration  had  to 
be  given  to  many  elements  of  the  problem. 
The  camps  had  to  be  located  near  large  centres 
of  population,  with  good  railroad  facilities  at 
hand;  the  ground  had  to  be  capable  of  proper 
drainage,  and  a  great  water-supply  available. 
In  every  case  at  least  2,000  acres  of  land  were 
needed  to  give  space  for  1,400  buildings,  ma- 
noeuvring-grounds,  and  rifle-ranges.  June  had 


THE  CANTONMENTS  51 

half  passed  before  the  last  site  had  been  settled 
on,  and  July  was  at  hand  when  the  last  contract 
for  construction  was  let.  There  was  no  time 
for  the  taking  of  competitive  bids.  The  work 
had  to  be  put  in  the  hands  of  the  great  contract- 
ing firms  who  had  the  machinery  to  handle  it, 
and  they  did  it  on  a  cost-plus-a-commission 
basis,  with  their  profit  being  limited  to  $250,000. 
This  method,  while  designed  to  save  the  gov- 
ernment money,  had  in  reality  quite  the  oppo- 
site effect,  for  the  contractors,  being  limited  in 
their  profit  and  being  called  on  for  the  highest 
possible  speed  in  construction,  had  little  reason 
for  economy  in  labor  or  material.  But  how- 
ever high  the  cost,  the  work  was  done,  and  on 
September  5  the  first  increments  of  the  new 
army  were  moving  into  the  soldier  towns. 

The  first  call  for  service  in  the  National  Army 
brought  687,000  men  to  the  colors.  Beginning 
in  September,  they  were  sent  to  the  cantonments 
in  successive  increments.  They  found  waiting 
there  officers  to  train  them,  and  for  many  a  life 
of  more  comfort,  health,  and  interest  than  they 
had  ever  known.  Then  began  the  work  of  our 
greatest  schools  of  Americanism  and  democ- 


52  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

racy.  Rich  man  and  poor  man,  business  man, 
laborer,  farmer,  and  mechanic  bunked  side  by 
side,  ate  the  same  food,  wore  the  same  uniform, 
and  performed  the  same  duties.  In  six  months 
they  were  welded  into  a  patriotic  and  efficient 
army.  No  praise  is  too  high  for  the  officers 
who  led  in  this  great  task  or  for  the  men  who 
seconded  them  by  their  readiness  to  learn  and 
to  serve.  Most  of  these  men  had  known  noth- 
ing of  military  life;  thousands  of  them  nothing 
of  the  healthy  life  of  out-of-doors;  there  were 
among  them  men  who  were  discontented  with 
the  fate  that  had  fallen  to  them,  but  even  of 
these  the  greater  part  soon  found  contentment 
in  the  new  environment;  before  the  winter  of 
training  was  over  the  shirkers  were  few  in  num- 
ber. 

We  in  New  York  saw  the  procession  of  our 
selective-draft  men  march  up  Fifth  Avenue  on 
the  eve  of  their  departure  for  Camp  Upton. 
Men  from  the  banks  and  offices,  men  from  the 
stores  and  shops,  moved  along  in  straggling 
lines,  and  out  of  step,  cheerful  and  cheering, 
and  yet  a  motley  body.  Of  many  of  them  pale 
stooping  shoulders,  and  shuffling  gait 


THE  CANTONMENTS  53 

told  the  story  of  sedentary  living.  They  looked 
as  though  but  little  hardship  would  break  them. 
They  did  not  seem  the  stuff  of  which  soldiers 
could  be  made.  Six  months  later  we  saw  them 
march  again  on  Fifth  Avenue  on  a  bitter  day. 
A  miracle  seemed  to  have  been  worked.  Brown 
and  hard,  clean-limbed,  they  swung  along,  bod- 
ies erect,  heads  up,  in  perfect  step  and  align- 
ment. You  were  conscious  of  their  pride  in 
their  uniform,  in  the  task  they  had  accom- 
plished, and  of  their  part  in  the  greater  task 
that  lay  ahead  of  them.  To-day  they  are  over- 
seas and  many  of  them  have  paid  the  great 
price  that  must  be  paid  if  men  are  to  be 
free. 

The  material  with  which  the  War  Department 
had  to  work  in  forming  the  first  divisions  of  the 
National  Army  was  very  raw,  and  it  came  not 
in  driblets  through  recruiting-stations,  so  that 
it  could  be  readily  absorbed  in  trained  units, 
but  it  came  in  mass.  Besides,  there  was  the 
widest  possible  divergence  in  the  character  of 
the  men.  Every  nationality  was  represented, 
even  to  Turks  and  Chinese.  Of  the  whole 
fully  10  per  cent  could  not  speak  English,  and 


54 

in  every  cantonment  there  were  at  least  a  thou- 
sand who  could  not  read  or  write.  The  can- 
tonment became  not  only  a  camp  but  a  school. 
For  the  foreign-born,  classes  in  English  were 
formed,  and  for  the  illiterate,  classes  in  elemen- 
tary studies.  Schools,  too,  were  established  to 
fit  the  more  intelligent  for  different  services  in 
which  they  were  needed.  There  are  a  great 
number  of  these  services.  The  commander  of 
one  of  the  camps  had  a  list  of  nearly  one  thou- 
sand occupations  for  which  specialists  were 
wanted  for  the  army.  It  included  dog-trainers. 
Our  National  Army  has  been  a  success  be- 
cause neither  energy  nor  money  has  been  spared 
in  the  care  for  the  men  in  their  early  service. 
The  quarters  are  comfortable,  electric-lighted, 
and  screened  in  summer,  and  in  winter  well 
heated.  Every  man  has  his  own  cot,  and  is 
amply  provided  with  blankets  and  clothing. 
The  food  is  wholesome  and  plentiful,  and  the 
active  Me  in  the  open  air  gives  a  zest  to  the 
appetite.  The  health  and  morals  of  the  men 
have  been  safeguarded  in  a  degree  never  before 
known  in  our  military  history.  Liquor  is  taboo. 
When  you  watch  a  company  of  these  soldiers  in 


THE  CANTONMENTS  55 

the  crisp  air  of  the  early  morning,  swinging  in 
rhythmic  unison  through  the  physical  drills, 
you  do  not  wonder  at  the  erect  and  sturdy 
figures  in  khaki  to  be  seen  by  the  hundreds  in 
our  streets  in  these  war-times. 

The  life  of  the  soldier  is  not  all  work.  From 
reveille  to  retreat  there  is  a  pretty  steady  round 
of  drill  and  police  duty,  but  let  there  be  but  a 
few  minutes  to  spare  and  the  grounds  are  alive 
with  athletic  games.  At  times  you  might  think 
a  cantonment  just  a  great  school  for  baseball, 
football,  or  basket-ball.  In  the  evening,  for  re- 
laxation, there  are  the  theatre,  the  moving- 
picture  show,  the  library,  and  the  huts  of  the 
Y.  M.  C.  A.  and  Knights  of  Columbus,  with 
their  variety  of  entertainment. 

One  afternoon  last  spring  I  watched  a  party 
of  some  two  thousand  recruits  arrive  at  Camp 
Upton.  When  the  long  train  had  stopped  they 
assembled  quickly  on  the  platform  of  the  sta- 
tion, the  men  from  each  local  board  under  the 
charge  of  an  officer.  They  were  from  the  fac- 
tory towns  and  farms  of  New  England  and  by 
their  appearance  represented  varying  degrees  of 
worldly  prosperity.  There  were  bent  little  fel- 


56  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

lows  who  had  just  come  from  the  looms  of  Fall 
River,  and  tall,  raw-boned  youths  who  had  left 
their  ploughs  and  hoes  among  the  stony  hills. 
Most  of  them  were  cheery,  facing  the  new  ad- 
venture with  good-will,  and  they  started  toward 
the  camp  in  a  ragged  formation,  with  much 
shouting  and  waving  of  flags.  A  few  of  the 
faces  were  gloomy,  filled  with  apprehension  of 
the  days  ahead.  One  could  not  wonder,  for  it 
is  no  light  thing  to  leave  your  home  and  occu- 
pation for  the  hardships  of  the  camp  and  the 
danger  of  the  field.  But  a  company  of  fresh- 
men just  arriving  at  college  would  have  shown 
a  like  proportion  of  set  and  solemn  faces.  Some 
of  the  men  had  little  bags  containing  precious 
possessions,  which  they  hoped  Uncle  Sam  would 
allow  them  to  take  to  France;  others  portman- 
teaus with  which  they  could  have  travelled 
around  the  world;  others  had  nothing  in  their 
hands  and  wore  neither  hats  nor  coats;  they 
were  stripped  for  action  and  trusted  the  gov- 
ernment to  give  them  all  they  needed.  The 
procession  straggled  across  the  plain  and  down 
one  of  the  long  cantonment  streets.  From  every 
barrack -window  came  a  volley  of  good-natured 


THE  CANTONMENTS  57 

gibes:  "Hey,  Sam,  you  won't  look  so  chipper 
when  you  get  the  needle!"  "Say,  Alonzo,  why 
don't  you  call  your  vally  to  carry  your  kit?" 
"Oh,  nurse,  nurse,  come  quick;  there's  Jimmy 
running  away  to  war  with  ma's  knitting-bag." 
The  men  in  khaki  had  forgotten  that  not  so 
long  since  they  had  shuffled  down  this  same 
street  in  this  same  way. 

The  motley  procession  crossed  a  parade- 
ground  and  there  divided,  the  improvised  com- 
panies being  led  off  to  their  quarters.  It  was 
the  time  for  retreat*,  and  as  the  rookies  squatted 
on  the  ground  before  their  barracks,  resting 
tired  limbs,  the  band  on  the  parade-ground 
sounded  the  first  notes  of  "The  Star-Spangled 
Banner."  Instantly  the  life  of  the  camp 
stopped.  Every  moving  figure  in  khaki  halted 
and  stood  at  attention,  facing  the  headquarters 
on  the  hilltop  a  mile  away,  where  the  flag  flew 
from  its  tall  mast. 

From  every  side  came  shouts:  "Stand  up, 
you  men,  face  toward  the  flag — hats  off!" 

They  got  to  their  feet  with  expressions  of 
wonderment  on  their  faces  and  stood  bare- 
headed until  the  last  notes  of  the  national  an- 


58  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

them  died  away  and  the  flag  fluttered  down. 
It  was  their  first  lesson  in  army  life. 

A  few  days  later  I  saw  these  same  men. 
They  were  in  uniform  and  every  man  of  them 
was  shaved  and  scrubbed.  Under  the  orders  of 
a  martinet  of  a  "non-com"  they  were  keeping 
good  step  and  executing  squads  right  and 
squads  left  with  fair  precision. 

Great  melting-pots — so  our  cantonments  have 
been  justly  called.  In  them  thousands  of  our 
foreign-born  have  become  true  Americans. 
They  have  learned  the  language  of  America 
and  the  ideals  of  America  and  have  turned  will- 
ing soldiers  in  her  cause.  That  this  is  true  is 
shown  by  the  great  number  of  foreign-born  men 
who  were  called  to  the  army  under  the  selective- 
service  law,  and  have  since  become  naturalized 
as  citizens.  By  act  of  Congress  this  process 
was  rightly  made  easy  for  them.  In  one  after- 
noon at  Camp  Upton  I  saw  300  men  forswear 
old-time  allegiances  and  become  citizens  of  the 
,  United  States.  Among  them  were  men  of  every 
nationality.  There  were  Russians  and  Poles, 
Danes  and  Swedes,  citizens  of  the  British  Em- 
pire and  the  French  Republic.  Among  them 


THE  CANTONMENTS  59 

there  were  a  score  of  Germans  and  Austro- 
Hungarians.  Again,  in  our  cantonments  class 
feeling  has  been  swept  aside,  for  the  selective- 
service  law  showed  no  favoritism.  Its  provi- 
sions called  to  service  rich  and  poor  alike,  and 
so  they  have  come  to  understand  one  another 
better.  The  only  class  distinction  known  in 
the  new  army  comes  through  intelligence  and 
merit.  The  men  called  as  privates  have  their 
opportunity  to  win  commissions.  Training- 
schools  have  been  established  for  them  and 
many  have  proved  themselves  worthy  to  wear 
the  officers'  insignia. 

These  cantonments  have  given  their  lesson 
not  only  to  those  who  have  served  in  them  but 
to  the  whole  country.  The  bugaboo  of  mili- 
tarism has  been  laid  low.  We  are  not  willing  to 
accept  the  German  brand  of  militarism  that 
makes  for  conquest  and  Kultur.  But  a  milita- 
rism that  strengthens  the  country's  uanhood 
and  trains  and  fits  it  to  defend  its  hones  and 
fight  for  justice  has  proved  its  worth.  Every 
community  over  the  land  has  seen  its  young 
men  called  to  service  by  the  law.  Many  of 
them  answered  with  reluctance  and  with  rebel- 


60  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

lion  in  their  hearts.  The  same  communities  have 
seen  those  men  months  later,  upstanding  in 
their  uniforms,  improved  in  physical  and  men- 
tal vigor  and  imbued  with  a  new  sense  of  pa- 
triotism and  desire  for  service.  They  have  seen 
what  our  kind  of  militarism  has  done  for  our 
men.  America  has  been  caught  once  unpre- 
pared to  fight.  She  will  not  be  so  again.  One 
feels  confident  that  when  peace  comes  there  will 
be  a  wide-spread  demand  that  the  work  of  our 
cantonments  be  continued  and  that  we  do  not 
abandon  these  great  schools  for  the  discipline 
and  improvement  of  our  manhood. 

Only  by  a  visit  to  one  of  the  cantonments 
can  a  conception  be  had  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  work  which  the  government  has  done  and 
is  doing.  They  are  all  cut  to  the  same  pattern, 
generally  being  laid  out  in  a  great  U.  An  ex- 
ample of  the  best  of  them  is  Camp  Dix  at 
Wrightstown,  New  Jersey.  Going  by  train 
through  a  quiet  farming  country,  you  pass  into 
a  deep  railroad  cut,  and  when  you  emerge  from 
it  you  have  suddenly  before  your  eyes  a  great, 
busy  city.  You  enter  it  by  a  wide,  clean  road. 


THE  CANTONMENTS  61 

At  one  hand  you  see  the  great  "hostess  house," 
managed  by  patriotic  women  for  the  entertain- 
ment of  the  soldiers'  visitors.  Beyond  that, 
stretching  for  a  long  mile  on  either  hand,  are 
the  barracks  of  the  men,  set  in  broad,  open 
spaces.  The  striking  note  is  the  absolute  clean- 
liness— not  a  scrap  of  paper,  not  a  bit  of  rub- 
bish to  be  seen  anywhere.  The  traffic  on  the 
road  is  heavy.  There  is  a  constant  movement 
of  wagons  and  motors,  but  it  is  carefully  regu- 
lated by  the  military  police  at  the  crossings. 
From  headquarters  hill,  in  the  camp's  centre, 
you  see  the  whole  place  under  your  eyes,  a 
great  U  of  buildings,  two  miles  in  depth,  en- 
closing the  broad  drill-grounds.  There  is  life 
everywhere.  The  drill-grounds  are  alive  with 
men.  Here  a  company  working  at  the  manual 
of  arms;  here  one  swinging  through  the  physical 
drill;  here  an  awkward  squad,  not  yet  in  uni- 
form, learning  the  rudiments  of  marching. 

The  routine  of  the  enlistment  is  rather  com- 
plicated. First  we  go  to  the  big  hall  where  the 
recruits  are  received  on  their  arrival.  Here 
the  records  of  the  local  draft  boards  are  checked 
up  and  the  men  accounted  for.  Then  they  have 


62  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

their  physical  examination.  A  small  percentage 
are  rejected  as  unfit.  A  large  percentage  are 
found  to  have  remediable  defects,  and  provision 
is  made  for  their  treatment.  Fully  2  per  cent, 
we  were  told,  have  the  unpleasant  but  much- 
needed  experience  of  being  fumigated,  and  all 
have  a  good  bath.  Thence  the  recruit  goes 
to  the  personnel-office,  where  hundreds  of  soldier- 
clerks  are  at  work  at  long  desks.  The  journey 
from  end  to  end  takes  a  half -hour.  Multiple  rec- 
ords are  made  out  for  the  War  Department, 
the  camp-office,  and  the  company  commander. 
These  records  give  a  condensed  history  of  the 
recruit,  show  his  marks  of  identification  and 
his  qualifications  for  special  duties.  When  they 
have  been  completed,  he  makes  his  allotments 
of  pay  and  files  his  application  for  government 

insurance.     He  leaves  the  building  a  member 

I 

of  the  army  and  gets  his  uniform. 

While  we  were  watching  this  process,  scores  of 
men  moving  from  clerk  to  clerk  down  the  long 
line,  our  guide,  an  upstanding  young  soldier, 
informed  the  captain  in  charge  that  one  recruit 
that  day  had  refused  to  sign  any  papers.  To 
our  inquiry  as  to  what  would  be  done  in  such  a 


THE   CANTONMENTS  63 

case  the  soldier  said:  "He'll  go  to  the  guard- 
house. One  of  the  officers  will  give  him  a 
pleasant  talking  to,  reason  with  him,  and  the 
chances  are  he  will  come  around  to-morrow — 
most  of  them  do.  And  when  they  do  they  get 
to  like  the  life — it's  a  fine  life." 


CHAPTER  V 
MILITARY  PREPARATION 

ENG  before  the  first  increments  of  our 
National  Army  were  called  to  the  colors, 
our  soldiers  were  pouring  into  France.  Within 
three  weeks  after  we  declared  war,  missions 
from  France  and  England,  headed  by  General 
Joffre  and  Mr.  Balfour,  were  in  our  country. 
The  first  thing  they  asked  for  was  men,  if  only 
a  division,  to  strengthen  the  morale  of  the 
Allied  armies  by  the  visible  evidence  that  armed 
America  was  coming  to  their  aid.  This  request 
was  promptly  granted,  and  on  June  26  a  divi- 
sion of  our  Regular  Army  landed  in  France.  We 
had  available  for  active  service  when  war  came 
only  our  Regular  Army  of  127,588  officers  and 
men.  In  physique  and  morale,  there  was  no 
finer  body  in  the  world,  but  their  number  was 
inadequate  to  make  an  impression  on  the  battle- 
front.  Under  the  national-defense  act  the  gov- 
ernment had  power  to  call  into  service  the 
National  Guards  of  the  various  States,  number- 

64 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  65 

ing  then  about  80,000  officers  and  men.  The 
personnel  of  these  troops  was  fine,  all  the  men 
being  volunteers,  but  they  were  neither  hard- 
ened nor  well  trained.  A  part  of  them  had 
seen  service  in  the  previous  year  on  the  Mexi- 
can border,  but  the  work  for  which  they  were 
now  needed  was  of  a  different  character.  By 
recruiting,  the  Regular  Army  was  increased  in  a 
year  to  513,840  officers  and  men,  and  to-day 
exceeds  that  number.  The  recruiting  for  the 
federalized  National  Guard  was  not  so  suc- 
cessful. Thousands  who  would  otherwise  have 
volunteered  were  deterred  by  the  operation  of 
the  selective-service  law.  Some  of  the  units 
could  not  be  filled  by  volunteers  and  had  to  be 
brought  to  war  strength  by  the  breaking  up  of 
other  organizations.  A  number  of  the  Guard 
regiments  received  large  increments  from  the 
National  Army  camps.  But  we  find  at  the  end 
of  the  first  year  of  war  the  strength  of  the 
National  Guard  was  448,476  officers  and  men. 
Besides  these  troops  and  the  National  Army 
there  was  in  the  federal  service  a  reserve  corps 
of  96,210  officers  and  77,360  men. 

America  could  not  choose  the  battle-ground 


66  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

against  Germany.  The  battle-front  was  in 
France  and  it  was  imperative  that  our  armies 
get  to  it  with  all  possible  speed  and  in  the 
greatest  possible  numbers.  There  were  three 
elements  in  the  problem  which  had  to  be  nicely 
balanced.  The  programme  of  man-power  had 
to  be  carried  on  without  upsetting  the  munition 
programme.  Both  of  these  programmes  had  to 
be  adjusted  to  that  of  tonnage.  We  have  seen 
how  the  men  were  gathered.  The  Regular  Army 
was  started  overseas  with  great  promptness. 
General  Pershing,  who  was  to  command  abroad, 
arrived  in  Paris  with  his  staff  on  June  13.  Fol- 
lowing the  first  contingent  of  troops,  there  was 
a  steady  movement  of  soldiers  overseas.  A  di- 
vision of  the  National  Guard  and  a  division  of 
marines  went  early,  with  regiments  of  engineers, 
railroad  men,  and  foresters.  On  these  last  fell 
the  work  of  preparing  the  port  of  debarkation 
for  the  thousands  who  were  to  follow,  and  of 
building  lines  of  communication  to  the  training- 
camps  inland  and  to  the  front.  All  the  fighting 
units,  even  those  of  the  Regular  Army,  have  had 
to  be  schooled  in  the  modern  methods  of  war- 
fare, and  at  least  four  months'  training  behind 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  67 

the  lines  are  required  before  the  troops  can  be 
sent  into  action.  It  was  October  10,  187  days 
after  war  was  declared,  before  our  men  were  on 
the  firing-line. 

Meantime  the  work  at  home  was  pushed  with 
vigor,  but  it  was  hampered  by  our  lack  of  mo- 
bilization-camps. For  nearly  five  months  the 
whole  National  Guard  could  not  be  called  into 
service  because  there  were  no  training-camps 
ready  for  them.  The  idea  of  constructing  for 
them  cantonments  like  those  of  the  National 
Army  had  been  abandoned  early,  and  in  Sep- 
tember they  were  mobilized  under  canvas  in 
sixteen  camps  in  the  South.  Here  they  worked 
hard  through  the  winter  in  preparation  for  the 
contest  ahead,  and  before  the  spring  had  come 
they  were  most  of  them  in  France.  Following 
them  promptly  went  the  first  divisions  of  the 
National  Army,  and  by  July  4  Secretary  Baker 
was  able  to  announce  that  we  had  more  than 
1,200,000  soldiers  on  or  near  the  battle-front. 
By  late  July  our  men  were  in  action  in  larger 
numbers  than  ever  before  in  our  history,  and 
we  were  hearing  daily  of  their  deeds  of  gal- 
lantry. 


68  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

This  great  movement  of  troops  over  the  sub- 
marine-infested Atlantic  is  of  the  highest  credit 
to  the  War  Department  and  to  the  navy  that 
guarded  it  so  effectively.  Considering  the  num- 
bers involved  the  loss  of  life  was  remarkably 
small.  But  one  loaded  transport,  the  Tuscania, 
was  lost  during  the  year,  and  several  hundred 
men  went  down  with  her.  The  movement  was 
made  possible  by  the  co-operation  of  our  allies, 
Great  Britain  and  France,  who  turned  over  to  us 
many  of  their  vessels  for  the  carrying  of  the  men. 

While  the  man-power  programme  has  worked 
with  admirable  smoothness,  the  same  cannot 
be  said  of  the  munition  programme  in  the  early 
part  of  the  war.  There  were  delays  which  were 
the  subject  of  much  criticism  in  Congress  and 
elsewhere.  A  lack  of  co-ordination  and  too 
much  experimentation  were  the  cause.  Then, 
too,  in  the  early  part  of  the  war  the  right  men 
were  not  in  the  right  place.  A  marked  im- 
provement came  when  the  government  called 
to  its  service  able  business  men  like  Edward  R. 
Stettinius  and  John  D.  Ryan.  The  first  was 
made  an  assistant  secretary  of  war  in  charge  of 
munitions,  and  the  last  was  given  the  direction 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  69 

of  aircraft  production.  Had  they  been  in  these 
places  of  responsibility  earlier  we  should  not 
have  seen  nearly  a  year  go  by  before  machine- 
guns  and  aircraft  were  coming  from  the  fac- 
tories in  quantities. 

When  you  have  a  mad  dog  in  your  yard  you 
do  not  go  out  to  find  an  improved  rifle  with 
which  to  shoot  it.  You  use  the  one  you  have. 
When  the  war  came  we  were  lacking  in  guns  of 
all  kinds,  from  the  light  machine  to  the  nine- 
inch  heavy.  We  had  at  our  disposal  the  Lewis 
machine-gun,  an  American  invention,  and  other 
types  which  were  being  used  with  success  on 
European  battle-fields.  Moreover,  our  factories 
had  been  making  them  for  our  allies  in  large 
quantities,  and  were  prepared  to  make  prompt 
deliveries.  The  Ordnance  Department  wanted 
something  better,  but  instead  of  paralleling  a 
programme  of  manufacture  in  large  quantities 
of  the  other  types  with  a  programme  of  experi- 
mentation, it  spent  months  in  experimentation 
alone.  The  Browning  guns,  a  splendid  weapon, 
were  the  result.  It  was  a  year  before  they 
were  being  delivered  in  large  numbers,  and  in 
the  meantime  we  had  to  depend  largely  on  our 


70  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

allies  to  equip  our  troops  in  France  with  such 
ordnance.  The  same  process  was  followed  in 
regard  to  the  heavier  guns.  According  to  the 
evidence  before  the  Senate  Military  Affairs 
Committee,  efforts  to  improve  details  of  the 
gun-carriages  used  by  France,  England,  and 
Italy  caused  such  a  delay  that  the  output  of 
pieces  of  field-artillery  this  year  will  be  very 
small,  and  we  have  been  compelled  to  rely 
largely  on  the  factories  of  our  allies.  It  is  true 
that  they  have  been  able  to  help  us  in  this  way 
because  we  have  sent  them  large  quantities  of 
raw  material  and  thousands  of  mechanics  to 
work  it  into  shape. 

Once  the  machinery  of  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment did  get  in  motion  it  worked  with  increas- 
ing momentum.  We  find  that  by  May,  1918, 
the  production  of  the  modified  Enfield  rifle  for 
the  army  had  been  speeded  up  to  45,000  a 
week.  By  the  middle  of  August  more  than  100,- 
000  machine-guns  of  various  types  had  been 
made,  of  which  19,100  were  light  Brownings 
and  11,200  of  the  heavy  types.  An  ultimate 
yearly  production  was  promised  of  15,000  field- 
pieces  of  calibers  ranging  from  3%  to  9  inches. 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  71, 

In  criticism  of  the  delays  incurred  in  the  Ord- 
nance Department  consideration  must  be  given 
to  the  size  and  complexity  of  the  task  which 
confronted  it.  When  war  was  declared  it  had  a 
commissioned  personnel  of  ninety-seven  officers, 
and  was  operating  with  a  yearly  expenditure  of 
about  $14,000,000.  The  war  programme  re- 
quired the  expansion  of  its  personnel  to  more 
than  5,000  officers,  and  in  the  first  year  it 
directed  the  expenditure  of  more  than  $4,500,- 
000,000.  To  a  peace-time  task  of  operating 
eleven  government  arsenals  it  had  added  the 
supervision  of  several  thousand  factories  en- 
gaged in  the  production  of  munitions  of  all 
kinds.  It  had  to  develop  industries  hitherto 
unknown  in  the  country,  such  as  that  for  reduc- 
ing nitrate  from  the  air.  For  the  manufacture 
of  gun-carriages  on  a  large  scale  it  had  to  create 
organizations  and  build  great  shops.  It  con- 
structed and  is  operating  two  large  plants  for 
the  making  of  high  explosives,  each  of  which 
cost  $45,000,000.  Under  its  charge  came  the 
development  of  new  weapons  of  warfare  of  all 
kinds  and  their  production.  The  Browning  gun 
alone  was  a  fine  achievement.  The  heavy  type 


72  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

in  a  government  test  fired  20,000  shots  in  48 
minutes  and  16  seconds,  without  malfunction. 

The  task  this  department  has  had  to  face  has 
been  one  of  the  heaviest  of  the  war.  The  num- 
ber of  items  it  has  had  to  secure  and  supply  to 
the  troops  will  number  at  least  100,000,  and 
they  range  from  the  firing-pin  of  a  rifle  to  a 
sixteen-inch  gun  or  a  motor-truck.  Fortunately 
it  was  able  to  draw  into  its  personnel  the  best 
minds  of  industrial  America.  It  has  made  mis- 
takes. There  have  been  trying  delays  at  times, 
caused  by  hesitation  and  lack  of  initiative,  but 
it  can  be  said  that  by  the  end  of  the  first  year 
of  war  its  direction  and  its  methods  had  greatly 
improved,  and  that  it  was  functioning  smoothly. 

The  other  great  supply  department  of  the 
army,  the  quartermaster's,  has  had  a  problem 
nearly  as  great,  though  not  so  intricate.  Its 
work  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  had  to  be  done 
quickly,  as  its  first  large  task  was  to  supply 
camps  for  the  gathering  armies.  The  department 
was  at  first  handicapped  by  lack  of  money,  since, 
because  of  obstructive  tactics  by  the  opponents 
of  war,  the  Congress  which  adjourned  on  March  4 
had  failed  to  pass  the  army  appropriation  bill. 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  73 

Red  tape  was  cut;  extraordinary  care  was  taken 
in  expenditures;  money  was  borrowed  from  the 
appropriation  for  national  defense;  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  financed  the  contractors.  The 
work  was  pushed  rapidly,  but  it  was  not  until 
June  15  that  the  new  Congress  made  the  needed 
appropriation.  The  making  of  the  camps  and 
cantonments  has  been  described.  But  the  de- 
partment had  to  repeat  these  feats  abroad, 
building  in  France  great  training  and  rest 
camps,  and  supplying  buildings  for  the  storage 
of  vast  quantities  of  war  material. 

To  the  subsistence  division  has  fallen  the  feed- 
ing of  the  army,  and  its  operations  have  been  on 
a  huge  scale,  and  its  purchases  in  a  year  run 
into  hundreds  of  millions  of  pounds  of  staple 
foods  of  all  kinds,  and  hundreds  of  millions  of 
cans  of  vegetables  and  fruit.  In  the  operations 
of  the  equipment  division  we  notice  purchases 
of  such  items  as  75,000,000  yards  of  olive-drab 
cloth,  50,000,000  pairs  of  heavy  stockings, 
11,000,000  pairs  of  field-shoes,  and  14,000,000 
pairs  of  woollen  breeches.  The  remount  divi- 
sion, which  has  charge  of  the  purchase,  mobili- 
zation, and  shipment  of  animals,  spent  nearly 


74  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

$45,000,000  in  one  year.  Great  remount  sta- 
tions had  to  be  established  at  all  the  camps, 
where  the  horses  and  mules  could  be  assembled 
and  put  in  condition  before  they  were  shipped 
to  the  war  zone.  It  is  estimated  that  in  the 
army's  operations  one  animal  is  needed  for 
every  five  men.  The  mortality  among  these 
animals  is  very  heavy,  and  constant  replacement 
is  required.  With  every  1,000,000  men  we  send 
abroad,  at  least  200,000  horses  must  go. 

An  idea  of  the  multitude  of  smaller  but  none 
the  less  essential  matters  which  require  the  War 
Department's  attention  can  be  had  from  an  in- 
cident which  occurred  in  Washington  last  win- 
ter. It  was  during  the  fuel  famine,  and  the 
department  appealed  to  the  fuel  administration 
for  coal  for  a  large  candy -manufacturing  com- 
pany. Candy  hardly  seemed  essential  then. 
But  inquiry  developed  the  fact  that  this  com- 
pany was  furnishing  the  government  with  co- 
coanut-shells  in  great  quantities,  and  from  them 
was  obtained  the  fibre  used  in  the  respirators 
of  gas-masks.  Then  there  arose  trouble  in  get- 
ting castor-oil.  It  is  used  as  a  lubricant  in  air- 
plane motors,  and  the  supply  is  limited.  The 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  75 

government  prepared  to  meet  its  needs  by 
planting  thousands  of  acres  of  land  with  castor- 
beans. 

This  vast  work  of  equipping  our  army  for  war 
could  not  have  been  carried  on  with  the  success 
it  has  had  it  not  been  for  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and 
its  many  subsidiary  committees.  These  commit- 
tees were  composed  of  men  representing  every 
branch  of  our  industry,  and  co-operated  with  the 
various  military  bureaus.  Their  function  was 
at  first  purely  advisory.  But  when  any  special 
article  was  called  for  they  knew  where  it  could 
be  obtained  or  made  in  the  least  possible  time. 
Mistakes  were  made.  There  were  delays,  as  in 
the  aircraft  and  gun  production.  In  the  rush 
of  work  sometimes  important  items  seem  almost 
to  have  been  forgotten.  For  example,  there 
was  the  problem  of  gas  warfare.  Our  gas  de- 
fensive was  early  provided  for;  not  so  the  gas 
offensive.  It  was  late  in  the  spring  of  1918  be- 
fore we  were  ready  to  supply  our  armies  abroad 
with  gas-shells  in  the  great  quantities  needed. 
It  is  no  secret  that  the  gas  they  are  now  using  is 
the  most  effective  known.  Such  defects  in  our 


76  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

war  preparations  seem  to  have  been  due  to  a 
lack  of  co-ordination.  The  country  was  stirred 
in  the  fall  of  1917  when  Senator  Chamberlain 
of  Oregon,  in  a  public  speech,  charged  the  War 
Department  with  procrastination,  and  declared 
that  it  was  not  functioning  properly.  In  Con- 
gress charges  were  made  that  our  war  pro- 
gramme had  broken  down.  Whether  or  not 
they  were  fully  justified  is  not  the  main  issue 
now.  Certain  it  is  that  their  effect  was  salu- 
tary. The  work  was  speeded  up.  Shifts  were 
made  among  the  bureau  heads.  New  men  were 
called  in  to  supervise  certain  operations.  More 
power  was  given  to  committees  whose  functions 
had  hitherto  been  advisory.  By  the  passage  of 
the  Overman  bill  by  Congress  in  May  of  this 
year  more  power  was  given  to  the  President  as 
directing  chief  of  all  our  war  activities.  Under 
its  provisions  he  can  make  whatever  adminis- 
trative changes  he  wishes  without  hindrance 
from  Congress.  Under  it  the  President  has 
been  able  to  secure  the  needed  co-ordination  in 
the  gigantic  task  which  the  country  has  had  to 
face.  There  is  no  divided  opinion  as  to  the 
necessity  of  accomplishing  that  task.  The  men 


MILITARY  PREPARATION  77 

of  both  the  great  political  parties  have  heartily 
supported  every  move  that  promised  victory, 
and  the  men  of  every  industry  have  bent  their 
energies  to  that  end. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE   MASTERY  OF  THE   AIR 

THE  two  most  effective  weapons  used  in  the 
World  War  have  been  the  machine-gun 
and  the  airplane.  Both  are  American  inven- 
tions. Yet  when  we  declared  war  on  Germany 
even  the  little  army  we  had  was  insufficiently 
supplied  with  machine-guns,  and  possessed  not 
a  single  fighting-plane.  In  April,  1917,  the  army 
air  service  consisted  of  65  officers  and  1,120  men. 
It  had  300  second-rate  planes  and  three  small 
flying-fields. 

It  is  a  fact  not  generally  known  that  even  the 
Zeppelin  had  its  forerunner  in  America,  and 
that  in  the  early  nineties  Congress  appropriated 
$100,000  for  the  construction  of  a  lighter- than  - 
air  machine.  Its  designer  was  a  Doctor  de 
Boussuet,  a  Frenchman,  who  planned  a  rigid 
balloon  made  of  very  thin  steel  plates,  supported 
inside  by  light  steel  tubing.  He  was  to  obtain 
buoyancy  by  exhausting  the  air  from  the  cylin- 
der, and  to  propel  it  by  the  simple  gas-engine 

78 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  79 

of  that  day.  All  his  figures  as  to  strength  and 
power  were  approved  by  naval  engineers.  It 
was  designed  to  carry  mail,  but  it  was  never 
built,  because  a  disagreement  arose  between  the 
government  and  its  inventor  as  to  his  reward, 
should  it  prove  a  success.  I  can  remember  the 
doctor  in  his  house  in  Brooklyn  in  1896,  sitting 
surrounded  by  a  confusion  of  detail  drawings, 
bewailing  the  stupidity  of  a  government  which 
was  so  parsimonious  as  to  block  his  experiment, 
because  of  a  matter  of  a  few  thousand  dollars. 
At  that  time  Samuel  P.  Langley  was  experi- 
menting in  heavier-than-air  machines.  He  was 
working  on  the  correct  principle  of  aeronautics 
—simply  put,  the  faster  you  skate  over  thin  ice 
the  less  is  the  likelihood  of  breaking  through. 
He  lacked  satisfactory  means  of  propulsion,  yet 
in  1896  a  model  of  his,  driven  by  steam,  did  fly, 
and  demonstrated  the  possibility  of  airplane 
navigation.  In  1903  a  model  driven  by  a  gas- 
engine  made  a  prolonged  flight,  and  he  con- 
structed the  first  man-carrying  airplane.  This 
he  never  succeeded  in  launching.  Death  ended 
his  experiments.  In  1914  Glenn  Curtiss  made 
a  successful  flight  in  that  machine. 


80  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

In  the  fall  of  1907  Wilbur  and  Orville  Wright 
came  from  Dayton,  Ohio,  to  New  York,  seeking 
capital.  They  asserted  that  they  had  solved 
the  flying  riddle,  but  their  claims  were  listened 
to  somewhat  sceptically  in  the  quarters  where 
they  were  heard.  It  was  not  until  the  next  year 
when  they  went  to  France,  and  made  extensive 
flights  at  low  altitudes  around  French  race- 
tracks, that  the  full  measure  of  their  success 
was  realized  by  the  world.  In  the  summer  of 
1910  a  little  flying-school  was  established  at 
Mineola,  Long  Island,  on  what  is  now  the  site 
of  two  great  army  fields,  and  it  was  a  favorite 
afternoon  diversion  of  Long  Islanders  to  go 
there  and  watch  a  half-dozen  aviators  soaring 
around,  hardly  higher  than  the  housetops.  In 
the  four  years  before  the  beginning  of  the  Euro- 
pean War  the  development  of  aviation  in  this 
country  was  very  slow.  Such  machines  as  we 
had  were  to  be  seen  generally  at  county  fairs, 
and  what  attention  was  paid  to  the  aviation 
problem  was  by  private  individuals.  Even  up 
to  the  time  of  our  entrance  into  the  war  the 
only  indication  that  we  had  any  air  section  in 
our  army  at  all  came  from  occasional  reports  of 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  81 

fatal  accidents.  Meantime  abroad  the  science 
of  airplane  building  and  flying  advanced  with 
startling  rapidity.  The  exigencies  of  war  were 
the  cause.  From  the  primitive  reconnoissance 
plane,  the  combatants  went  quickly  to  heavy- 
armed  observation-planes,  fitted  with  wireless 
and  photographic  apparatus,  to  very  fast,  high- 
flying, fighting-machines,  and  to  large  machines 
capable  of  carrying  tons  of  bombs  to  spread 
devastation  behind  the  battle-lines  and  in  the 
cities.  Systems  of  aerial  acrobatics  and  combat 
were  developed  to  a  degree  hitherto  undreamed 
of.  In  none  of  these  developments  in  military 
aeronautics  did  we  follow.  In  all  the  years 
previous  to  April  6,  1917,  we  had  spent  just 
$1,500,000  in  this  branch  of  army  service.  We, 
in  whose  country  the  first  plane  had  flown,  had 
to  sit  humbly  at  the  feet  of  our  allies  and  learn. 
One  trouble  has  been  that  our  humility  was 
not  great  enough. 

It  was  believed  that  the  armies  that  held  the 
mastery  of  the  air  would  win.  Blind  the  Ger- 
mans !  It  would  be  easier  and  quicker  to  send 
overseas  an  overwhelming  air  force  than  an 
overwhelming  army.  Though  we  had  few  avi- 


82  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

ators  and  no  fighting-planes,  we  had  thousands 
of  young  men  ready  and  willing  to  train  for  fly- 
ing, and  great  industrial  plants  to  produce  the 
machines  rapidly.  Then  we  had  money.  Con- 
gress quickly  appropriated  $640,000,000  to  be 
available  for  the  first  year,  and  we  began  to 
work  on  our  ambitious  programme.  This  sum 
was  later  increased  to  over  a  billion  dollars. 
The  programme  was  not  too  ambitious.  It  was 
admirable.  The  disappointment  came  from  our 
being  made  too  sanguine  of  its  first  part  being 
accomplished  in  a  year.  The  American  public 
and  our  allies  were  led  to  expect  too  much. 
There  was  too  much  talking.  Who  was  respon- 
sible for  this  inflation  of  our  expectations  is  a 
mooted  question.  The  official  Bureau  of  Public 
Information  in  its  early  career  certainly  had  a 
way  of  issuing  bombastic  statements. 

Within  a  year  we  were  to  have  thousands  of 
fighting-planes  on  the  western  front.  How  was 
this  to  be  accomplished  ?  The  work  was  put  in 
charge  of  a  special  board  of  the  Signal  Corps 
of  the  army  working  in  conjunction  with  the 
newly  formed  Aircraft  Production  Committee  of 
the  Council  of  National  Defense.  This  com- 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  83 

mittee  was  made  up  of  a  number  of  men  con- 
spicuous as  successful  in  the  manufacture  of 
automobiles.  There  were  fine  engineers  in  both 
of  these  bodies,  but  no  experts  in  practical  aero- 
nautics. 

Now  consider  their  task.  According  to  the 
programme,  to  blind  the  German  armies  we 
were  to  send  to  the  western  front  as  fast  as  pos- 
sible at  least  20,000  airplanes  and  aviators.  It 
was  desired  and  expected  that  a  large  part  of 
these  would  be  in  service  in  the  campaigns  of 
1918.  The  call  for  young  men  to  train  for  avi- 
ation was  sent  out  promptly,  and  they  volun- 
teered by  thousands.  As  fast  as  they  could  be 
cared  for  they  were  accepted  for  service.  At 
the  time  of  our  entry  into  the  war  we  had  in 
the  country  but  a  small  number  of  aircraft  in- 
ventors and  experts,  and  some  dozen  factories 
which  were  making  airplanes,  or  airplane  parts 
and  accessories.  Now  aircraft  companies  began 
to  spring  up  like  mushrooms  and  to  prepare  for 
the  work  ahead.  The  main  elements  in  the 
problem  faced  were  to  secure  quickly  large 
numbers  of  engines,  material  for  the  wings, 
linen,  cotton,  wood,  and  navigating  instru- 


84  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

ments.  The  construction  of  engines  and  planes 
had  to  be  carried  on  simultaneously.  Our  allies 
promptly  placed  at  our  disposal  all  their  best 
models  of  engines  and  planes,  and  it  might  have 
seemed  a  wise  thing  to  begin  at  once  copying 
these  and  producing  them  as  fast  as  possible. 
But  it  was  believed  that  with  our  methods  of 
manufacturing  it  would  not  be  possible  to  pro- 
duce such  planes  in  the  great  numbers  needed. 
It  is  a  fact  that  we  did  not  then  have  in  the 
country  enough  expert  mechanics  to  build  in 
quantities  engines  as  they  are  built  abroad,  that 
is  by  the  most  careful  hand  labor.  Our  me- 
chanical labor  has  always  been  done  largely  by 
machinery.  By  a  standardization  of  design  and 
the  use  of  machinery  it  would  be  possible  to 
make  engines  in  large  numbers.  So  this  method 
was  adopted.  We  might  have  followed  the  two 
courses,  copying  the  foreign  engines  with  as 
much  speed  as  possible,  and  at  the  same  time 
experimenting  with  and  perfecting  our  own. 
We  did  not,  and  time  was  lost. 

In  June  the  country  was  electrified  by  the 
announcement  given  out  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment, through  the  Bureau  of  Public  Information, 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  85 

that  American  mechanical  genius  had  invented 
an  airplane  engine  which  was  superior  to  all 
others,  and  was,  moreover,  capable  of  being 
manufactured  in  great  numbers  by  machine 
processes.  Twenty-two  thousand  were  prom- 
ised within  a  year.  We  can  smile  now  at  that 
bombastic  announcement.  We  recall  the  story 
which  we  were  told  of  two  engineers  locking 
themselves  in  a  few  rooms  in  a  Washington  hotel 
and  completing  in  three  weeks  designs  for  a  mo- 
tor which  equalled,  if  not  surpassed,  in  quality 
the  best  results  of  years  of  experiment  and  prac- 
tice abroad.  The  inference  was  that  our  en- 
gineers went  into  those  rooms  with  nothing  in 
their  heads  but  ideas,  and  emerged  with  working 
plans.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  we  know  now, 
the  engineers  of  a  well-known  automobile  com- 
pany, foreseeing  our  entry  into  the  war,  had 
been  working  for  two  years  on  the  construction 
of  an  efficient  airplane  motor.  Several  models 
had  been  made  and  tested  successfully  on  a 
block.  The  last,  equipped  with  an  air-propeller, 
had  driven  a  truck  about  the  streets  of  Detroit 
and  had  given  proof  of  great  power.  It  was  on 
this  design,  which  was  offered  to  the  govern- 


86  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

ment,  that  the  engineers  worked,  and  they  made 
on  it  a  number  of  changes  and  improvements 
in  their  three  weeks'  conference.  On  July  3 
the  manufacturers  were  able  to  ship  to  Wash- 
ington the  first  of  the  new  engines,  and  it  was 
named  the  Liberty  motor.  To-day  Liberty 
motors  are  being  built  in  large  numbers,  but 
before  they  attained  their  present  efficiency  in 
certain  kinds  of  airplane  work,  months  had  to 
be  spent  in  experiment,  and  these  months  were 
of  vital  importance  in  the  war.  The  first  motor 
in  block  tests  proved  itself  very  powerful. 
Weighing  but  little  over  800  pounds,  it  devel- 
oped 400  horse-power,  giving  it  a  weight  of  ap- 
proximately two  pounds  per  horse-power.  In 
practice  on  an  airplane  trouble  developed.  In 
the  design  of  airplane  motors  consideration  has 
to  be  given  to  the  fact  that  they  work  in  high 
airs  and  changing  temperatures,  and  their  cool- 
ing systems  have  to  be  so  devised  that  they 
function  smoothly  in  changing  altitudes.  The 
first  Liberty  motors  did  not  do  this,  and  changes 
had  to  be  made  in  the  radiation  system.  De- 
fects developed,  also,  in  the  lubrication,  and 
certain  parts  were  found  to  be  not  sufficiently 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  87 

strong.  The  improvements  added  to  the  weight. 
On  September  12  Secretary  Baker  made  a  pub- 
lic announcement  of  the  success  of  the  final 
tests  and  assured  the  country  that  a  large  num- 
ber of  motors  would  be  ready  for  service  in  "a 
comparatively  short  time."  The  comparatively 
short  time  proved  to  be  nearly  a  year. 

Contracts  for  the  manufacture  of  the  motors 
were  let  to  five  large  companies.  That  there 
should  be  no  profiteering,  these  contracts  pro- 
vided that  the  manufacturers  should  receive  a 
profit  of  \%1A  per  cent  on  an  estimated  cost  of 
$5,000  per  engine.  If  the  actual  cost  exceeded 
$5,000  the  manufacturer  was  to  be  reimbursed 
for  the  outlay  but  would  receive  a  reduced  profit 
or  none  at  all;  if  the  cost  was  less  than  $5,000 
he  was  to  receive  a  bonus  of  25  cents  on  every 
dollar  saved.  While  the  percentage  of  profit 
might  seem  large,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  manufacturers  had  to  provide  special  plants 
and  equipment  in  order  to  fill  the  orders.  Such 
contracts  would  give  assurance  of  profiteering 
only  by  the  most  devious  methods.  Certain  of 
the  needed  parts  the  manufacturers  could  not 
make,  and  to  obtain  them  they  had  to  place 


88  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

orders  with  numerous  other  plants.  To  equip 
all  these  plants  with  the  necessary  machinery 
took  time,  and  once  the  quantity  production 
programme  was  started,  more  time  was  lost  by 
the  constant  changes  in  design  ordered  by  the 
Signal  Corps.  These  changes  were  continued  up 
to  April,  and  it  was  not  until  that  month  that 
the  production  of  motors  had  reached  any 
numbers.  By  June  1,  instead  of  nearly  the 
20,000  promised,  there  had  been  delivered  about 
1,500.  In  that  month,  however,  the  factories 
got  into  their  stride,  and  week  by  week  the  out- 
put increased,  so  that  by  August  the  engines 
were  being  delivered  at  a  rate  of  nearly  1,000  a 
week. 

The  delay  in  the  aircraft  programme  was 
known  in  Washington  in  the  fall  of  1917,  and 
this  delay  was  due  not  only  to  the  motor  prob- 
lem but  to  the  plane  construction.  Apparently 
little  effective  work  was  done  to  speed  up.  It 
was  not  until  the  following  April  that  the  Ameri- 
can public  became  aware  of  the  trouble,  and 
explanations  were  demanded.  Congress  took 
up  the  matter.  It  wanted  to  know  why,  when 
it  had  provided  for  an  expenditure  of  many 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  89 

millions  in  one  year  so  few  machines  had  been 
produced,  and  we  had  sent  no  battle-planes 
abroad.  It  came  out  that  of  this  money  only 
$270,000,000  had  actually  been  paid  out,  a  large 
part  of  it  for  flying-fields,  and  that  the  rest  was 
represented  in  contracts  let  and  uncompleted. 
The  men  mainly  responsible  for  the  carrying 
out  of  the  programme  were  called  and  ques- 
tioned. Without  doubt  they  were  men  of  the 
highest  patriotism  and  had  acted  with  the  best 
intentions,  but  it  was  felt  in  some  quarters  that 
serious  mistakes  had  been  made.  Considerable 
acrimony  developed.  The  President  acted.  He 
had  hardly  signed  the  Overman  bill,  on  May  20, 
when  he  used  its  powers  by  ordering  a  sweeping 
reorganization.  The  production  of  aircraft  was 
placed  in  the  control  of  John  D.  Ryan,  who  had 
wide  powers  given  him.  The  old  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board  was  continued  in  an  advisory 
capacity.  The  control  of  aircraft  operation  was 
taken  from  the  Signal  Corps  and  placed  with 
the  newly  organized  Department  of  Military 
Aeronautics,  which  now  has  charge  of  all  aerial 
work,  of  observation  balloons  and  photography, 
as  well  as  of  the  fighting-planes. 


90  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

The  original  scheme  for  our  airplane  motor 
was  an  excellent  one  could  it  have  been  carried 
out  in  all  its  parts.  It  contemplated  a  stand- 
ardized engine  which  could  be  produced  in 
quantity  and  fitted  to  almost  any  kind  of  plane. 
The  value  of  such  a  standardized  engine  at  the 
battle-front  is  manifest.  All  the  parts  would 
be  interchangeable  and  kept  at  hand,  so  that 
repairs  could  be  quickly  made.  But  experience 
has  proved  that  the  Liberty  motor  works  well 
only  in  the  heavier  types  of  planes,  such  as 
those  used  in  bombing  and  observation.  It  is 
very  powerful  for  its  weight,  but  its  weight  is 
too  great  for  small  fast-flying  scout  planes.  A 
large  number  of  these  had  been  ordered,  but  it 
was  found  that  the  Liberty  engine  was  too 
heavy  and  powerful  for  them.  So  for  this  spe- 
cial work  we  had  to  turn  at  a  late  date  to  types 
of  motors  originally  offered  to  us  by  France, 
England,  and  Italy.  Our  air  programme  had 
to  be  materially  altered.  Our  main  task  be- 
came to  supply  a  great  number  of  machines  of 
the  heavy  type,  for  bombing,  observation,  and 
photography  for  our  own  use  and  the  use  of 
our  allies.  To  our  friends  abroad  we  had  to 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  91 

trust  largely  for  equipment  in  the  little  single- 
seater  fighters. 

Even  had  the  production  of  Liberty  motors 
been  accomplished  on  schedule  time,  it  is  doubt- 
ful that  we  should  have  had  ready  the  planes  on 
which  to  mount  more  than  a  small  number. 
Without  the  planes  the  engines  were  useless. 
In  the  excitement  tending  the  development  of 
the  motor  other  essential  features  of  the  pro- 
gramme were  delayed.  Millions  of  square  yards 
of  especially  prepared  cloths  and  millions  of 
feet  of  carefully  treated  timber  had  to  be  secured 
for  the  construction  of  the  wings.  As  every  air- 
plane carries  some  seven  delicate  instruments 
needed  in  its  operation,  the  simultaneous  pro- 
duction of  thousands  of  these  was  a  necessity. 
It  was  late  in  the  summer  of  1917  before  these 
vital  needs  had  been  provided  for. 

The  wood  used  in  the  construction  of  air- 
plane wings  has  to  be  light,  hard,  straight- 
grained,  and  free  from  defects.  Spruce  has 
proved  the  best  for  the  purpose,  and  of  this 
wood  our  largest  supply  comes  from  the  North- 
west. Before  we  entered  the  war  the  Allied 
governments  were  buying  spruce  there  in  large 


92  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

quantities,  but  the  added  needs  of  our  own  war 
programme  required  that  the  government  take 
over  these  outstanding  contracts,  assume  con- 
trol of  the  timber  production,  and  supply  the 
demands  of  all.  At  first  the  work  of  getting 
out  the  lumber  was  carried  on  in  rather  slipshod 
fashion.  There  were  labor  troubles  during  the 
summer  and  a  subtle  propaganda  of  disloyalty 
developed  among  the  workers,  hampering  the 
operations.  It  was  seen  that  it  was  necessary 
that  the  government  not  only  supervise  the 
spruce  output,  but  that  it  operate  the  industry. 
In  September  the  spruce  production  division  of 
the  army  was  formed  and  placed  in  charge  of 
an  officer,  with  headquarters  at  Vancouver.  He 
organized  a  corps  of  officers,  engineers,  foresters, 
lumber-jacks,  and  mill-hands,  numbering  nearly 
12,000  men.  To  counteract  the  insidious  agita- 
tion of  the  I.  W.  W.  an  appeal  to  the  patriotism 
of  the  workers  was  made.  The  Loyal  Legion  of 
Loggers  and  Lumbermen  was  formed  in  the 
forests  and  thousands  of  men  enrolled  in  local 
chapters  all  over  the  lumber  district.  Labor 
disputes  were  satisfactorily  settled,  and  disloy- 
alty so  stamped  out  that  it  ceased  to  be  a 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  93 

menace.  When  the  division  was  formed  the 
forests  and  mills  were  putting  out  only  2,000,000 
feet  of  lumber  monthly,  and  10,000,000  monthly 
were  urgently  needed.  New  methods  had  to  be 
inaugurated;  new  roads  had  to  be  laid  to  reach 
distant  stands  of  trees,  and  railroads  constructed 
to  get  out  the  timber;  new  saw-mills  had  to  be 
built  and  kilns  provided  for  the  drying  of  the 
spruce  pieces.  The  task  was  difficult,  but  it 
was  carried  on  with  success.  The  production 
increased  steadily  month  by  month  and  the 
time  spent  in  moving  it  across  the  continent  to 
the  factories  was  greatly  reduced.  By  the  sum- 
mer of  1918  spruce  in  ample  quantities  was 
being  obtained  for  our  airplanes. 

To  provide  the  men  to  drive  and  care  for 
these  projected  planes  the  War  Department 
acted  with  promptness  and  energy.  Great  fly- 
ing-fields were  established  all  over  the  country 
and  barracks  and  hangars  were  constructed  in 
quick  time.  Within  one  year  our  air  service 
was  expanded  until  a  personnel  of  some  1,100 
officers  and  men  became  over  100,000.  An  air- 
plane squadron  consists  of  eighteen  machines 
and  154  men.  Eighteen  of  these  men  are  com- 


94  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

missioned  pilots.  The  rest  are  ground  officers, 
observers,  mechanics,  cooks,  and  guards.  It 
can  readily  be  calculated  that  if  we  had  20,000 
planes  in  service  we  should  have  1,100  squadrons, 
for  the  operation  of  which  more  men  would  be 
required  than  we  had  in  our  army  when  the  war 
began.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  first  year  we 
produced  fliers  four  times  as  fast  as  we  produced 
motors.  In  the  middle  of  June,  1918,  we  had  in 
our  service  9,000  flying  officers  of  whom  about 
1,500  were  abroad,  most  of  them  completing 
their  training  in  French  and  English  schools. 
We  had  in  our  service  some  5,000  machines,  the 
greatest  number  of  which  were  training-planes. 
By  the  middle  of  July  the  War  Department  an- 
nounced that  we  had  built  733  bombing-planes, 
of  which  425  had  been  sent  abroad.  Most  of 
these  were  of  a  type  known  as  the  De  Haviland 
4,  and  as  in  practice  they  were  not  proving 
entirely  satisfactory,  orders  were  given  late  in 
July  to  build  no  more,  but  to  construct  a  later 
and  better  type  known  as  the  De  Haviland  9. 
Meantime  orders  had  been  given  to  scrap  a 
large  number  of  Bristol  fighting-planes  which  had 
)been  completed.  It  was  found  that  the  Liberty 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  95 

motor  was  too  powerful  for  them,  and  even  had 
motors  been  at  hand  the  type  had  become  out 
of  date,  so  rapidly  are  the  improvements  made 
by  those  who  are  actually  developing  planes 
under  the  trying  conditions  of  battle.  The 
needed  instruments,  such  as  altimeters  and 
compasses,  were  not  at  this  time  forthcoming 
in  the  numbers  needed  even  for  training  pur- 
poses. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  we  had  few 
skilled  aviators  in  the  country,  and  they  had 
to  be  utilized  as  instructors.  The  corps  of  in- 
structors was  enlarged  by  a  large  number  of 
foreign  flying  officers  who  were  sent  overseas  to 
our  fields  to  teach  our  men.  That  we  were  able 
to  increase  so  rapidly  our  possible  flying  per- 
sonnel was  due  to  the  energy  of  the  War  De- 
partment in  providing  fields  and  schools,  to  the 
patriotism  of  thousands  of  young  Americans 
who  volunteered  for  this  dangerous  service,  and 
to  the  co-operation  of  the  colleges  and  universi- 
ties of  the  country.  These  last  turned  their 
technical  departments  over  to  the  government 
service,  and  in  many  of  them  ground  schools 
were  founded,  where  the  embryo  fliers  could  be 


96  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

instructed  in  the  mechanics  of  motors  and  in 
the  construction  of  planes  before  going  to  the 
flying-fields  for  training  in  the  air.  Since  the 
summer  of  1917  there  has  been  a  steady  stream 
of  young  men  passing  through  these  schools  to 
the  flying-fields.  So  great  has  their  number 
been  that  when  the  airplane  production  was 
delayed  not  enough  machines  could  be  had  hi 
which  to  teach  them  all  to  fly.  Hundreds  were 
sent  abroad  to  take  their  training  in  the  schools 
of  our  allies.  The  war  was  a  year  old  before 
even  the  training-planes  were  coming  from  our 
factories  in  numbers  sufficient  for  our  needs. 

Not  only  did  we  have  to  provide  training  for 
our  aviators,  but  schools  had  to  be  established 
to  fit  men  for  many  phases  of  the  work  of  the 
air  service.  At  the  factories  and  in  the  fields 
instruction  was  provided  for  mechanics,  pho- 
tographers, balioonists,  engineers,  armorers,  and 
supply  and  administration  officers.  The  organ- 
ization of  so  great  a  personnel  in  so  short  a 
time  has  been  a  work  well  done. 

The  work  of  our  aeronautical  department  has 
been  gaining  in  momentum.  To  realize  that  it 
is  at  last  under  way  effectively  one  has  only  to 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  97 

visit  Long  Island.  Not  a  day  passes  but  from 
early  morning  to  night  one  can  hear  the  drum  of 
engines  high  in  the  air.  The  planes  fly  over- 
head by  the  scores,  some  singly,  some  in  battle 
formation.  Often  one  sees  lone  aviators  prac- 
tising acrobatics,  looping  and  spiralling,  shoot- 
ing toward  earth  in  the  nose-dive  or  tail-spin, 
in  hair-raising  fashion.  The  skill  with  which 
they  perform  these  evolutions  gives  evidence 
of  their  training.  In  fields  all  over  the  coun- 
try this  same  dangerous  work  is  being  done 
by  an  army  of  as  fine  young  men  as  have  ever 
taken  to  the  air.  To  scores  of  them  the  train- 
ing has  ended  in  death,  and  they  have  given 
themselves  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and  justice  as 
truly  as  though  they  died  in  battle.  The  first 
Americans  to  die  in  battle  were  aviators,  and 
daily  the  list  grows  longer  with  the  names  of 
those  gallant  young  souls  who  have  made  the 
supreme  sacrifice. 

Our  aircraft  programme  will  succeed,  if  some- 
what tardily.  The  invention  of  the  Liberty 
motor,  a  good  motor  which  could  be  made 
rapidly  in  large  numbers,  was  an  achievement. 
The  trouble  was  that  it  was  too  much  adver- 


98  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

tised  and  so  much  expected  of  it  that  other 
matters  of  equal  importance  were  neglected. 
One  wonders  why  it  was  advertised  at  all.  The 
Germans  never  knew  of  the  tanks  until  the 
tanks  were  rolling  toward  them  over  the  Flan- 
ders fields,  spitting  fire.  By  the  vaunting  of 
the  motor's  virtues  and  the  announcement  that 
it  alone  would  be  used  on  our  airplanes,  capa- 
ble inventors  were  discouraged  from  efforts  in 
improving  engines.  We  should  have  had  avia- 
tion experts  in  charge  of  the  programme  from 
the  beginning,  and  we  did  not.  More  work  and 
fewer  optimistic  statements  on  the  part  of  the 
War  Department  would  have  brought  efficiency 
out  of  confusion  much  sooner  than  it  really 
came. 

This  practically  sums  up  the  situation.  What 
has  been  said  is  corroborated  in  the  report 
made  public  on  August  22  by  the  Senate's 
investigating  committee.  This  committee  found 
that  a  substantial  part  of  the  original  appropria- 
tion of  $640,000,000  had  been  wasted.  It  de- 
clared that  of  the  planes  sent  abroad  but  67 
De  Haviland  4's  had  reached  the  front  by 
August  1,  and  that  these  were  good  only  for 


THE  MASTERY  OF  THE  AIR  99 

day  bombing  and  observation;  that  at  the  same 
date  we  had  not  at  the  front  a  single  American- 
made  chasse  (or  plane  of  attack)  or  heavy 
bombing-plane.  It  found  that  $6,500,000  was 
wasted  on  Bristol  planes,  as  these  had  to  be 
scrapped,  after  several  lives  had  been  lost  in 
trials.  It  found  that,  though  3,000  fast  fighting 
Spads  were  ordered  in  September,  1917,  this 
order  was  cancelled  because  they  could  not  be 
adapted  to  the  Liberty  motor.  It  found  that, 
though  facilities  were  ready  to  build  the  Caproni 
bombing-machine  in  the  fall  of  1917,  only  one 
experimental  plane  had  been  completed.  While 
commending  the  Liberty  motor  for  certain  pur- 
poses, the  committee  declared  that  it  was  too 
heavy  and  too  powerful  for  the  lighter  types  of 
planes,  and  that  we  should  have  manufactured 
the  best  types  of  foreign  motors  contemporane- 
ously with  its  development,  instead  of  which 
we  subordinated  all  the  other  phases  of  the 
aircraft  programme  to  its  perfection  and  pro- 
duction. 

A  few  days  after  the  Senate  committee's  re- 
port was  made  public  Secretary  of  War  Baker 
again  acted  to  correct  the  trouble.  He  ap- 


100  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

pointed  Mr.  Ryan,  second  assistant  secretary  of 
war,  with  full  charge  of  all  our  activities  in  the 
air.  Mr.  Ryan  not  only  was  made  responsible 
for  the  production  of  aircraft,  but  for  operation 
of  the  department  of  military  aeronautics,  for 
the  purpose  of  co-ordinating  both  of  these 
branches  of  the  work.  By  the  same  order 
Benedict  C.  Crowell,  first  assistant  secretary, 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  munitions  pro- 
gramme, succeeding  Mr.  Stettinius,  who  was 
then  abroad  as  a  special  representative  of  the 
department. 

The  placing  of  a  man  of  Mr.  Ryan's  abilities 
at  the  head  of  our  air  programme  should  prove 
beneficial.  After  he  became  head  of  the  pro- 
duction board  marked  changes  for  the  better 
were  noticed.  Engines  and  planes  of  the  best 
types  were  ordered,  and  our  real  programme 
was  put  under  way.  A  year  late,  but  still  next 
year  we  should  prove  a  power  in  the  combat 
in  the  air. 


CHAPTER  VII 
NAVAL  PREPARATION 

IN  considering  the  problems  faced  by  America 
in  her  preparation  for  war  there  has  been, 
at  times,  a  tendency  to  compare  the  work  of 
the  Navy  Department  with  that  of  the  War 
Department.  Such  comparison  is  unfair.  Our 
navy,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  was  a  finely 
organized  machine,  ready  for  instant  action. 
Our  army  was  so  small  that  it  hardly  sufficed 
for  police  work.  Under  the  theory  that  the 
sea  protected  us  from  foreign  aggression,  the 
navy  was  always  considered  our  first  line  of  de- 
fense, and  had  been  treated  with  fair  generosity 
by  Congress,  while  the  army  was  stunted  and 
starved  by  niggardly  appropriations.  Nearly 
a  year  before  the  beginning  of  hostilities  Con- 
gress more  than  doubled  the  customary  appro- 
priation for  naval  purposes,  allotting  large 
sums  of  money  for  new  ship  construction,  for 
machine-shops,  dry-docks,  and  ordnance.  In 

the  same  session  the  army  was  practically  neg- 

101 


102  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

lected.  When  we  declared  war  the  expan- 
sion of  the  naval  force  was  already  under  way. 
Since  then  the  personnel  has  been  increased 
nearly  seven  times.  In  the  same  period  the 
War  Department  has  had  to  increase  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  army  more  than  twenty-five 
times,  and  contemplates  still  greater  additions 
to  its  force.  Both  departments  faced  great 
tasks.  The  quietness  and  efficiency  with  which 
the  Navy  Department  has  been  doing  its  work 
has  merited  the  highest  praise. 

The  navy  was  ready.  Even  before  war  had 
been  officially  declared  our  sailors  were  in  ac- 
tion from  the  decks  of  armed  merchantmen, 
exchanging  shots  with  German  submarines.  In 
such  an  engagement,  in  the  sinking  of  the  Aztec 
on  April  1,  the  first  of  our  fighting  men  lost  his 
life  in  service.  When  war  seemed  inevitable, 
Admiral  William  S.  Sims  was  hurried  abroad  to 
get  in  touch  with  the  British  and  French  ad- 
miralties and  make  arrangements  for  our  en- 
trance into  the  conflict.  When  war  was  begun 
every  available  ship  was  manned  and  prepared 
for  action.  The  navy  worked  quickly  and  si- 
lently. On  May  4,  in  less  than  a  month  after 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  103 

hostilities  began,  we  learned  that  our  first  flotilla 
of  destroyers  had  reached  a  British  port,  and 
with  added  gratification  we  heard  how  the  Brit- 
ish commander,  asking  when  the  boats  would 
be  ready  for  action,  received  the  reply:  "We  are 
ready  now."  War-ship  followed  war-ship.  By 
the  close  of  the  year  we  had  in  service  in  Eu- 
ropean waters  35,000  officers  and  men,  more 
than  one-half  the  navy's  total  strength  on  April 
6.  One  destroyer  detachment  in  the  first  six 
months  steamed  1,000,000  miles,  was  3,600  days 
at  sea,  attacked  81  submarines,  and  escorted 
717  merchant  vessels  safely  to  port.  The  first 
of  our  armed  forces  to  reach  France  were  naval 
aviators,  who  landed  on  June  8.  From  the 
first  our  navy  has  made  a  record  for  efficiency 
and  daring  of  which  every  American  has  reason 
to  be  proud.  Working  with  the  fleets  of  our 
allies,  it  has  battled  with  the  submarines  so 
successfully  as  to  lessen  greatly  the  menace  of 
the  undersea  pirates;  it  has  so  guarded  the 
ocean  lanes  that  we  have  landed  in  France  more 
than  a  million  and  a  half  of  men,  with  a  loss  of 
life  almost  negligible,  and  have  kept  moving  a 
stea  ly  stream  of  supply -ships  in  comparative 


104  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

safety.  Under  the  direction  of  able  men  the 
splendid  traditions  of  our  navy  have  been  upheld. 
The  man  directly  responsible  for  these  opera- 
tions at  sea  is  the  secretary,  Mr.  Josephus 
Daniels.  Few  men  in  public  life  in  the  past 
decade  have  been  subject  to  so  much  criticism 
as  Mr.  Daniels.  When,  in  1913,  he  left  the 
editorial  desk  in  his  North  Carolina  newspaper 
office  to  join  the  cabinet,  he  had  little  knowl- 
edge of  naval  affairs.  He  somewhat  jarred  the 
sensibilities  of  both  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
navy,  accustomed  to  long-established  methods 
of  operation  and  discipline,  by  instituting  a 
series  of  reforms.  The  impression  got  abroad 
that  he  regarded  the  navy  as  not  so  much  a 
fighting-machine  as  a  school  for  young  men. 
In  common  with  most  men  in  public  life  he  had 
a  hobby,  democracy,  and  he  rode  it  with  vigor. 
His  early  actions  in  reform  have  been  described 
as  "amiable  floundering."  But  Mr.  Daniels 
was  willing  to  learn  and  to  listen  to  able  pro- 
fessional advisers,  whom  he  trusted.  Many  of 
his  reforms  proved  excellent,  even  to  the  minds 
of  those  who  at  first  opposed  them.  Others 
which  were  found  inadvisable  he  quietly  ^ 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  105 

doned.  Increased  efficiency  has  come  from  his 
fight  against  the  use  of  alcoholic  liquors  among 
the  rank  and  file.  The  navy  has  never  been  an 
aristocratic  institution,  but  it  was  formerly  im- 
possible for  an  enlisted  man  to  win  an  officer's 
commission.  For  the  responsibilities  attend- 
ing the  command  of  a  ship,  men  had  to  be 
trained  carefully.  The  government  provides 
this  education  at  the  Naval  Academy.  The 
Annapolis  cadets  come  from  every  part  of  the 
country,  and  every  walk  of  life  under  carefully 
laid  down  rules.  Through  the  initiative  of  Mr. 
Daniels  the  law  has  been  so  changed  as  to  allow 
each  year  the  appointment  to  Annapolis  of  100 
enlisted  men  under  the  age  of  twenty.  Such  a 
system,  while  in  no  way  lessening  the  qualifi- 
cations required  for  a  commission,  certainly 
gives  encouragement  to  hundreds  of  ambitious 
young  men  who  could  in  no  other  way  find  the 
road  open  to  the  quarter-deck.  Under  the  old 
methods  promotions  in  the  commissioned  corps 
were  made  by  seniority.  An  officer  was  sure  of 
his  promotion  even  though  his  attainments  and 
work  were  mediocre,,  Mr.  Daniels  secured  the 
passage  of  a  law  by  which  the  promotion  of 


106  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

officers  above  the  rank  of  lieutenant-commander 
is  made  by  selection.  While  this  does  offer 
an  opportunity  for  favoritism,  it  allows  the 
placing  in  posts  of  responsibility  younger,  and 
often  abler,  men  than  could  be  obtained  by  the 
seniority  principle.  There  have  been  times 
when  the  secretary's  amiable  ways  and  ideas 
seemed  to  tend  to  upset  discipline,  that  neces- 
sity in  all  fighting-machines,  but  since  we  en- 
tered the  war  we  have  heard  nothing  of  these 
things.  He  has  gathered  around  him  able  ad- 
visers. Competent  men  have  been  placed  at 
the  heads  of  bureaus,  and  able  men  in  com- 
mand of  our  fleets.  From  the  beginning  a  great 
work  has  been  carried  on  efficiently  and  without 
friction. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Europe  the 
American  Navy  ranked  third.  Great  Britain 
led  with  a  tonnage  of  2,500,000;  Germany  sec- 
ond, with  951,713  tons;  the  United  States  third, 
with  774,353.  In  the  previous  decade  we  had 
fallen  from  second  place,  a  fact  not  due  to  the 
present  naval  administration  but  to  the  failure 
of  an  earlier  Congress  to  provide  money  with 
which  to  lay  down  new  vessels.  In  that  decade 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  107 

the  general  board  of  the  navy  had  recom- 
mended the  construction  of  326  new  ships  of 
all  classes.  Congress  granted  but  153.  From 
the  beginning  of  the  World  War  the  Navy  De- 
partment worked  consistently  to  secure  a  large 
increase  in  the  naval  establishment,  but  for  the 
first  two  years  we  find  no  marked  addition  to 
the  appropriations.  In  1916  the  growing  strain 
in  our  relations  with  Germany  did  arouse 
Congress  to  action,  and  legislation  was  passed 
looking  to  our  future  needs,  both  as  to  ships 
and  personnel.  By  the  act  of  August  29,  of 
that  year,  the  appropriation  for  the  previous 
year  was  more  than  doubled,  and  provision 
was  made  for  the  beginning  of  a  great  construc- 
tion programme,  to  be  carried  over  three  years. 
Besides  the  new  ships,  the  programme  provided 
for  an  increase  in  personnel,  a  greater  aero- 
nautical equipment,  new  dry-docks,  new  armor- 
plate  and  projectile  plants,  new  shops,  enlarged 
navy-yards,  instruction  camps,  and  an  increase 
in  reserve  supplies  of  all  kinds.  For  new  ships 
the  programme  contemplated  the  earliest  pos- 
sible construction  of  ten  battleships,  six  battle 
cruisers,  t«n  scout  cruisers,  fifty  destroyers,  nine 


108  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

fleet  submarines,  fifty-eight  coast  submarines, 
and  a  number  of  repair  and  supply  vessels.  Ap- 
proximately, a  half  billion  of  dollars  was  needed 
to  complete  the  construction.  Scenting  danger 
in  the  break  in  our  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany,  the  Sixty-fourth  Congress  before  its 
adjournment  in  the  following  March  passed  a 
still  greater  appropriation  bill  for  the  navy,  and 
the  next  Congress,  in  special  session,  following 
the  declaration  of  war,  enacted  two  deficiency 
bills. 

The  appropriations  for  the  navy  for  the  fiscal 
year  1917-18  and  including  the  special  appro- 
priation of  1916  were  as  follows: 

Act  of  August  29, 1916 $312,888,060.25 

Act  of  March  4,  1917 516,491,802.08 

Act  of  June  5,  1917 514,805,033.87 

Act  of  October  6,  1917. .  561,436,023.50 


Total $1,905,620,919.70 

For  the  fiscal  year  ending  July  1,  1919,  the 
present  Congress  has  appropriated  $1,616,550,- 
360  for  naval  purposes.  The  sum  of  these  ap- 
propriations exceeds  the  total  expenditures  in 
our  navy  from  1794  to  1916. 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  109 

When  we  went  to  war  our  navy  numbered 
in  service  fifteen  dreadnaughts,  twenty  pre- 
dreadnaughts,  ten  armored  cruisers,  twenty-five 
light  cruisers,  seven  monitors,  seventy-four  de- 
stroyers, nineteen  torpedo-boats,  and  sixty-six 
submarines.  A  number  of  these  vessels  were 
out  of  date.  The  foresight  of  the  department, 
in  inaugurating  the  three-year  programme  seven 
months  before,  allowed  a  rapid  and  powerful 
increase  in  our  forces.  Within  a  year  many 
vessels  of  all  classes  were  added  to  the  navy. 
How  the  new  construction  has  proceeded,  and 
details  as  to  the  vessels  launched  or  laid  down, 
have  not,  of  course,  been  announced.  In  the 
fall  of  1916  there  were  on  the  ways  six  battle- 
ships in  various  stages  of  construction.  Of 
these  only  the  launching  of  the  Arizona  has 
been  made  public.  There  were  also  on  the 
ways  at  that  time  ten  destroyers  and  thirty- 
four  submarines,  besides  several  supply-ships. 
The  three-year  programme  called  for  the  con- 
struction, in  1917,  of  four  battleships,  four  fast 
battle  cruisers,  four  scout  cruisers,  twenty  de- 
stroyers, thirty-one  coast-defense  submarines, 
and  several  supply-ships.  When  war  was  de- 


110  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

clared  a  large  number  of  additional  destroyers 
were  at  once  ordered,  and  every  available  yard 
set  to  work  on  them.  Since  then  the  progress 
of  such  work  has  not  been  made  public.  Mr. 
Daniels  has  stated  that  within  a  year  the  ves- 
sels in  service  have  been  increased  from  some 
300  to  over  1,000,  and  that  we  had  laid  down 
more  destroyers  than  were  to  be  found  in  any 
two  combined  navies  before  1914.  It  must  be 
remembered,  however,  that  among  that  thou- 
sand vessels  are  many  armed  yachts  and  small 
submarine  chasers  which  have  no  value  other 
than  for  scouting. 

The  department  has  officially  stated  that  on 
April  1,  1917,  there  were  building  or  authorized 
for  the  navy  123  vessels,  as  follows: 

Battleships 15 

Battle-cruisers 6 

Scout-cruisers 7 

Destroyers 27 

Submarines 61 

Fuel-ships 2 

Supply-ship 1 

Transport 1 

Gunboat 1 

Hospital-ship 1 

Ammunition-ship 1 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  111 

It  has  announced,  further,  that  since  that 
date  contracts  have  been  placed  for  949  vessels 
of  all  kinds,  including  100  submarine-chasers 
for  the  navies  of  our  allies. 

The  work  thrown  on  the  department  by  the 
building  programme  has  been  very  great,  but 
it  has  been  carried  on  rapidly  and  well.  At 
first  we  lacked  yards,  ways,  shops,  and  dry- 
docks.  Consideration  had  to  be  given  also  to 
the  pressing  needs  of  the  merchant  marine,  and 
the  programme  so  carried  out  as  to  allow  a 
coincident  increase  of  both  the  naval  and  mer- 
chant services.  These  handicaps  have  been 
overcome  and  very  rapid  construction  accom- 
plished, particularly  in  the  matter  of  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers,  so  urgently  needed  to  hunt 
the  submarine.  Formerly  it  took  from  one  to 
two  years  to  build  a  destroyer.  Now  the  feat 
is  accomplished  in  from  three  to  five  months. 
Seventeen  and  a  half  days  after  the  laying  of 
her  keel,  the  Ward  was  launched  at  Mare 
Island,  84  per  cent  completed.  On  July  4 
sixteen  new  destroyers  slipped  from  the  ways 
in  various  parts  of  the  country.  To  attain 
this  speed  in  construction  the  same  system  of 


HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

standardization  and  fabrication  as  is  used  for 
the  merchant  marine  is  followed  largely.  A  no- 
table example  of  the  way  in  which  the  work  is 
done  is  to  be  found  at  the  Ford  works  at  Detroit. 
Here  a  fast  steel  submarine  chaser,  200  feet  long, 
is  built  on  a  track.  The  keel  is  laid,  the  frame 
set,  the  plates  riveted  on  in  successive  opera- 
tions as  the  vessel  rolls  through  the  shops,  and 
in  an  incredibly  short  time  it  slips  into  the  river 
more  than  80  per  cent  completed.  The  plans 
for  these  vessels — eagles,  as  they  are  called — 
were  not  finished  until  January.  In  June  the 
first  was  launched,  and  since  then  the  navy  has 
had  an  almost  daily  accession  of  fast  and  ca- 
pable little  fighters. 

To  man  the  greatly  increased  number  of 
naval  vessels  demanded  an  enlargement  of  the 
personnel  of  the  force.  On  April  6,  1917,  there 
were  in  the  navy  69,046  officers  and  men,  and 
in  the  Marine  Corps  13,692.  On  July  23  the 
department  announced  that  the  personnel  num- 
bered 503,792  officers  and  men — in  the  regular 
navy,  219,158;  in  the  Marine  Corps,  58,463;  in 
the  Naval  Reserve,  219,566;  in  the  Coast  Guard, 
6,605. 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  113 

When  it  authorized  the  three-year  building 
programme  Congress  foresaw  that  more  men 
would  be  needed  for  the  ships,  and  in  the  same 
act  authorized  an  increase  in  the  regular  per- 
sonnel, and  gave  the  President  power  to  aug- 
ment the  force  further  in  case  of  emergency. 
The  same  legislation  formed  the  United  States 
Naval  Reserve.  This  force  is  divided  into  six 
classes,  with  varying  qualifications  laid  down 
for  admission,  and  varying  rules  as  to  terms  of 
service.  The  necessity  of  war,  however,  has 
required  that  the  whole  force  be  treated  as  one, 
and  as  a  part  of  the  regular  naval  service.  The 
men  serve  in  the  fighting  ships,  in  the  transports 
and  supply-vessels,  wherever  they  are  needed. 
All  of  this  great  force  has  been  secured  by  vol- 
untary enlistment.  The  selective-service  law 
operates  only  to  furnish  men  to  the  army. 
For  the  service  on  the  sea  young  Americans 
have  been  offering  themselves  as  fast  as  they 
can  be  equipped  and  trained.  The  beginning 
of  the  war  found  the  navy  some  20,000  men 
short  of  its  authorized  strength,  and  there 
were  enrolled  in  the  Naval  Reserve  not  more 
than  10,000.  It  was  necessary  to  carry  on 


114  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

a  wide  campaign  to  secure  the  much-needed 
men.  The  nation  had  to  be  educated  to  the 
needs  of  its  navy.  The  Navy  Publicity  Bureau 
flooded  the  country  with  posters  and  patriotic 
appeals;  meetings  were  held  everywhere  to 
stimulate  interest,  and  the  recruiting-stations 
sent  out  travelling  parties  to  the  remotest  dis- 
tricts. Under  the  stimulus  of  this  campaign 
the  recruiting  increased  rapidly.  To-day  the 
country  realizes  that  it  is  at  war,  to  a  degree 
that  it  did  not  realize  a  year  ago,  and  little  diffi- 
culty has  been  experienced  in  keeping  up  a 
steady  flow  of  splendid  young  men  into  our  sea 
service.  Every  outstanding  German  outrage 
has  been  followed  by  a  rush  of  volunteers,  those 
who  would  not  wait  the  operation  of  the  selec- 
tive-service law  to  do  their  bit  in  fighting  the 
menace  of  the  Hun.  Successive  legislation  has 
greatly  increased  the  authorized  strength  of  the 
regular  navy,  and  the  law  places  no  limit  on 
the  number  that  can  be  enrolled  in  the  reserve. 
For  the  same  reasons  the  Marine  Corps  has 
been  increased  from  hardly  more  than  10,000 
to  nearly  75,000. 

The  equipment  and  training  of  these  great 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  115 

forces  has  been  a  mighty  task  for  the  depart- 
ment. Old  training-camps  had  to  be  greatly 
enlarged  and  new  ones  built.  The  problem 
faced  here  was  much  like  that  of  the  army  in 
regard  to  the  cantonments,  though  the  con- 
struction has  not  been  on  so  large  a  scale.  In 
every  case  model  camps  have  been  formed,  and 
every  effort  has  been  made  to  give  the  young 
men  in  them  clean  and  wholesome  surroundings 
during  their  apprenticeship.  The  Commission 
on  Training  Camp  Activities  works  here  as  well 
as  in  the  army  cantonments,  and  with  the  co- 
operation of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.,  the  Knights  of 
Columbus,  and  other  patriotic  bodies,  sees  that 
the  men's  hours  of  leisure  are  filled  with  clean 
sport  and  amusement. 

The  period  of  service  in  the  naval  camps  is 
brief,  extending  only  over  a  few  months.  The 
men  are  trained  there  in  the  rudiments  of  sea- 
manship and  military  practice,  and  then  are 
passed  on  to  service  on  the  sea.  For  the  more 
intelligent,  schools  are  provided  to  develop  cox- 
swains, quartermasters,  naval  aviators,  aviation 
mechanics,  radio  operators,  and  hospital-corps 
men. 


116  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

An  idea  of  the  work  of  these  great  naval 
schools  can  be  had  from  that  at  Great  Lakes, 
111.  When  the  war  broke  out  it  was  a  perma- 
nent station  fitted  to  accommodate  1,500  ap- 
prentices. Then  the  boys  of  the  Middle  West 
poured  into  it  by  the  thousands.  At  first  they 
had  to  be  sheltered  in  tents,  but  a  permanent 
cantonment  was  built  quickly,  and  to-day 
nearly  30,000  young  sailors  are  comfortably 
housed  in  thoroughly  sanitary  quarters.  In  the 
first  six  months  of  the  war  50,000  were  passed 
through  the  camp  to  the  fighting  ships.  In  all 
the  camps  the  percentage  of  sickness  has  been 
very  small,  so  carefully  have  the  men  been 
guarded  against  contagion  of  all  kinds.  Every 
newcomer  is  quarantined  for  several  weeks  be- 
fore he  is  allowed  to  come  in  contact  with  the 
main  body  of  his  fellows,  and  he  is  carefully 
examined  to  make  sure  that  he  carries  no  disease 
germs. 

The  work  of  training  men  for  the  navy  is 
more  difficult  than  for  the  army,  for  the  reason 
that  the  operation  of  ships  requires  many  men 
thoroughly  qualified  for  highly  technical  tasks. 
This  has  been  especially  true  in  the  matter  of 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  117 

officers.  The  merchant  marine  was  so  small 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  that  it  could  furnish 
to  the  navy  few  officers  qualified  for  the  duties 
of  the  bridge  and  engine-room.  Fortunately 
there  were  in  the  country  thousands  of  young 
men  who  had  had  experience  in  operating  small 
boats  of  all  kinds,  and  others  whose  training  at 
our  technical  schools  had  given  a  sound  basis 
for  education  in  the  special  branches  of  naval 
work.  They  went  to  the  classes  at  the  Naval 
Academy  and  to  officers'  schools  hi  the  camps, 
and  in  a  year  of  intensive  training  fitted  them- 
selves for  commissions  in  the  reserve  and  for 
service  at  sea.  Certain  vessels  have  been  used 
as  schools  in  gunnery  and  engineering,  and 
through  them  hundreds  of  young  men  have 
been  passing  to  active  duty  on  our  war-ships, 
and  as  armed  guards  on  our  merchantmen. 
The  task  of  arming  our  merchantmen  has 
added  greatly  to  the  work  of  the  department. 
Before  we  had  declared  war  we  were  arming 
our  merchant  ships  as  a  defense  against  the 
submarine,  and  short  though  the  navy  was  in 
men,  thousands  of  gunners  and  hundreds  of 
guns  had  to  be  provided  for  this  new  service. 


118  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

A  special  armed  guard  division  of  the  navy 
was  formed,  and  its  work  has  been  steadily 
increased  by  the  output  of  new  vessels,  which 
must  have  this  protection. 

Another  division  that  has  seen  a  tremendous 
increase  in  personnel  and  equipment  is  the 
Naval  Aviation  Corps.  A  year  ago  this  de- 
partment of  our  naval  work  was  not  greatly 
developed.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
War  it  was,  in  fact,  but  little  developed  in  any 
other  navy.  The  flying-boat,  however,  early 
proved  its  value,  not  only  for  scouting  purposes 
but  as  a  weapon  against  the  submarine.  As 
has  been  said,  the  first  of  our  armed  forces  to 
land  in  France  were  naval  aviators.  Since  that 
time  this  branch  of  the  service  has  been  greatly 
augmented.  The  flying  sections  of  the  regular 
navy,  Marine  and  Reserve  Corps  now  number 
more  than  30,000  men,  including  flying  officers, 
mechanics,  and  others.  One  great  plant  for 
the  construction  of  hydroairplanes  has  been 
built,  and  it  is  turning  out  machines  rapidly. 

The  foregoing  facts  give  some  idea  of  the  vast 
work  entailed  on  the  Navy  Department  by  the 
war.  That  the  great  increase  in  fighting  ships. 


NAVAL  PREPARATION  119 

in  personnel  and  supplies  has  been  secured  so 
rapidly  and  smoothly  speaks  well  for  the  offi- 
cers who  have  had  charge  of  the  task.  First  of 
these  is  Admiral  William  S.  Benson,  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations.  He  is  responsible  for  the 
operation  of  the  fleet  and  for  its  preparation  for 
battle;  he  has  to  co-ordinate  every  phase  of 
naval  work  so  as  to  secure  the  greatest  effective- 
ness against  the  enemy.  We  have  legally  no 
general  staff  in  the  navy.  The  Chief  of  Opera- 
tions and  the  heads  of  the  various  bureaus, 
meeting  with  the  secretary,  constitute  a  war 
council,  which  can  act  quickly  on  any  important 
question  that  arises.  The  country  has  been 
fortunate  to  have,  in  these  trying  times,  able 
men  at  the  head  of  these  important  naval  bu- 
reaus. They  had  a  magnificent  machine  ready 
for  war,  and  steadily  they  have  increased  its 
power  and  efficiency.  The  one  thought  of  these 
men,  long  trained  in  the  high  traditions  of  the 
navy,  is  the  good  of  the  service,  and  the  good  of 
the  service  is  the  good  of  the  country. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION 

OUR  allies  were  hard  pressed  when  we 
joined  them  in  the  war  on  Germany. 
The  collapse  of  Russia  had  freed  great  German 
armies  for  service  in  the  west  instead  of  the 
east.  The  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  was 
in  the  heyday  of  its  success,  and  the  steadily 
declining  merchant  tonnage  was  threatening 
disaster  to  Great  Britain.  Our  own  ship- 
building programme  was  being  delayed,  and 
month  after  month  showed  more  vessels  lost 
than  built.  Two  things  had  to  be  done  at 
once:  the  submarine  had  to  be  met  in  its  own 
haunts,  and  fighting  men  sent  to  the  front  with 
all  speed  and  in  all  possible  numbers. 

The  most  troublesome  weapon  which  America 
had  to  combat,  the  cause,  in  fact,  of  our  en- 
trance into  the  war,  was  an  American  device. 
As  a  newspaper  man,  the  writer  watched  with 
interest  the  early  development  of  the  subma- 
rine. In  the  fall  of  1897,  with  the  assistance 

120 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  121 

of  John  Holland,  he  wrote  in  the  New  York 
Evening  Sun  a  page  giving  an  account  of  the 
then  known  experiments  in  underwater  naviga- 
tion, and  including  prophecies  of  some  naval 
men  of  vision  as  to  its  future  development. 
Since  then  volumes  have  been  written  on  the 
subject.  If  he  remembers  correctly,  the  first 
known  experiment  with  a  submarine  was  made 
in  a  Spanish  harbor  some  two  hundred  years 
ago,  and  it  ended  disastrously  for  the  inventor. 
In  our  Revolution,  Bushnell,  an  American  in- 
ventor, contrived  a  hand-propelled  underwater 
boat,  which  navigated  from  Tarrytown  to  Fort 
George,  Staten  Island,  and  there  attempted, 
unsuccessfully,  to  blow  up  a  British  war-ship 
with  a  crude  bomb.  A  keg  of  powder  was  car- 
ried in  the  top  of  the  submarine,  and  it  was 
purposed  to  attach  this  to  the  hull  of  the  war- 
ship by  means  of  a  screw,  cast  loose,  and  let 
a  timed  clock  explode  the  bomb.  The  war- 
ship's hull  so  resisted  the  turn  of  the  screw  that 
the  operator  had  to  abandon  the  enterprise, 
but  he  got  safely  home.  Robert  Fulton  de- 
vised a  submarine  of  much  the  same  type,  and 
offered  it  to  Napoleon  for  service  against  the 


122  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

fleets  of  England.  In  the  Civil  War,  a  sub- 
marine of  considerable  size  which  had  been 
devised  by  a  Confederate  officer  went  down 
with  all  on  board,  in  Charleston  harbor,  while 
attempting  to  attack  a  Federal  cruiser.  All 
these  boats  submerged  by  taking  on  water-bal- 
last, and  the  great  problem  of  the  inventors 
was  to  find  means  of  propulsion.  Holland,  in 
his  experiments  with  the  boats  which  he  built 
in  the  '80's,  had  a  small  gas-engine,  and  this 
used  up  the  air  so  rapidly  that  he  could  not 
stay  submerged  for  any  time.  He  devised  a 
new  method  of  submerging  by  means  of  hori- 
zontal rudders,  and  worked  out  devices  to  make 
for  safety  and  accuracy  in  navigation.  The  de- 
velopment of  the  storage-battery  as  a  means  of 
storing  electric  energy  solved  the  difficulty  of 
power.  In  1892  he  secured  an  order  from  the 
Navy  Department  to  build  a  submarine  tor- 
pedo-boat, the  Plunger.  It  was  to  travel  on 
the  surf  ace  by  steam  and  under  water  by  elec- 
tric power.  This  craft  was  begun  but  never 
finished.  About  this  time  a  French  inventor 
was  working  on  a  submarine  with  success. 
With  the  help  of  private  enterprise  Holland, 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION 

in  the  fall  of  1897,  laid  the  keel  of  another 
submarine,  called  the  Holland,  at  Nixon's  ship- 
yard at  Elizabethport,  N.  J.  It  was  launched 
in  March  of  the  next  year,  and  the  Evening 
Sun  of  that  date  published  a  page  account 
of  the  vessel,  but  the  event  was  regarded 
as  of  so  little  importance  as  to  be  almost  dis- 
regarded by  the  other  papers.  Not  many 
weeks  later  the  tiny  vessel  was  navigating 
under  the  waters  of  New  York  harbor,  her 
performances  being  watched  with  wondering 
eyes  by  naval  men.  But  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment did  not  take  kindly  to  the  submarine. 
The  craft  was  too  revolutionary,  the  battle- 
ship was  the  pet  of  the  construction  depart- 
ment, and  it  gave  little  encouragement  to  Hol- 
land or  to  the  other  men  who  now  set  about 
perfecting  this  manner  of  craft.  A  few  boats 
were  ordered,  but  for  years  we  lagged  behind 
other  nations  in  the  development  of  the  type 
Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  France  were  less 
slow  in  seizing  on  the  new  naval  weapon,  and 
how  Germany  has  used  it  the  world  knows  te 
its  sorrow. 

The  fleets  of  Great  Britain  drove  the  German 


124  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

Navy  from  the  sea  almost  the  day  war  was  de- 
clared. Only  in  her  submarines  had  Germany 
an  effective  naval  weapon,  and  these  proved 
almost  powerless  to  accomplish  anything  against 
the  vigilant  British  men-of-war.  To  the  aston- 
ishment of  civilized  peoples,  they  were  turned 
against  helpless  merchantmen,  and  began  their 
career  of  murder.  An  unarmed  ship  was  at 
their  mercy.  From  an  armed  ship  they  could 
always  seek  safety  in  the  depths.  To  destroy 
the  submarine  became  the  perplexing  problem 
of  the  allied  navies.  Numerous  methods  were 
followed,  but  it  was  found  that  the  most  effec- 
tive was  a  careful  patrol  by  armed  vessels  of 
the  infested  sea  areas.  Many  small,  fast,  armed 
motor-boats  were  built,  and  for  a  while  did  good 
work,  but  the  ever-increasing  size  of  the  pirate 
craft  and  their  heavier  armament  soon  made 
them  more  than  a  match  for  the  lightly  armed 
chaser.  Now  the  main  reliance  is  placed  on 
fast  destroyers  and  hydroairplanes. 

Our  Navy  Department  early  realized  the 
danger  of  the  submarine,  and  long  before  we 
entered  the  war  it  was  devising  means  to  meet 
it,  should  the  necessity  arise.  An  important 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  125 

step  in  the  work  of  preparedness  was  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board,  a  body  of 
men  skilled  in  every  branch  of  science,  who 
placed  their  services  at  the  government's  dis- 
posal. It  was  formed  in  1915,  with  Thomas 
A.  Edison  at  its  head,  an  I  has  been  working 
ever  since  at  the  problems  of  offense  and  defense 
in  naval  warfare.  Naturally,  a  flood  of  sugges- 
tions for  dealing  with  the  submarines  has  been 
submitted  to  it,  and  the  great  part  of  them 
have  not  proved  of  value.  Since  we  went  to 
war  the  National  Research  Council,  another 
scientific  body  connected  with  the  Council  of 
National  Defense,  has  been  working  over  tL? 
same  problem.  The  results  of  the  labors  of  these 
two  bodies  have  not  been  made  public,  but  it 
is  known  that  they,  in  conjunction  with  similar 
bodies  in  the  service  of  our  allies,  have  perfected 
some  very  effective  devices  for  locating  and 
destroying  the  submarine.  One  of  them,  the 
depth-bomb,  which  dropped  from  a  vessel  or  hy- 
droairplane  explodes  at  a  given  depth,  destroy- 
ing any  craft  within  a  considerable  area,  has 
proved  the  destruction  of  many  of  the  pirates. 
The  first  duty  of  the  navy  when  war  was 


126  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

declared  was  to  attack  the  submarine,  and  it 
did  so  with  great  promptness.  In  less  than  a 
month  our  first  flotilla  of  destroyers  had  ar- 
rived on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  and  was 
engaged  in  active  operations  against  the  Ger- 
mans. The  patrol  of  this  side  of  the  sea  was 
taken  over  by  our  vessels,  releasing  for  service 
in  the  more  infested  waters  a  number  of  our 
allies'  ships.  The  first  flotilla  was  followed  by 
other  squadrons,  and  to-day  thousands  of  our 
seamen  are  working  with  their  fellows  of  Eng- 
land and  France  making  the  seas  safe  for 
transport  of  all  kinds.  That  the  co-operation 
or  the  allied  navies  has  been  attended  with 
marked  success  is  evidenced  by  the  gradual 
but  steady  decline  in  the  number  of  ships  tor- 
pedoed, and  by  the  continuing  increase  in  the 
number  of  hostile  U-boats  sunk.  The  exact 
figures  as  to  the  destruction  of  these  U-boats 
have  never  been  made  public,  but  we  have  the 
assurance  of  the  British  Government  that,  be- 
cause of  the  strengthened  patrol  and  unproved 
offensive  methods,  their  destruction  since  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1918  has  exceeded  their 
replacement. 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  127 

The  second  great  operation  of  our  navy  was 
to  get  our  military  forces  overseas.  Germany 
has  belittled  America  as  a  foe  because  she  did 
not  believe  it  possible  for  us  to  send  a  force  of 
any  importance  so  great  a  distance,  especially 
through  waters  infested  by  her  U-boats.  She 
learned  her  mistake  when,  in  June,  our  gallant 
marines  at  Chateau-Thierry  helped  to  stop  her 
rush  toward  Paris.  Had  she  doubts  then,  she 
must  have  been  convinced  that  we  really  had 
an  army  at  the  Marne  when  thousands  of  our 
soldiers  threw  themselves  upon  her  armies  and 
helped  to  drive  them  from  the  Chateau-Thierry 
salient.  A  million  and  a  half  men  moved  in 
a  year  and  a  half  to  France,  and  the  prospect 
of  the  number  doubled  within  a  year  must 
make  her  wonder. 

The  forces  we  could  send  to  France  in  the 
early  months  were  only  small.  Aside  from  our 
Regular  Army,  we  had  not  the  men  then  ready. 
But  France  was  calling  for  even  the  moral 
support  of  a  small  force.  Ships  for  transports 
were  lacking.  Almost  at  the  moment  war  was 
declared  we  had  seized  in  our  ports  118  interned 
enemy  vessels,  but  these  had  been  so  badly 


128  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

damaged  by  their  crews  as  not  to  be  ready  for 
service  at  that  time.  Such  suitable  vessels  as 
could  be  had  from  our  small  merchant  marine 
and  from  our  allies  were  gathered  together  in 
various  harbors,  and  about  the  middle  of  June, 
in  one  great  convoy,  they  set  forth  over  the 
Atlantic  carrying  the  first  contingents  of  our 
Regular  Army  and  a  vast  quantity  of  supplies. 
The  Germans  had  been  apprised  of  their  com- 
ing and  a  flotilla  of  submarines  was  lying  in 
wait.  They  attacked  the  convoy  off  the  French 
coast,  but  the  vigilance  of  our  destroyers  and 
the  accuracy  of  their  fire  drove  off  the  U-boats, 
at  least  one  of  which,  it  is  believed,  was  sent 
to  the  bottom.  On  June  25  the  entire  fleet 
arrived  safely  in  a  French  harbor.  Not  a  life 
was  lost  in  this  expedition.  Since  that  time 
a  steady  movement  of  transports  and  supply- 
ships  has  kept  going  and  coming  over  the  seas, 
and  thanks  to  the  navy's  vigilance  the  loss  of 
life  as  compared  with  the  great  number  of 
troops  carried  has  been  almost  negligible.  In  a 
year  but  two  transports  were  lost.  The  Antilles 
was  sunk  while  returning  from  France.  The 
Tuscania,  a  British  vessel  carrying  our  soldiers, 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  129 

was  sent  to  the  bottom  and  several  hundred 
lives  were  lost.  The  Finland  was  torpedoed, 
but  reached  a  British  port  under  her  own  steam. 

The  German  Government  calculated  that  the 
lack  of  vessels  and  the  attacks  of  the  submarines 
would  make  a  great  movement  of  American 
troops  impossible.  The  navy  has  rendered  the 
submarine  ineffective.  The  difficulty  over  the 
ship  shortage  has  been  solved  by  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  navy  and  the  shipping  board.  At 
the  end  of  six  months  all  the  German  vessels 
which  we  seized  had  been  repaired  and  were  in 
the  government  service.  But  to  carry  the 
men  has  not  been  the  only  problem.  With 
them  a  steady  supply  of  food  and  ordnance  of 
all  kinds  has  to  be  kept  moving  and  protected, 
and  the  handling  of  so  many  vessels  and  the 
vast  quantities  of  stores  necessitated  practi- 
cally the  reconstruction  of  a  French  port  and 
a  great  increase  in  its  docking  facilities. 

The  movement  of  our  troops  abroad  in  1917 
was  not  great.  Hardly  more  than  300,000  men 
were  sent  over.  Then  in  the  late  winter  our 
National  Guard  and  National  Army  were  ready 
to  start  to  the  front.  By  this  time  the  subma- 


130  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

rine  had  been  curbed  and  many  new  vessels 
were  coming  from  our  ways,  though  we  had 
still  to  rely  largely  on  our  allies,  and  particu- 
larly on  Great  Britain,  for  transports.  The 
massing  of  heavy  German  armies  in  the  west, 
threatening  a  desperate  attack  on  the  allied 
line,  caused  France  and  Great  Britain  to  send 
us  an  urgent  appeal  for  all  possible  fighting 
men,  and  the  movement  of  troops  in  the  spring 
and  summer  was  accelerated  to  a  degree  that  a 
year  ago  would  have  seemed  incredible.  In 
the  month  of  June,  276,370  soldiers  were  carried 
over,  and  in  July  more  than  300,000.  To  that 
time  the  total  loss  of  life  in  the  .perilous  move- 
ment had  been  less  than  300.  In  the  meanwhile 
the  work  of  the  allied  navies  against  the  sub- 
marines was  telling,  as  was  shown  by  the 
steadily  decreasing  loss  of  tonnage.  The  total 
loss  for  June  was  81,905  gross  tons  less  than  in 
May.  The  sinkings  in  July  were  one-half  those 
of  the  same  month  last  year. 

The  navy  has  not  only  had  to  protect  the 
transports,  but  in  many  cases  it  has  had  to 
man  them.  The  transport  service  is  really  in 
charge  of  a  division  of  the  War  Department, 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  131 

which  has  branches  in  all  our  great  ports,  and 
supervises  the  operation  of  the  vessels.  The 
navy's  main  task  is  that  of  policing  the  seas, 
but  it  has  also  to  furnish  armed  guards  to  all 
vessels  that  pass  through  the  danger  zone. 
There  has  been  difficulty  in  finding  civilian 
crews  to  man  the  great  number  of  new  mer- 
chantmen sailing  under  our  flag,  and  in  such 
cases  the  army  and  the  shipping  board  have 
had  to  call  on  the  navy  for  assistance,  and  crews 
have  been  supplied.  For  this  work  the  Naval 
Reserve  force  has  proved  of  special  value,  as  it 
contains  many  men  who  have  seen  service  in 
the  merchant  marine. 

In  writing  of  the  mobilization  of  our  naval 
forces  for  war,  it  is  fitting  thai  mention  should 
be  made  of  that  gallant  corps,  our  soldiers  of 
the  sea,  who  have  been  acquitting  themselves 
so  bravely  on  the  soil  of  France.  The  motto 
of  the  marine  corps  is  Semper  Fidelis.  To  the 
popular  mind  it  is  "The  First  to  Fight."  In 
every  war  in  which  America  has  engaged,  the 
marines  have  conducted  themselves  gallantly, 
and  never  have  they  failed  to  live  up  to  the 
high  traditions  of  their  service.  Under  the 


132  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

old  theory  the  marines  were  the  police  of  the 
ship,  and  as  a  consequence  did  not  enjoy  high 
favor  with  the  jackies.  In  battle  they  fought 
with  small  arms  and  were  of  special  value  in 
landing-parties.  Before  this  war  their  service 
was  always  in  small  units.  To-day  they  are 
fighting  in  divisions  as  a  part  of  our  army. 

The  history  of  the  corps  intertwines  with 
that  of  both  army  and  navy.  Marines  fought 
under  John  Paul  Jones  on  the  Ranger  and  the 
Bon  Homme  Richard.  In  the  war  with  Tripoli, 
in  1803,  they  played  a  conspicuous  part,  and 
they  had  a  hand  in  the  War  of  1812,  both  on 
sea  and  land.  In  the  Mexican  War  a  body  of 
marines  were  the  first  of  our  forces  to  enter  the 
city  of  Mexico.  There  is  hardly  a  year  in 
American  history  when  our  marines  have  not 
been  on  dangerous  duty  somewhere  in  the 
world  keeping  order  and  upholding  the  honor 
of  the  flag.  They  made  the  first  landing  in 
Cuba  in  1898,  and  fought  their  way  to  Pekin 
with  the  allied  troops  in  the  Boxer  campaign. 
When  the  present  war  came  the  corps  was 
ready  as  always,  trained  to  the  minute  and 
equipped  to  the  last  button,  and  a  brigade  of 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  133 

them  formed  part  of  our  first  forces  to  land  in 
France. 

The  strength  of  the  corps  has  usually  been 
kept  about  one-fourth  that  of  the  navy  per- 
sonnel. On  April  6,  1917,  it  numbered  13,692 
officers  and  men,  and  the  President  was  author- 
ized to  increase  its  war  strength  to  17,400, 
which  was  rapidly  done.  Successive  legisla- 
tion, designed  to  make  its  growth  keep  pace 
with  that  of  our  other  forces,  has  raised  its 
numbers  to  nearly  75,000.  All  these  have  been 
volunteers,  and  a  finer  lot  of  men  would  be  hard 
to  find.  The  physical  qualifications  for  the 
service  have  always  been  very  high,  and  even 
under  the  necessity  of  obtaining  thousands  of 
recruits  these  standards  have  been  but  little 
relaxed.  The  romance  of  the  service  by  sea 
and  land  "from  the  shores  of  Tripoli  to  the 
halls  of  Montezuma,"  has  had  a  wide  appeal 
among  the  young  men  of  the  country.  The 
corps  offers  opportunities  for  rapid  advance- 
ment, and  hundreds  of  highly  educated  men 
have  gone  into  its  ranks  with  the  purpose  of 
working  their  way  up  to  commissions.  The 
needs  of  our  growing  navy  in  the  past  twenty 


134  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

years  have  made  it  necessary  that  all  the 
trained  Annapolis  graduates  be  put  into  the 
line.  For  a  time  many  of  the  marine  corps 
officers  were  appointed  from  civil  life,  but  to- 
day it  secures  them  almost  entirely  from  its 
own  ranks.  It  has  become  a  great  military 
school  in  which  every  man  is  made  to  feel  the 
honor  of  the  service  and  is  taught  the  obligation 
of  upholding  its  splendid  record.  It  has  become 
a  body  of  fighting  men  in  physique  and  train- 
ing the  equal  of  any  in  the  world. 

The  rapid  expansion  of  the  corps  in  the  past 
year  has  been  splendidly  accomplished.  Re- 
cruits go  to  the  great  camps  at  Paris  Island, 
S.  C.,  or  Mare  Island,  Cal.  Here  they  undergo 
fourteen  weeks  of  intensive  training.  Clean- 
liness of  person,  implicit  obedience,  precision  in 
drill  and  accurate  shooting  are  absolute  require- 
ments. The  men  who  are  chosen  for  overseas 
duty  are  sent  to  complete  their  training  at 
Quantico,  Va.  This  is  one  of  the  model  war- 
schools  of  the  country.  Here  actual  fighting 
conditions  have  been  simulated  to  a  greater  de- 
gree than  in  any  other  of  our  cantonments. 
The  barracks  are  the  acme  of  cleanliness  and 


.  ~ 

la 

03    '.3; 
JS     a 

"  * 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  135 

healthful  conditions.  A  training-ground  hun- 
dreds of  acres  in  extent  gives  room  for  artil- 
lery and  rifle  ranges,  and  a  great  trench  system, 
with  wire  entanglements  and  dugouts.  From 
these  trenches  in  their  training  the  men  have 
been  sent  out  into  No  Man's  Land  behind  a 
real  barrage  of  artillery -fire.  Training  under 
such  conditions  is  the  nearest  thing  to  actual 
fighting  that  our  men  see  on  this  side  of  the 
water. 

All  of  our  navy  camps  are  splendidly  located 
and  managed.  Their  situation  near  large  bodies 
of  water  adds  much  to  their  health.  The  writer 
has  visited  several  of  them  and  found  them  alike 
in  their  standards  of  health  and  comfort.  The 
large  station  for  the  reserve  at  Pelham  Bay 
Park  on  Long  Island  Sound  is  an  excellent  ex- 
ample of  them.  The  writer  was  fortunate 
enough  to  have  a  sailor  friend  there  who  guided 
him  from  the  main  gate  through  all  the  work- 
ing parts  of  this  big  school  for  seamen.  Close 
by  the  gate  are  the  huts  of  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  and 
the  Knights  of  Columbus,  where,  it  being  noon, 
scores  of  young  sailors  were  found  writing, 
reading,  and  amusing  themselves  with  music 


136  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

and  games.  To  my  guide's  inquiry  as  to  what 
I  wished  to  see  first,  the  reply  was,  "Food,"  and 
I  was  led  to  the  great  mess-hall.  The  kitchen 
was  spotless.  We  lined  up  before  the  affable 
cooks  and  received  a  tin  plate  with  a  plentiful 
helping  of  excellent  beefsteak,  carrots,  pota- 
toes, and  green  peas,  a  cup  of  coffee  and  a 
plate  of  stewed  peaches.  These  we  consumed 
at  the  long  tables  in  the  mess-hall  with  the 
added  luxury  of  the  first  white  bread  I  had  seen 
in  a  year.  The  meal  over,  we  began  our  tour, 
going  first  to  the  bakery,  where  thousands  of 
loaves  of  that  delicious  white  bread  were  being 
made.  Thence  we  went  to  the  storerooms  and 
they  would  have  been  a  model  for  any  first- 
class  hotel.  In  the  enlistment  bureau  we  fol- 
lowed the  process  that  changes  a  civilian  into  a 
seaman.  In  one  room  a  score  of  young  men 
still  in  mufti  were  filling  out  their  papers;  in 
the  next  another  score  were  sitting  in  the  clothes 
they  were  born  in  beside  the  discarded  apparel 
of  civil  life;  in  the  next  a  half  dozen  Apollo  Bel- 
videres  were  being  pounded  by  surgeons  and 
jabbed  with  needles;  in  the  last  there  were 
more,  scrambling  into  clothes  again,  but  now 


OUR  NAVY  IN  ACTION  137 

the  clothes  allotted  to  them  by  Uncle  Sam. 
We  emerged  into  the  detention -camp.  Here 
the  rookies  stay  three  weeks  in  quarantine, 
carefully  wired  off  from  the  rest  of  the  camp. 
For  the  better  control  of  any  contagion  their 
barracks  are  divided  so  that  only  a  small  squad 
is  housed  in  one  room.  We  passed  back  to  the 
main  camp.  Here  each  barrack  is  occupied  by 
one  company.  The  buildings  are  light,  airy, 
and  scrupulously  clean.  In  them  the  new 
sailors  get  their  first  taste  of  sea  ways,  for  they 
sleep  in  hammocks.  In  daytime  the  ham- 
mocks are  neatly  rolled  against  the  wall  beside 
the  canvas  bag  that  contains  the  owner's  equip- 
ment; at  night  they  stretched  between  iron-pipe 
jack-stays,  and  if  the  men  feel  none  of  the 
motion  of  a  ship  they  have  at  least  a  touch  of 
the  fo'c'sle. 

That  afternoon  the  bay  was  alive  with  boats, 
the  crews  pulling  at  their  oars  under  the  com- 
mands of  vociferous  petty  officers.  In  the 
school  barracks  scores  of  young  aspirants  for 
commissions  were  poring  over  text-books  and 
listening  to  lectures  on  the  technic  of  the 
sailor's  profession.  On  the  parade-ground, 


138  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

under  the  eyes  of  the  commandant,  six  compa- 
nies from  the  detention-camp  were  drilling  ear- 
nestly in  a  competition  which  promised  a  day's 
leave  from  camp  for  the  winning  company. 
On  the  water,  in  the  schools,  on  the  drill -grounds 
thousands  of  white-clad  young  men  were  work- 
ing hard  to  fit  themselves  for  their  country's 
service.  They  were  men  from  the  colleges  and 
schools,  from  the  factories,  shops,  and  farms. 
Many  of  them,  perhaps,  had  little  knowledge 
of  the  underlying  causes  of  the  war.  To  all 
of  them  the  vital  thing  was  that  their  country 
was  in  arms  against  a  race  of  outlaws  and  will- 
ingly and  cheerfully  they  were  hardening  them- 
selves to  do  their  bit  in  the  whipping  of  the 
Hun. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  FOOD   CAMPAIGN 

THE  fourth  great  problem  which  the  gov- 
ernment has  had  to  solve  in  its  conduct 
of  the  war  has  been  that  of  food.  It  is  an  ex- 
aggeration to  say  that  food  will  win  the  war. 
Food  is  but  one  of  the  weapons  with  which 
the  victory  will  be  won.  The  battle  to  pro- 
duce and  conserve  food  is  one  in  which  the 
humblest  of  us  has  been  able  to  have  a  part. 
It  was  the  campaign  for  increased  production 
and  conservation  that  first  brought  to  the  mass 
of  the  people  a  realization  that  we  were  in  a 
war  the  winning  of  which  demanded  personal 
sacrifice  of  every  American.  Before  an  Amer- 
ican soldier  had  set  foot  in  France  we  were 
ploughing  new  fields  and  taking  stock  of  our 
larder. 

To  reach  an  understanding  of  the  pressing 
food  problem  of  txxlay  one  has  to  consider  the 
situation  of  the  world  as  to  food-supplies  before 
1914.  In  the  decade  before  that  Europe  had 

189 


140  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

been  unable  to  increase  the  production  of  the 
staple  food,  wheat.  Vast  as  were  our  resources, 
America,  in  the  same  period,  had  not  increased 
her  power  of  export  to  any  great  degree. 
Europe  had  to  be  fed  largely  from  outside,  and 
for  a  great  part  of  her  wheat  depended  on  the 
plains  of  Asia,  South  America,  and  Australia. 
When  the  war  came  our  present  allies  were  shut 
off  from  the  Russian  and  Rumanian  fields.  It 
is  estimated  that  in  the  year  1917  there  were 
in  Russia,  China,  India,  and  Argentine  about 
four  hundred  million  bushels  of  exportable 
wheat,  but  war  and  lack  of  transport  made  it 
impossible  to  get  it  to  our  allies.  Australia  to- 
day has  in  her  elevators  an  exportable  surplus 
of  nearly  two  hundred  million  bushels  of  wheat, 
but  while  a  ship  is  making  one  round  trip  be- 
tween Sydney  and  Europe  she  can  make  three 
to  America.  The  free  movement  of  crops  has 
long  been  vital  to  the  life  of  Europe,  and  when 
this  movement  was  hampered  by  the  war,  fam- 
ine was  threatened.  Making  the  danger  of 
starvation  greater  was  the  fact  that  millions  of 
men  were  withdrawn  from  the  farms  to  serve 
in  the  armies  and  munition-factories.  It  is 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN 


141 


estimated  that  in  the  countries  of  our  allies  the 
destructive  activities  of  war  have  withdrawn 
nearly  forty  million  men  from  the  productive 
activities  of  peace.  Before  the  war  France  had 
to  import  30  per  cent  of  her  food.  In  1917  her 
cereal  crop  was  40  per  cent  below  the  pre-war 
average.  Great  Britain  in  peace-times  imports 
50  per  cent  of  her  food.  To-day  she  is  getting 
nearly  44  per  cent  of  her  food-supply  from 
America. 

The  following  table  gives  clear  proof  of  Great 
Britain's  dependence  on  the  sea  for  life.  It 
gives  the  average  per  cent  of  certain  foodstuffs 
home  produced  and  imported  during  the  years 
from  1906  to  1913. 


HOME   PRODUCED 

IMPORTED 

Meat  

59 

41 

Wheat  

22 

88 

Barley  

60 

40 

Oats  

80 

20 

Potatoes  

97 

3 

Butter  

35 

65 

Cheese  

25 

75 

Apples  .  . 

58 

42 

Corn  

practically  none 

Fish  

practically  all 

142  HOW  WE  WENT  TO   WAR 

When,  in  1914,  the  great  sources  of  supply  in 
Asia  were  cut  off,  and  the  long  haul  from  India, 
Australia,  and  South  America  made  it  unfeasi- 
ble to  secure  much  food  there,  our  allies  and  the 
neutral  countries  turned  for  help  to  the  nearest 
markets,  our  own.  The  result  of  this  demand, 
even  before  our  entrance  into  the  war,  was  a 
rapid  rise  in  the  price  of  all  foodstuffs.  Ac- 
cording to  government  reports  in  the  five  years 
previous  to  June,  1918,  there  was  an  average 
increase  of  66  per  cent  of  the  price  of  all  food- 
stuffs in  America.  Had  we  not  had  recourse  to 
governmental  regulation,  that  increase  would 
have  been  much  greater.  Wheat  which  in  1914 
was  selling  around  $1  a  bushel,  in  the  spring  of 
1917  rose  from  $1.44  to  $3,  and  the  prices  of 
all  other  basic  foodstuffs  were  sky-rocketing  in 
the  same  way. 

Our  entrance  into  the  war  found  our  allies  in 
great  distress  as  to  food-supplies.  It  found  their 
own  food  production  steadily  declining,  and  the 
submarine,  then  in  the  heyday  of  its  successes, 
smking  many  tons  of  precious  cargoes  vital  to 
their  life.  We  promised  them  three  things, 
men,  ships,  and  food.  Germany  was  boasting 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  143 

that  within  six  months  she  would  by  starvation 
bring  Great  Britain  to  her  knees.  She  has  not 
starved  Great  Britain  and  she  will  not  because 
Americans  know  that  the  life  of  Great  Britain 
and  France  is  vital  to  America's  safety;  they 
know  that  if  our  allies  fail  to  get  food  we  shall 
be  left  to  fight  alone  and  that  the  war  will 
come  to  our  coast.  In  the  field  and  in  the 
kitchen  they  have  been  carrying  on  a  work  that 
is  a  part  of  the  great  offensive  to  crush  the 
enemy.  The  moment  they  entered  the  war 
they  were  told  by  the  government  what  had  to 
be  done,  and  they  have  done  it  willingly.  The 
food  campaign  has  been  one  of  universal  service. 
In  pre-war  days  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy, 
and  Belgium  imported  yearly  some  750,000,000 
bushels  of  grain  and  vast  quantities  of  animal 
and  fat  products.  In  the  three  years  before  the 
war  the  United  States  exported  a  yearly  aver- 
age of  120,000,000  bushels  of  grain  (wheat, 
corn,  oats,  barley,  and  rye)  and  500,000,000 
pounds  of  animal  products  and  fats.  In  the 
year  1917  the  Allies'  production  of  cereals  had 
diminished  by  525,000,000  bushels,  and  herds 
of  cattle,  sheep,  and  swine  by  30,000,000  ani- 


144  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

mals.  The  continuation  of  the  war  promised 
an  ever-increasing  shortage  in  their  supplies. 
In  the  fiscal  year  1916-17  we  exported  400,000,- 
000  bushels  of  grain  and  1,500,000,000  pounds 
of  animal  products  and  fats.  To  do  this  we 
had  reduced  our  food  stocks  to  the  lowest  fig- 
ure, relatively,  in  our  history,  and  we  were  kill- 
ing animals  faster  than  we  were  raising  them. 
When  we  joined  the  Allies  in  the  fight  for  free- 
dom it  ceased  to  be  merely  a  matter  of  business 
to  send  them  food.  It  became  a  deep  obliga- 
tion and  a  work  of  patriotism.  For  the  year 
1917-18  our  allies  called  for  525,000,000  bushels 
of  wheat,  their  basic  ration,  and  our  normal  ex- 
port of  wheat  had  been  only  80,000,000  bushels; 
Canada's  normal  export  was  100,000,000  bushels 
and  it  was  possible  for  them  to  get  but  little 
from  the  more  distant  markets.  This  situation 
left  a  wide  gap  to  be  filled,  and  the  same  diffi- 
culty presented  itself,  not  with  wheat  alone 
but  with  every  other  foodstuff.  The  problem 
could  never  have  been  solved  without  govern- 
ment supervision  and  nation-wide  co-operation. 
Fortunately  the  government  had  ready  for 
service  Herbert  C.  Hoover,  who,  from  the  out- 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  145 

break  of  the  war  in  Europe  until  our  own  en- 
trance into  it,  had  been  working  as  the  head  of 
the  American  Commission  for  Relief  in  Bel- 
gium. In  working  out  the  difficult  problem  of 
rationing  millions  of  starving  Belgians  Mr. 
Hoover  became  an  expert  on  food-supply  and 
food  values.  When  he  went  to  Washington  in 
the  spring  of  1917  he  had  for  months  no  author- 
ity for  effective  action.  He  could  only  work 
informally  with  the  sanction  of  President  Wil- 
son. He  organized  an  office  force,  composed 
largely  of  volunteers,  and  this  force  was  the 
nucleus  of  what  subsequently  became  under  the 
law  the  United  States  Food  Administration. 
The  first  work  done  was  largely  that  of  propa- 
ganda. A  campaign  of  education  was  carried 
on.  The  pressing  needs  of  our  allies  were  ex- 
plained to  the  people  of  the  country  and  on 
them  was  impressed  the  absolute  necessity  of 
raising  more  food  and  of  using  and  wasting  less. 
On  August  10  the  so-called  Lever  bill  became  a 
law,  and  under  its  broad  powers  the  President 
was  enabled  to  organize  the  Food  and  the  Fuel 
Admin  istrations . 

As  essential  to  the  national  security  the  bill  is 


146  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

designed  "to  assure  an  adequate  supply  and  an 
equal  distribution  and  to  facilitate  the  move- 
ment of  foods,  feeds,  fuel,  including  fuel-oil  and 
natural  gas"  and  of  fertilizers  and  of  the  ma- 
chinery and  implements  used  in  the  production 
of  these  necessities. 

At  his  discretion  the  President  is  empowered 
to  license  all  persons  engaged  in  producing, 
storing,  or  dealing  in  these  necessities,  except 
that  farmers  and  gardeners,  and  retailers  doing 
less  than  $100,000  gross  business  yearly  are 
exempted.  He  can  require  the  licensees  to 
make  reports  for  inspection  by  his  agents.  If  it 
is  found  that  "the  storage  charge,  commission 
profit,  or  practice  of  any  licensee  is  unjust  or 
unreasonable,  or  discriminatory  and  unfair  or 
wasteful,"  and  such  practice  is  not  discontinued, 
the  license  may  be  revoked.  Without  a  license 
the  business  cannot  be  continued,  under  a  pen- 
alty of  fine,  or  imprisonment,  or  both. 

Hoarding  is  prohibited,  and  is  made  punish- 
able by  a  fine,  or  imprisonment,  or  both. 

The  use  of  any  foodstuffs,  grains  or  fruits,  in 
the  distillation  of  spirits  for  beverages  is  for- 
bidden. 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  147 

The  President  is  authorized  when  necessary 
to  the  public  welfare  to  requisition  storage  fa- 
cilities, and  he  can  take  over  and  operate  any 
factory,  packing-house,  mine,  and  pipe-line  or 
other  plant  used  hi  the  production  or  moving 
of  the  necessities  named,  but  hi  all  such  cases 
he  must  make  just  compensation  to  the  owners. 

He  can  purchase  and  provide  storage  facilities 
for,  and  sell  at  reasonable  prices  for  cash,  wheat, 
flour,  meal,  beans,  and  potatoes.  In  such  cases 
he  must  pay  for  these  commodities  the  mini- 
mum price,  if  such  minimum  price  has  been 
fixed  under  the  later  provisions  of  the  law. 

If  he  finds  that  an  emergency  exists  requir- 
ing the  stimulation  of  the  production  of  wheat, 
he  can  give  public  notice  of  what  is  a  reasonable 
price  for  wheat  hi  order  to  insure  the  producers 
a  reasonable  profit.  Thereupon  the  govern- 
ment guarantees  every  producer  of  wheat  this 
reasonable  price.  The  law  provided  that  until 
May  1,  1919,  the  price  should  not  be  fixed  at 
less  than  $2  per  bushel. 

The  President  was  further  authorized  to  fix 
the  price  of  coal  and  coke,  "wherever  and  when- 
ever sold,  either  by  producer  or  dealer." 


148  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

An  appropriation  of  $150,000,000  was  made 
to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  act.  This 
sum  constitutes  a  revolving  fund  to  be  used  in 
the  work  of  purchasing  and  selling  the  com- 
modities named. 

Immediately  on  signing  the  bill  the  President 
appointed  Mr.  Hoover  United  States  Food  Ad- 
ministrator, and  Mr.  Hoover  and  his  associates 
organized  the  United  States  Food  Administra- 
tion. 

The  problem  facing  the  Food  Administration 
was  a  difficult  one.  Production  had  to  be  in- 
creased and  consumption  reduced  with  the 
least  possible  disarrangement  of  the  ordinary 
processes  of  trade.  Opinions  as  to  the  best 
methods  varied.  High  and  rising  wages  with 
wide-spread  employment  promised  increased 
consumption.  On  the  other  hand,  if  increased 
production  were  obtained  by  allowing  the  prices 
of  foodstuffs  to  rise  unrestrained,  it  wras  con- 
tended that  a  great  burden  would  be  thrown 
on  those  least  able  to  pay.  It  was  decided  that 
prices  must  be  regulated  and  production  stimu- 
lated and  waste  eliminated  by  an  appeal  to  the 
patriotism  of  the  people.  The  Food  Adminis 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  149 

tration  ?oon  became  a  great  business  organiza- 
tion, dealing  in  basic  foodstuffs  and  regulating 
trade  and  at  the  same  time  conducting  a  patri- 
otic propaganda. 

The  President  on  August  14  authorized  the 
formation  of  the  Food  Administration  Grain 
Corporation,  with  a  capital  stock  of  $50,000,000, 
all  held  by  the  government,  with  a  purpose  to 
buy  and  sell  wheat.  This  stock  has  since  been 
trebled.  A  few  days  later  the  Grain  Corpora- 
tion opened  agencies  at  all  the  principal  primary 
grain -markets  and  began  its  work  of  dealing  in 
wheat,  at  a  price  of  $2.20  per  bushel,  with  cer- 
tain differentials  for  locality  and  grade,  fixed 
by  the  President.  There  is  nothing  in  the  law 
that  prevents  any  one  from  buying  or  selling 
at  another  price,  but  the  government's  action 
acted  automatically  to  hold  the  price  at  the 
fixed  figure.  It  is  manifest  that  nobody  would 
sell  wheat  at  a  less  figure  than  the  government 
was  ready  to  give  for  it,  and  that  no  one  would 
buy  it  at  a  greater  figure  than  the  government 
would  pay  for  it,  as  the  government  was  always 
ready  to  undersell  him  afterward.  Through 
its  system  of  licenses,  the  government  has  been 


150  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

able  to  supervise  the  dealings  in  grain,  and  has 
wiped  out  much  of  the  cost  of  the  movement 
from  producer  to  consumer  by  reducing  the 
profits  of  the  middlemen.  After  its  purchase  of 
wheat  it  sells  to  the  miller  with  only  a  very 
small  charge  for  overhead  expenses  of  opera- 
tion. It  has  eliminated  speculation  and  extor- 
tionate charges  by  middlemen.  It  has  another 
lever  of  control  by  its  purchases  of  all  foodstuffs 
for  our  allies  abroad  and  the  supervision  of  the 
exports  to  neutrals.  The  sales  to  the  Allies  are 
made  at  price-levels  prevailing  here,  so  that  the 
producer  has  no  better  market  than  that  at 
home.  To  prevent  the  home  wheat-market 
from  being  undersold  by  imports,  the  President 
has  power  to  raise  the  tariff  to  a  protective  point. 
The  result  of  the  first  year  of  the  operations 
in  wheat  has  been  that  the  consumer  has  been 
paying  less  per  barrel  for  flour,  while  the 
farmer's  profit  has  increased  more  than  60  cents 
a  bushel  for  wheat,  which  is  equivalent  to  about 
$3  for  a  barrel  of  flour.  In  May,  1917,  flour 
was  selling  at  Minneapolis  for  $16.75  a  barrel. 
A  year  later  the  price  had  gone  down  to  $9.80. 
In  peace-tunes,  of  the  price  of  a  pound  of  bread 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  151 

the  fanner  took  an  average  of  less  than  30  per 
cent,  the  miller  about  7  per  cent  and  the  baker 
about  two-thirds.  In  the  present  year  the 
farmer  receives  approximately  45  per  cent,  the 
baker  49  per  cent,  and  the  miller  6  per  cent. 
By  such  processes  has  the  planting  of  wheat 
been  stimulated  and  the  price  of  flour,  which 
threatened  to  go  over  $20  a  barrel,  been  kept 
down. 

To  regulate  the  prices  of  all  staple  commodi- 
ties the  Food  Administration  exercised  its  right 
to  call  on  all  wholesale  dealers  to  take  out  li- 
censes. It  further  asked  their  co-operation  in 
carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  law  and  in 
the  great  majority  of  cases  this  has  been  given 
heartily.  An  arrangement  with  the  sugar-re- 
finers was  early  effected,  by  which  they  agreed 
to  refine  on  a  net  profit  margin,  between  the 
cost  of  their  material  and  the  selling  price  of 
their  product,  of  1.3  cents  per  pound,  after  de- 
ducting trade  discounts.  By  this  agreement 
the  price  of  sugar  was  prevented  from  sky-rock- 
eting to  $50  a  barrel.  Like  results  were  ob- 
tained from  other  agreements  between  the  ad- 
ministration and  the  dealers.  By  its  power  to 


152  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

call  for  frequent  reports  from  the  businesses 
involved,  the  administration  has  been  able  to 
scrutinize  the  charges  and  profits  made.  Where 
it  has  found  these  unfair  or  objectionable  prac- 
tices indulged  in,  it  has  issued  orders  for  imme- 
diate correction.  When  its  orders  have  not 
been  carried  out,  it  has  revoked  the  licenses  of 
the  offenders. 

But  while  the  administration  has  wide  powers 
of  control  over  the  large  dealers,  its  powers  of 
regulation  of  the  small  retailers  are  more  lim- 
ited. In  Germany  the  final  selling  price  of  an 
article  is  fixed  by  law,  but  the  German  Govern- 
ment, with  its  autocratic  power,  can  compel  pro- 
duction, no  matter  how  dissatisfied  the  producer 
may  be  with  his  return.  Under  our  system  of 
government  there  was  no  power  to  compel  a 
farmer  to  raise  crops.  It  was  necessary  to  in- 
sure him  a  just  return  for  his  labor,  and  then, 
to  keep  down  the  ultimate  price  of  his  products, 
the  system  established  aimed  to  eliminate  the 
middlemen's  profits  as  far  as  possible  and  to 
reduce  waste.  The  Food  Administration  has  no 
power  to  license  retail  dealers  doing  a  gross 
business  of  less  than  $100,000  a  year  and  9£ 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  153 

per  cent  of  those  in  the  country  are  in  this  class. 
A  wide  campaign  was  carried  on  to  secure  the 
co-operation  of  these  unlicensed  dealers.  With 
the  help  of  travelling  salesmen  who  were  made 
special  representatives  of  the  government,  more 
than  250,000  of  the  350,000  small  retail  grocers 
of  the  country  enrolled  as  members  of  the  Food 
Administration.  They  signed  pledges  to  give 
their  customers  the  benefit  of  fair  and  moderate 
prices,  which  they  could  do  because  the  govern- 
ment controlled  the  prices  until  the  products 
reached  their  stores.  Every  retailer  who  joins 
the  Food  Administration  receives  a  certificate, 
which  every  customer  in  his  store  can  see.  Any 
retailer  who  does  not  live  up  to  the  pledge  or 
who  charges  unfair  prices  is  likely  to  receive  no 
more  supplies  from  the  wholesale  dealers,  for 
they  are  forbidden  to  sell  to  violators  of  the 
regulations. 

By  all  these  means  the  prices  of  staple  food- 
stuffs have  been  held  within  reasonable  bounds, 
but  coincident  with  this  work  it  was  necessary 
to  carry  on  a  campaign  of  conservation.  The 
Food  Administration  became  a  great  department 
of  our  government,  spreading  its  power  into  the 


154  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

remotest  sections  of  our  country.  In  every 
state  there  is  a  federal  food  administrator, 
and  under  him  in  nearly  every  county  a  sub- 
ordinate food  official.  These  men  are  charged 
with  the  enforcement  of  the  law,  and  have,  be- 
sides, to  conduct  a  campaign  of  education,  to 
encourage  production  and  conservation.  The 
work  has  been  carried  on  largely  by  patriotic 
volunteers.  The  food-saving  movement  quickly 
assumed  wide  proportions.  The  co-operation  of 
the  people  was  asked  in  limiting  their  consump- 
tion and  using  those  foods  of  which  we  have 
abundance  in  place  of  those  of  which  there  was 
a  scarcity,  in  order  that  we  might  send  every- 
thing needed  to  our  soldiers  overseas,  and  to 
those  who  were  fighting  with  us.  The  people 
responded  willingly.  Within  a  year  after  the 
administration  began  its  work,  more  than 
12,000,000  persons  signed  cards  pledging  them- 
selves to  adhere  to  the  rules  laid  down  in  the 
conservation  programme,  as  issued  from  tune 
to  time  by  the  government.  These  pledges 
called  for  certain  wheatless  and  meatless  days 
every  week,  and  for  an  endeavor  to  prevent 
waste  and  to  save  sugar  and  fats. 


THE  FOOD  CAMPAIGN  155 

To  carry  out  successfully  so  great  a  campaign 
of  education  has  required  an  army  of  workers. 
Through  the  churches,  women's  clubs,  fraternal 
lodges,  and  commercial  travellers'  organizations 
the  administration  obtained  thousands  of  vol- 
unteers. Sixty  thousand  commercial  travellers 
have  enrolled  as  special  representatives,  and 
their  reports  on  conditions  as  they  find  them 
on  their  trips  about  the  country  have  proved 
exceedingly  valuable.  Through  the  efforts  of 
these  various  organizations  fully  half  the  people 
of  the  United  States  have  been  reached  per- 
sonally and  appealed  to  to  do  their  bit  in  raising 
food  and  in  saving  it.  An  important  element 
in  the  saving  of  food  has  been  the  spreading  of 
the  knowledge  of  food  values,  the  teaching  of 
economical  methods  of  cooking,  and  the  use  of 
substitutes  having  equal  nutritious  value.  Along 
these  lines  the  Home  Economics  Division  works. 
This  division  has  its  representatives  in  every 
State,  and  it  works  in  close  co-operation  with 
the  county  representatives  of  the  Women's 
Council  of  National  Defense,  through  whom  it 
keeps  in  touch  with  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
housekeepers.  Under  its  direction  courses  in 


156  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

household  economics  have  been  established  in 
485  colleges  and  236  normal  schools,  from  which 
women  trained  in  food  uses  and  values  have 
gone  into  field-work  to  spread  their  knowledge. 
Through  the  work  of  the  Food  Administration, 
with  the  co-operation  of  the  vast  majority  of  the 
people,  the  battle  for  food  is  being  won. 


CHAPTER  X 
HELPING  OUR  ALLIES 

WHEAT  is  the  basic  ration  of  all  civilized 
nations.  It  forms  39  per  cent  of  the 
total  diet  in  the  United  States,  67  per  cent  of 
the  diet  of  France,  and  of  Italy's  a  still  larger 
percentage.  America  uses  in  its  ration  a  great 
deal  of  corn,  but  our  allies  are  not  accustomed 
to  this  food.  They  have  but  few  mills  where  it 
can  be  ground  and  the  meal  deteriorates  so 
rapidly  as  to  make  it  not  good  for  export.  In 
1917,  as  we  have  seen,  our  allies  were  calling  on 
us  and  on  Canada  for  more  than  twice  the 
amount  of  wheat  that  was  in  normal  times 
available  for  export.  They  had  reduced  their 
pre-war  consumption  of  wheat  more  than  25 
per  cent;  of  sugar,  fats,  and  oils  50  per  cent. 
Our  own  1917  wheat-crop  was  150,000,000 
bushels  short  of  the  average  of  800,000,000, 
and  by  March,  1918,  there  was  left  in  the  coun- 
try only  enough  for  the  normal  needs  of  the 
people.  The  entire  surplus  had  been  exported. 

157 


158  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

To  ship  more  abroad  we  had  to  save.  The 
President,  on  January  18,  issued  a  proclamation 
urging  greater  efforts  to  save  food,  especially 
wheat.  The  Food  Administration  acted  to  cur- 
tail the  use  of  wheat.  It  ordered  millers  to 
make  more  flour  from  a  given  weight  of  grain 
by  using  4  per  cent  more  of  the  berry  than  had 
been  the  custom.  It  issued  orders  limiting 
wholesale  dealers  in  cereals  to  70  per  cent  of 
the  flour  purchases  in  the  corresponding  periods 
of  1917,  and  compelled  them  to  sell  wheat-flour 
only  to  retailers  who  bought  a  corresponding 
amount  of  other  cereals.  The  retailers  were 
required  to  sell  flour  only  to  customers  who 
bought  equal  quantities  of  other  cereals.  All 
manufacturers  of  macaroni,  crackers,  breakfast 
foods,  pastries,  etc.,  were  likewise  limited  to  70 
per  cent  of  their  purchases  of  flour  in  1917. 
For  the  bakers  a  standard  loaf  was  adopted  with 
regulations  as  to  the  quantities  of  sugar  and 
shortening,  and  they  were  required  to  mix  with 
their  wheat-flour  20  per  cent  of  the  flour  of 
other  grains.  Through  the  bakeries  alone  a 
great  saving  of  wheat  was  effected,  since  40 
per  cent  of  the  country's  stock  passes  through 


HELPING  OUR  ALLIES  159 

them  to  the  consumer.  Further  saving  was 
made  by  the  action  of  more  than  200,000  pro- 
prietors of  hotels  and  restaurants  pledging 
themselves  to  restrict  the  use  of  wheat  in  any 
form  until  the  new  harvest  was  in,  and  by 
the  action  of  the  householders  in  substituting 
breads  made  of  corn-meal  and  other  cereals  for 
wheat  bread.  These  measures  were  effective. 
We  saved  enough  wheat  to  tide  over  our  allies 
until  the  harvest  of  the  present  year  was  com- 
ing in.  On  July  36  the  Food  Administration 
announced  that  the  crisis  was  passed  and  re- 
leased the  hotel  and  restaurant  men  from  their 
pledges. 

It  was  impossible  for  the  United  States  and 
Canada  to  send  to  Europe  all  the  wheat  needed 
there,  but  with  small  imports  from  other  coun- 
tries and  by  careful  regulation  and  the  substi- 
tution of  other  foods,  our  allies  were  able  to 
pass  safely  a  crisis  that  threatened  serious  con- 
sequences. To  accomplish  this  we  had  to  re- 
duce our  own  consumption  of  wheat  from 
42,000,000  bushels  a  month  to  30,000,000  bush- 
els. Answering  the  appeal  of  the  government, 
the  farmers  this  year  planted  a  greatly  enlarged 


160  HOW  WE  WEN1    TO  WAR 

acreage.  With  a  large  crop,  with  an  improve- 
ment in  our  railroad  traffic,  and  an  increased 
merchant  marine,  it  is  expected  that  the  prob- 
lem of  getting  the  needed  bread  to  our  allies 
will  not  in  the  future  be  so  difficult  as  in  the 
past,  if  the  wise  regulation  continues  and  the 
people  carry  on  their  sacrifice,  which,  after  all, 
has  proved  but  a  little  hardship. 

Americans  have  not  had  to  save  wheat  alone. 
Wheat  has  been  the  most  vital  element  in  the 
battle  for  food,  but  there  have  been  other  prob- 
lems of  almost  equal  importance.  The  herds  of 
our  allies  had  been  greatly  reduced,  and  the 
dislocation  of  shipping  rendered  it  difficult  for 
them  to  get  their  meat  products  in  the  custom- 
ary quantities  from  Argentine.  It  was  not 
feasible  to  carry  sugar  from  the  distant  markets, 
and  to  make  good  these  deficits  of  meat  and 
sugar  they  had  to  look  to  us.  Even  before  we 
entered  the  war  we  had  been  slaughtering  our 
animals  to  a  dangerous  degree.  To  maintain  a 
continuous  supply  of  meat  products  for  our- 
selves and  our  allies,  it  was  necessary  that  the 
killing  of  animals  be  curtailed  as  far  as  possible 
and  a  steady  supply  of  meat  products  secured 


HELPING  OUR  ALLIES  161 

by  a  reduction  of  the  individual's  consumption. 
This  result  was  obtained  through  the  agency  of 
the  Food  Administration's  rules  and  propa- 
ganda. Meatless  days  as  well  as  wheatless 
days  were  instituted,  and  as  a  result  without 
any  appreciable  diminution  of  our  herds  we 
have  been  able  to  send  abroad  vast  quantities 
of  meat  products.  By  a  gradual  reduction  of 
the  sugar  ration  per  person  per  month  we  have 
been  able  to  spare  considerable  stocks  for  our 
friends  overseas. 

The  report  of  the  Food  Administration  for 
the  fiscal  year,  July  1,  1917-18,  shows  clearly 
what  America  has  accomplished  in  the  matter 
of  helping  to  feed  our  allies. 

Of  meats  and  fats,  including  dairy  products 
and  vegetable  oils,  we  sent  to  them  and  to  our 
expeditionary  armies  3,011,100,000  pounds,  an 
increase  of  844,600,000  pounds  over  the  pre- 
vious year. 

Of  cereals  and  cereal  products,  reduced  to  the 
terms  of  cereal  bushels,  we  sent  them  340,803,000 
bushels,  an  increase  of  80,900,000  bushels.  Of 
these  cereals  our  shipments  of  wheat  were 
131,000,000  bushels  and  of  rye  13,900,000  bush- 


162 


HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 


els.  In  addition  10,000,000  bushels  of  1917 
wheat  were  then  on  their  way  to  allied  ports. 
The  total  shipment  of  wheat  of  the  1917  har- 
vest was  therefore  about  141,000,000  bushels. 
In  1916-17,  when  we  had  a  larger  crop,  we  sent 
abroad  135,100,000  bushels  of  wheat  and  2,300,- 
000  bushels  of  rye. 

In  addition,  we  sent  to  neutral  countries,  de- 
pendent on  us  for  food,  10,000,000  bushels  of 
prime  foodstuffs,  wheat  and  rye. 

The  following  table  shows  in  what  degree 
our  efforts  have  helped  to  feed  our  allies. 


COUNTRY 

POFOTATION 

APPROXIMATE 
NUMBER    MEN 
SUPPORTED    BY 
PRESENT   UNITED 
STATES    EXPORTS 

PER   CENT  OF 
TOTAL  POPULATION 
SUPPORTED   BY 
PRESENT  UNITED 
STATES    EXPORTS 

United  Kingdom  .  . 
France  

46,000,000 
39,000,000 

20,000,000 
5,500,000 

43.5 
14.1 

Italy  

36,000,000 

4,000,000 

11.1 

Mr.  Hoover  has  calculated  that,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  nutritional  production  of  the 
country  for  the  past  fiscal  year  was  more  than 
7  per  cent  lower  than  the  average  of  the  three 
previous  years,  we  exported  a  nutritional  sur- 
plus at  least  7  per  cent  greater,  showing  how 


HELPING  OUR  ALLIES  16£ 

the  consumption  and  waste  of  food  was  reduced 
by  the  efforts  of  our  people. 

Besides  helping  to  fill  the  larders  of  our 
allies,  America  has  been  feeding  the  populations 
of  Belgium  and  the  parts  of  northern  France 
occupied  by  the  Germans.  This  means  that 
nine  millions  of  people  have  been  depending  on 
us  for  life.  When  the  German  armies  had  over- 
run Belgium  and  northern  France,  ruthlessly 
destroying  all  the  sources  of  life  for  these  unfor- 
tunate people,  an  appeal  was  made  to  America, 
then  neutral,  for  help.  The  Commission  for 
Relief  in  Belgium  was  formed.  It  was  at  first 
operated  as  a  private  charity.  From  the  fall  of 
1914  to  the  day  of  our  entering  the  war  it  had 
sent  to  Belgium  2,562,000  tons  of  clothing  and 
foodstuffs.  To  carry  this  it  chartered  a  fleet 
of  some  forty  steamships.  German  kultur  has 
not  spared  these  vessels  on  their  errands  of 
mercy.  Eighteen  of  them  have  been  destroyed 
by  submarines  or  mines.  But  their  work  has 
continued  and  to-day,  flying  the  flag  of  the 
commission,  they  travel  over  certain  fixed  routes 
under  guarantee  of  the  German  Government 
that  they  will  not  be  molested. 


164  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

When  we  went  to  war  all  the  American  repre- 
sentatives of  the  commission  had  to  leave  Bel- 
gium, but  the  work  has  since  been  carried  on 
through  different  agencies.  The  commission  has 
established  agencies  in  Washington,  New  York, 
London,  and  Rotterdam,  where  all  purchases 
are  handled.  The  food  is  shipped  through  Hol- 
land and  is  controlled  by  representatives  of  the 
commission  up  to  the  Belgium  border.  Here 
the  Belgium  agent  of  the  commission  receives  it 
and  turns  it  over  to  the  Belgium  National  Com- 
mittee which  supervises  its  distribution.  Under 
a  plan  formulated  before  the  withdrawal  of  the 
American  delegates  on  May  1,  1917,  the  Spanish 
and  Dutch  delegates  took  charge  of  the  work 
of  guarding  the  supplies  and  seeing  that  they 
reached  the  suffering  people.  Any  infractions 
of  the  guarantees  given  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment not  to  confiscate  any  domestic  or  imported 
foodstuffs,  they  report  to  their  ministers,  who 
endeavor  to  have  the  agreement  enforced. 

To  support  this  great  work,  the  United  States 
Government  advances  to  the  commission 
$9,000,000  monthly  for  Belgium  and  $6,000,000 
for  northern  France.  These  sums  are  simply 


HELPING  OUR  ALLIES  165 

loans  to  the  respective  governments.  The  Euro- 
pean expenditures  are  met  from  the  French  and 
British  treasuries,  and  bring  the  total  up  to 
about  $20,000,000  monthly.  This  sum  barely 
suffices  to  send  to  the  needy  people  a  life-sus- 
taining ration  and  much-needed  clothing.  The 
basic  ration  provided  is  made  up  of  wheat,  corn, 
rice,  dried  peas  and  beans,  bacon,  lard,  and  con- 
densed milk,  and  an  effort  is  made  to  see  that 
120,000  tons  of  these  foods  monthly  cross  the 
Dutch  border  to  the  stricken  regions.  Sup- 
plementary meals  and  medicines  and  supplies 
for  children,  the  aged  and  sick,  have  to  be 
supplied  by  private  funds  given  to  the  com- 
mission. 

The  food -conservation  campaign  has  given  a 
great  lesson  to  Americans.  Feeding  Belgium 
is  not  rightly  charity.  It  is  rather  helping  to 
pay  a  part  of  the  great  debt  owing  to  the  gallant 
little  nation  which  kept  faith  with  the  world 
and  delayed  the  first  onrush  of  the  Huns.  To 
the  men  who  are  offering  their  lives  for  us  on 
the  battle-fields  of  France  we  owe  another  great 
debt.  To  eat  less  and  save  more  is  an  unheroic 
way  of  helping  the  country  to  fight  its  battles, 


166  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

but  it  has  been  brought  home  to  all  Americans 
that  the  field  and  the  kitchen  are  supporting 
lines  of  our  armies  and  our  allies,  and  they  must 
not  fail  them. 


CHAPTER  XI 
THE  WAR  BUDGET 

A  FEW  years  ago  it  would  have  seemed  in- 
•*  ^  credible  that  America  would  ever  be  called 
on  to  spend  in  one  war  more  money  than  the 
government  had  expended  in  its  history  of  one 
hundred  and  forty  years.  Yet  such  has  come 
to  be  a  fact.  In  this  battle  for  liberty,  as  we 
have  had  to  mobilize  our  fighting  manhood,  our 
industrial  power,  our  food  power,  so  we  have 
had  to  mobilize  our  money  power  to  a  degree 
hitherto  undreamed  of.  Here  we  find  the 
fifth  element  of  the  problem  that  confronted 
our  country  when  we  accepted  Germany's  chal- 
lenge— how  to  pay  the  enormous  cost  of  the 
struggle.  Not  so  long  since  we  thought  we 
talked  largely  when  we  spoke  of  millions  in  re- 
lation to  national  finance.  To-day  we  speak 
undismayed  in  terms  of  billions.  We  are  told 
that  in  the  year  1918-19  we  shall  spend  as  a 
nation  more  then  $24,000,000,000,  and  we  ac- 
cept the  situation  with  complacence. 

167 


168  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

Before  the  present  conflict  began  it  was  a 
common  theory  that  another  great  war  in  the 
world  was  unlikely,  because  it  could  be  pre- 
vented by  the  bankers.  It  was  known  that 
hostilities  under  modern  conditions  would  be 
enormously  costly,  and  it  was  calculated  that 
no  nation,  however  rich,  would  be  able  to  bear 
the  financial  burden  of  their  long  continuance. 
Germany  had  the  correct  idea  of  war  finance. 
She  prepared  herself  for  war  as  no  other  nation 
had  ever  prepared,  and  attacked  her  neighbors 
suddenly.  Her  expenses  were  to  be  paid  by 
her  victims,  through  the  robbery  of  their  ter- 
ritories and  indemnities.  Germany,  as  usual, 
misread  human  nature.  She  found  the  victims 
of  her  aggression  ready  to  go  down  into  their 
pockets  for  their  last  cent,  and  into  their  lar- 
ders for  their  last  bone,  to  thwart  her  foul 
purposes.  A  beaten  Germany  may  see  a  na- 
tion whose  national  income  will  be  hard  put  to 
it  to  pay  the  interest  on  her  national  debt. 
Fortunately  for  her,  this  debt  is  owed  almost  en- 
tirely at  home.  Unquestionably  there  have  been 
times  in  late  years  when  smouldering  sparks 
of  war  have  been  prevented  from  bursting  iato 


THE  WAR  BUDGET  169 

full  flame  by  action  of  the  great  financial  cen- 
tres, but  when  Germany  thought  she  had  her 
neighbors  by  the  throat,  no  question  of  money 
could  hold  her  back.  As  they  have  survived 
the  struggle  of  the  battle-field,  so  have  they 
survived  the  struggle  of  the  pocket-book,  but 
their  financial  problem  was  growing  more  diffi- 
cult, and  had  not  America  taken  up  arms  with 
them,  they  might  have  been  in  sore  straits,  for 
with  their  own  productive  power  declining, 
they  were  being  compelled  more  and  more  to 
go  abroad  for  food  and  munitions.  They  would 
soon  have  been  hard-pressed  for  money  with 
which  to  pay,  as  the  trade  balances  were  steadily 
against  them.  Our  government,  however,  real- 
ized that  for  more  than  two  years  they  had  been 
valiantly  fighting  our  battle  as  well  as  their 
own,  and  when  we  declared  war  on  Germany, 
one  of  our  first  acts  was  to  go  to  the  aid  of  our 
allies  financially,  to  place  large  credits  at  their 
disposal,  and  to  protect  them  from  the  addi- 
tional burden  of  mounting  prices  for  the  ma- 
terials they  needed.  The  Treasury  Depart- 
ment reported  on  August  23,  1918,  that  since 
April  6,  1917,  we  had  advanced  to  the  Ai- 


170  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

lies  $6,089,064,750.  This  sum  represented  the 
money  actually  paid  out.  Under  agreements 
with  them  the  total  credits  established  for  their 
benefit  amounted  to  $6,692,040,000,  as  follows: 
Great  Britain,  $3,345,000,000;  France,  $2,065,- 
000,000;  Italy,  $760,000,000;  Russia,  $325,000,- 
000;  Belgium,  $154,250,000;  Greece,  $15,790,- 
000;  Cuba,  $15,000,000;  Serbia,  $12,000,000. 
In  one  year  we  advanced  to  our  friends  more 
than  five  times  the  sum  spent  in  an  average 
year  for  the  expenses  of  our  government.  This 
money  has  not,  however,  gone  out  of  the  coun- 
try in  the  form  of  gold,  the  international  medium 
of  exchange.  It  is  represented  by  great  ship- 
ments of  food  and  munitions,  purchased  through 
our  government  for  the  Allies,  for  which  they 
have  engaged  themselves  to  pay  when  the  war 
is  over.  We  have  been  advancing  them  nearly 
$10,000,000  a  day.  Before  our  entrance  into 
the  war  the  great  financial  burden  was  borne 
by  Great  Britain,  which  was  lending  large  sums 
to  those  engaged  with  her  in  fighting  the  Hun. 
This  burden  has  fallen  on  our  shoulders  to  a 
large  extent.  The  figures  involved  in  these 
loans  would  have  staggered  our  imaginations  a 


THE   WAR  BUDGET  171 

few  years  ago,  and  we  should  have  doubted  our 
ability  to  make  them.  But  America  has  found 
the  money.  It  has  found  it  in  a  far  greater 
sum.  Americans  have  been  pouring  out  their 
treasure  as  well  as  their  blood  to  assure  the  de- 
feat of  the  arch-enemy  of  civilization. 

A  fine  part  of  the  German  plot  against  the 
world  was  to  attack  America  when  Europe  lay 
prostrate  at  Germany's  feet.  There  is  evidence 
of  this  in  the  writings  and  speeches  of  hundreds 
of  her  publicists,  statesmen,  and  soldiers.  Had 
we  not  entered  the  war,  it  would  not  have  taken 
long  for  a  victorious  Germanj  to  have  found 
cause  for  a  quarrel  with  us.  In  fact  she  had 
long  been  planning  it.  With  the  friendly  acqui- 
escence of  England  we  have  upheld  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  for  nearly  a  century.  Germany 
regards  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  impudence, 
and  would  have  attacked  it  on  the  first  oppor- 
tunity. She  would  have  sought  to  thrust  her 
horrid  kultur  down  our  throats,  and  then  to 
make  us  pay  for  it  handsomely  in  indemnities. 
Had  we  presevered  in  our  long-standing  policy  of 
non-interference  in  European  affairs  we  should 
probably  have  had,  not  so  far  in  the  future, 


172  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

a  fine  war  of  our  own  on  our  hands,  with  the 
predatory  German  demanding  indemnities.  But 
Americans  found  that  the  frontiers  of  their 
liberty  lay  on  the  battle-fields  of  Europe,  and 
upset  the  German  scheme.  Since  we  went  to 
war  it  has  been  common  to  hear  the  German 
press  and  German  statesmen  boastfully  pro- 
claiming their  purpose  to  make  us  pay  heavily 
for  taking  up  arms  against  their  country. 
To-day  we  pay  billions  for  defense;  we  will  not 
pay  one  cent  for  tribute. 

The  income  of  the  American  people  in  1917 
was  slightly  less  than  $50,000,000,000.  In  the 
last  fiscal  year  before  we  declared  war,  ending 
June  30,  1916,  the  total  receipts  of  the  govern- 
ment were  $1,153,044,639;  the  total  disburse- 
ments were  $1,072,894,093.  In  the  year  fol- 
lowing, ending  June  30,  1917,  we  had  three 
months  of  war,  and  we  find  the  total  receipts, 
including  the  sale  of  Liberty  Bonds,  certificates 
of  indebtedness,  treasury  notes,  etc.,  $3,882,- 
068,710;  the  total  expenditures,  $3,083,476,791. 
Those  three  months  of  war  increased  the  cost 
of  our  army  from  $164,635,576  to  $440,276,880, 
and  of  our  navy  from  $155,029,425  to  $257,166.- 


THE  WAR  BUDGET  173 

437.  When  one  deals  with  such  figures  you 
abandon  the  cents,  even  though  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  records  them. 

The  Sixty-Fourth  Congress  was  generous  to 
the  navy  and  niggardly  to  the  army.  This 
Congress  had  in  it  many  patriotic  and  far- 
seeing  men,  but  they  were  hampered  in  their 
actions  by  dull-witted  pacifists  and  pro-Ger- 
mans. The  Sixty-fifth  Congress,  which  suc- 
ceeded it  almost  immediately  in  special  session, 
had  in  its  membership  some  of  the  same  dull- 
witted  pacifists,  and  the  pro-Germans  turned 
Americans.  We  wonder  if  even  the  lady  from 
Montana  would  to-day  vote  against  war  with 
the  inventors  of  gas  and  liquid  fire  as  a  means 
of  forwarding  the  aims  of  kultur.  In  the  Sixty- 
fifth  Congress,  from  the  start,  the  patriotic  and 
the  far-seeing  had  their  way.  They  were  in  a 
heavy  majority.  The  dull-witted  pacifists  and 
the  pro-Germans-turned-Americans  did  delay 
legislation  on  the  selective-service  law,  but  not 
for  long.  When  it  came  to  appropriations  the 
administration  had  only  to  ask  and  it  received. 
The  loans  to  our  allies  were  authorized.  Issues 
of  bonds,  surpassing  any  sum  we  had  ever 


174  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

dreamed  of,  were  authorized.  And  rightly ! 
It  was  no  time  to  cavil  over  expenses.  We  had 
seen  Belgium  overrun  and  left  ruined  and  starv- 
ing; we  had  seen  Serbia  overrun  and  her  popu- 
lation almost  wiped  out;  Russia  dissolving 
through  Teuton  intrigue  into  a  state  of  an- 
archy; our  old  friend  France  standing  with 
her  back  to  the  wall  against  the  onrush  of  kul- 
tur's  savages;  and  Britain,  the  Mother  of 
Democracy,  giving  her  children  by  the  millions 
that  the  horrid  Thing  that  had  attacked  the 
world  might  be  killed.  The  Sixty-Fifth  Con- 
gress has  given  the  administration  everything 
it  asked  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The 
same  house  that  argued  so  long  over  the  selec- 
tive-service law  a  little  over  a  year  later  ex- 
tended its  provisions  to  include  all  men  from 
18  to  45,  by  a  vote  of  336  to  2.  We  have  to-day, 
according  to  the  German  press,  a  crazy  Presi- 
dent, a  crazy  Congress,  and  a  crazy  people. 

After  we  declared  war,  the  government  pro- 
ceeded at  once  to  the  tremendous  expansion  of 
our  army,  navy,  and  merchant  marine.  No 
matter  what  the  cost,  the  work  had  to  be  done. 
In  framing  its  estimates  of  expenditures  for  the 


THE  WAR  BUT  3ET  175 

first  year  the  government  placed  the  figure  at 
about  $21,000,000,000,  or  nearly  twice  the  sum 
that  Great  Britain  had  expended  in  any  one 
year  of  the  war.  It  happened,  however,  that 
the  productive  capacity  of  the  country  for  war 
was  not  fully  organized,  and  that  while  enor- 
mous orders  of  all  kinds  were  placed,  these  orders 
could  not  be  filled  as  rapidly  as  was  expected. 
As  a  result,  our  expenditure  in  the  first  year  of 
the  war  was  some  $8,000,000,000  less  than  the 
estimated  figure.  At  the  end  of  the  fiscal 
year,  June  30,  1918,  the  treasury  reported  that, 
including  the  money  spent  in  the  first  three 
months  of  the  war,  it  had  disbursed,  $13,915,- 
205,290.  Of  this  sum  nearly  $5,623,029,750 
was  loaned  to  our  allies. 

The  beginning  of  the  present  fiscal  year  found 
our  war  programme  in  full  swing.  Plans  had 
been  laid  to  double  the  size  of  our  armies;  war- 
ships and  merchant  ships  were  slipping  from  the 
ways  and  had  to  be  paid  for;  ordnance  in  vast 
quantities  was  coming  from  our  factories;  our 
allies  were  calling  for  still  more  financial  aid. 
The  government  presented  to  Congress  its  esti- 
mates of  expenditures  to  June  30,  1919,  and 


176  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

Congress   authorized   the   disbursement  of   the 
enormous  sum  of  more  than  $24,000,000,000. 

How  these  appropriations  have  been  appor- 
tioned is  shown  in  the  following  table: 

War  Department $14,073,671,181.88 

Navy  Department 1,616,550,360.77 

Shipping  Board 1,807,543,500.00 

National  defense 50,000,000.00 

Federal    control     of     transportation 

systems 500,000,000.00 

War  Finance  Corporation 500,000,000.00 

Housing  for  war  needs 100,000,000.00 

Loans  to  Allies 3,000,000,000.00 

Interest  on  public  debt 588,049,168.00 

Postal  service 385,511,072.23 

Deficiencies  for  prior  years 727,567,797.35 

For  all  other  purposes 989,455,184.31 

$24,338,348,264.54 

The  total  represents  one-half  of  the  income  of 
the  American  people.  It  means  that  one-half 
the  productive  energy  of  the  people  will  go  to 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  It  has  been  pointed 
out  by  certain  experts  in  finance  that  it  may  be 
found  impossible  to  spend  so  great  a  sum,  as 
what  we  can  spend  is  limited  by  what  we  can 
produce,  and  we  are  already  feeling  a  scarcity 
of  both  material  and  labor.  It  has  been  con- 


Selling  Liberty  Bonds  in  front  of  the  Sub-Treasury,  New  York  City. 

'Of  the  $13,000,000,000  spent  by  our  government  in  the  past  year  of  the  war,  more  than\ 
two-thirds  was  raised  by  the  sale  of  Liberty  Bonds." 


THE   WAR  BUDGET  177 

tended  that  it  will  be  easier  for  the  American 
people  to  raise  these  vast  sums  than  to  spend 
them;  that  the  great  problem  will  not  be  to 
find  the  money,  but  to  produce  the  war  material 
for  which  it  pays. 

It  has  long  been  an  axiom  of  government  that 
wars  must  be  paid  for  largely  out  of  the  people's 
future  earnings;  that  the  generation  that  fights 
a  war  must  in  part  be  relieved  of  the  financial 
burden  by  the  generations  that  will  profit  by 
the  victory.  To  raise  a  war's  entire  cost  by 
taxation  would  disrupt  a  country's  business. 
It  has  been  considered  sound  policy  to  raise  the 
money  needed  by  loans;  to  raise  by  increased 
taxation  the  money  to  pay  the  interest  on  the 
loans,  and  to  constitute  a  fund  with  which  to 
pay  them  off  when  they  fall  due.  Of  the  $13,- 
000,000,000  spent  by  our  government  in  the 
past  year  of  the  war,  more  than  two-thirds  was 
raised  by  the  sale  of  Liberty  Bonds.  About 
$4,000,000,000  was  secured  by  income  and  ex- 
cess profits  taxes  and  the  usual  forms  of  rev- 
enue. When  for  the  second  year  of  the  war 
Congress  authorized  the  expenditure  of  almost 
double  the  sum  spent  in  the  first  year,  it  was 


178  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

deemed  advisable  to  double  the  income  received 
by  the  government  from  taxation,  and  this  was 
done  by  greatly  increasing  the  imposts  on  the 
incomes  of  business  enterprises  and  private  per- 
sons, and  imposing  special  forms  of  taxation. 
With  $8,000,000,000  secured  from  taxation,  there 
remained  to  be  obtained  from  the  sale  of  bonds 
about  $16,000,000,000  in  the  present  fiscal  year. 
This  was  a  task  to  tax  any  people,  however 
rich  they  might  be,  but  the  record  of  Ameri- 
cans in  the  previous  Liberty  Loan  campaigns 
left  no  doubt  that  they  would  meet  the  issue. 

We  are  raising  a  larger  proportion  of  our  war 
expenses  by  taxation  than  are  our  allies,  and 
we  are  spending  much  more  money.  The  total 
cost  of  the  war  to  Great  Britain  from  August, 
1914,  to  January  1,  1918,  was  $20,465,000,000, 
besides  which  she  had  lent  to  her  allies  some 
$6,500,000,000.  Of  this  she  has  raised  18.33 
per  cent  by  taxation.  In  the  same  period 
France  spent  $20,637,800,000,  of  which  she 
raised  15,3  per  cent  by  taxation.  Italy,  in  the 
war  up  to  January  1,  1918,  spent  $6,077,378,000, 
of  which  she  raised  11.8  per  cent  by  taxation. 
Germany  had  spent,  in  the  same  time,  $24,129,- 
000,000,  of  which  she  raised  less  than  4  per  cent 


THE  WAR  BUDGET  179 

by  added  taxes  on  her  people.  As  to  whether  or 
not  it  is  good  policy  for  us  to  raise  so  large  a 
proportion  of  our  war  costs  by  taxation  is  a 
question  on  which  there  are  wide  differences 
of  opinion.  American  business  men  and  the 
American  people  have  more  than  met  the  gov- 
ernment half-way  in  their  willingness,  both  to 
pay  and  to  lend.  It  is  vital  to  the  success  of 
our  army  and  navy  that  enterprise  be  encour- 
aged and  that  we  produce  to  the  limit  of  our  ca- 
pacity. But  too  heavy  imposts  on  business  tend 
to  a  discouragement  of  enterprise  and  a  curtail- 
ment of  production.  The  policy  of  our  govern- 
ment has  been  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  war  out 
of  our  present  income,  as  far  as  is  possible, 
without  disrupting  business.  To  secure  such  a 
result  requires  exceedingly  delicate  adjustment. 
Even  the  securing  of  one-third  of  the  money 
needed  by  taxation  "still  leaves  a  vast  sum  to 
be  raised  by  loans,  sixteen  times  what  was  re- 
quired for  our  government  in  normal  years. 
But  the  appeal  to  the  people  to  show  their 
patriotism  by  lending  then*  money  has  in  every 
instance  met  with  a  hearty  response.  The 
loans  have  all  been  oversubscribed.  Before  the 
first  Liberty  Loan  was  put  out  there  were  in 


180 


HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 


the  country  only  400,000  holders  of  bonds. 
Our  government  securities  were  practically  all 
held  by  the  banks.  The  vast  number  of  our 
people  did  not  know  what  a  bond  was,  and  the 
loan  campaigns  proved  themselves  of  value  in 
the  inculcation  of  lessons  of  thrift  and  of  finance 
as  well  as  of  patriotism.  To  the  first  issue  there 
were  4,500,000  subscribers;  to  the  second, 
double  that  number;  to  the  third  17,000,000 
Americans  subscribed.  This  means  that  one 
person  in  every  six  of  our  population  is  the 
holder  of  a  government  obligation.  An  analy- 
sis of  the  figures  shows  a  progressive  increase 
in  the  number  of  small  subscriptions.  Of  the 
first  loan  23  per  cent  was  represented  by  pur- 
chases of  less  than  $10,000;  of  the  second,  29 
per  cent;  of  the  third  47  per  cent. 

The  record  of  the  people,  in  response  to  the 
call  of  the  government  to  lend  it  their  money, 
is  shown  in  this  table: 


SUBSCRIBED 

ALLOTTED 

First  Liberty  Loan     

$3,035,226,850 

$2  000  000  000 

Second  Liberty  Loan  

4,617,532,300 

3,808,766,150 

Third  Liberty  Loan  

4,170,019,650 

4,170,019,650 

THE   WAR  BUDGET  181 

The  fact  that  of  the  second  loan,  more  than 
12,000,000  bonds  of  the  denomination  of  $100 
and  $50  were  purchased  gives  evidence  of  the 
degree  to  which  persons  with  small  incomes 
participated. 

With  their  men  fighting  so  gallantly  on  the 
fields  of  France  and  on  the  sea,  Americans  will 
not  stint  to  support  them  with  their  treasure. 
They  will  ask,  though,  for  the  sake  of  those 
very  men,  that  the  money  be  carefully  and 
wisely  spent.  In  the  main  it  has  been.  In  the 
expenditure  of  sums  so  vast  there  are  likely  to 
be  cases  of  recklessness  and  extravagance.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Senate  Investigating  Committee 
millions  were  wasted  on  the  aircraft  programme, 
many  millions  spent  and  few  fighting  planes 
placed  on  the  front.  Before  another  year  the 
millions  put  into  aircraft  production  will  tell, 
though  it  was  unfortunate  that,  through  lack  of 
foresight,  they  must  tell  so  late.  But  it  is  well 
to  remember  that,  while  the  War  Department 
failed  to  do  well  with  the  money  placed  in  its 
hands  for  aerial  warfare,  with  the  money  given 
to  it  to  raise,  equip  and  transport  armies  to 
the  battle-front  it  has  done  much.  It  has  seen 


182  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

to   it  that,  as   a  whole,  our  fighting  men  are 
well  clothed,  well  fed,  and  well  quartered. 

Our  soldiers  and  sailors  are  paid  as  are  the 
men  of  no  other  country,  and  the  government 
has  arranged  that  proper  provision  is  made  for 
them  or  their  dependants  in  event  of  death  or 
disability.  It  is  now  conducting  in  the  Treasury 
Department  the  greatest  insurance  company  in 
the  world.  The  department's  Bureau  of  War 
Risk  Insurance,  as  now  carried  on,  is  the  out- 
growth of  the  need  of  protecting  our  merchant 
marine  at  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War. 
The  government  had  then  to  take  cognizance  of 
the  fact  that  the  risks  of  war  made  it  impos- 
sible for  our  ship  owners  to  secure  proper  in- 
surance at  anything  but  prohibitive  rates.  By 
act  of  Congress,  approved  September  2,  1914, 
the  government  undertook  to  insure  these  ves- 
sels at  reasonable  rates.  Then  the  dangers  of 
the  sea  made  it  difficult  for  the  vessels  to  get 
crews,  and  by  an  act  of  June  12,  1917,  the  op- 
erations of  the  bureau  were  extended  to  insure 
the  crews  of  these  ships.  The  price  of  insur- 
ance for  a  man  in  our  army  or  navy  was  pro- 
hibitive in  a  private  company.  It  was  found 


THE  WAR  BUDGET  183 

that  these  companies  would  charge  $580  a  year 
for  a  $10,000  policy  on  the  life  of  a  soldier  or 
sailor,  and  a  private  serving  in  France  receives 
only  $396  a  year.  Under  a  law  passed  on 
October  6,  1917,  the  government  will  insure 
any  soldier  or  sailor  against  death  or  total  dis- 
ability up  to  the  sum  of  $10,000,  in  multiples  of 
$500  at  the  same  rate,  practically,  that  they 
would  pay  to  an  insurance  company  in  peace 
times.  The  charge  for  this  insurance  is  de- 
ducted from  his  monthly  pay.  The  treasury 
bears  the  cost  of  administration  and  the  excess 
mortality  and  disability  cost  resulting  from  the 
hazards  of  war.  A  statement  of  the  Treasury 
Department  shows  that  on  August  1,  1918, 
nearly  3,000,000  applications  for  insurance  had 
been  received,  representing  a  total  of  more  than 
$25,000,000,000,  in  average  policies  of  $8,511. 

Such  a  provision  is  certainly  just  to  the  men 
who  are  fighting  the  country's  battles.  Further, 
to  insure  their  ease  of  mind  regarding  their  de- 
pendent families,  the  government  makes  what 
are  known  as  family  allotments.  The  enlisted 
man  must  allot  $15  monthly  to  his  wife  and 
children,  which  is  withheld  from  his  pay  by  the 


184  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

government.  To  this  the  government  adds 
$15  monthly  to  the  wife;  where  there  is  a  wife 
and  one  child,  $25;  a  wife  and  two  children, 
$32.50,  and  $5  for  each  additional  child.  Pro- 
vision is  made  in  this  way  for  motherless 
children  and  for  dependent  parents.  Under 
another  section  of  the  law  the  government  pro- 
tects itself  against  the  evils  that  grew  up  un- 
der the  old  pension  system,  and  at  the  same 
time  makes  clear  to  the  fighting  man  just  what 
his  dependants  will  receive  in  case  of  his  death, 
or  what  he  will  receive  in  event  of  disability 
incurred  in  the  service.  Every  contingency  is 
carefully  provided  for.  The  sums  granted  are 
not  large.  A  widow,  for  example,  will  receive 
$25  monthly;  if  she  has  a  child,  $35;  if  two 
children,  $47.50,  with  $5  for  each  additional 
child.  But  it  is  considered  that  such  sums, 
with  the  insurance  added,  should  provide  com- 
fortably for  the  soldiers'  families. 

Besides  its  task  of  collecting  and  disbursing 
vast  sums  of  money,  and  of  conducting  an  in- 
surance business  on  a  scale  hitherto  unheard  of, 
the  work  of  the  Treasury  Department  has  been 
greatly  increased  by  new  duties  thrown  on  it 


THE  WAR  BUDGET  185 

by  various  acts  of  Congress.  Even  before  we 
went  to  war,  the  Federal  Farm  Loan  law  was  in 
operation,  with  Federal  Land  Banks  established 
in  twelve  districts  of  the  country.  These  banks, 
through  their  agencies,  have  been  lending  money 
on  farm  mortgages  and  have  proved  valuable 
in  stimulating  food  production  since  we  went 
to  war.  In  1917  more  than  $20,000,000  was 
loaned  by  these  banks  for  the  furtherance  of 
agricultural  projects,  and  in  the  present  year 
this  sum  will  be  exceeded.  The  War  Finance 
Board,  of  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
is  chairman,  was  created  by  an  act  of  April 
5,  1918.  It  has  a  capital  stock  of  a  $500,000,- 
000,  all  owned  by  the  government,  and  its 
function  is  to  aid  by  advances  of  money  those 
businesses  whose  operation  is  necessary  to  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  The  same  act  also  estab- 
lished the  "Capital  Issues  Committee,"  which 
acts  to  curb  the  expansion  of  unnecessary  en- 
terprises, by  supervising  the  issue  of  new  se- 
curities of  amounts  greater  than  $100,000.  The 
government  has  held  that  unnecessary  enter- 
prises must  be  curbed,  and  that  it  will  need 
for  its  own  uses  every  dollar  that  can  be 


186  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

saved.  It  is  easy  to  understand  this  view.  Our 
expenditures  are  now  running  at  the  rate  of 
$2,000,000,000  monthly.  If  the  war  lasts  until 
the  end  of  1919,  we  shall  have  to  spend  $50,- 
000,000,000.  To  raise  so  great  a  sum  all  the 
energies  of  the  American  people  will  be  needed. 


CHAPTER  XII 
LABOR 

OBVIOUSLY  we  cannot  keep  our  ships 
afloat  and  our  vast  armies  overseas  unless 
the  industries  of  the  country  are  organized  on 
a  war  basis  and  operated  by  an  army  of  patriotic 
men.  It  is  estimated  that  it  requires  all  the 
labor  of  at  least  three  men  to  keep  one  fighting 
man  at  the  front.  This  figure  is  small.  But 
accepting  it,  we  see  that  to  keep  an  army  of 
5,000,000  men  fighting  we  must  have  15,000,000 
at  home  working  solely  for  the  soldiers.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  we  are  expending  half  of  our 
national  income  on  war  work,  and,  therefore, 
half  of  our  working  energy.  The  problem  of 
organizing  the  country's  labor-power  that  it 
might  be  used  to  the  best  advantage  becomes 
one  of  the  most  difficult  of  the  intricate  problems 
faced  by  the  government. 

Before  we  entered  the  war  the  urgent  needs 
of  the  fighting  nations  brought  them  to  our 
markets  for  food  and  materials  of  all  kinds, 


188  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

and  the  result  of  their  competitive  bidding  for 
these  things  was  a  rapid  rise  in  prices  at  home 
and  a  startling  increase  in  the  costs  of  living. 
Large  profits  were  to  be  made  in  these  foreign 
contracts  and  the  manufacturers  and  pro- 
ducers began  bidding  against  one  another  for 
labor,  a  process  which  resulted  in  greatly  in- 
creased wage  scales.  Factories  not  engaged 
in  highly  profitable  war  work,  and  the  farms, 
found  great  difficulty  in  securing  workers,  and 
to  be  able  to  pay  the  advanced  rates  had  to 
increase  the  prices  of  their  products.  And  so 
the  withdrawal  of  millions  of  men  and  women 
from  productive  occupations  in  Europe  brought 
to  us  a  parallel  rising  of  wages  and  prices. 
Some  employers  made  great  profits  and  there 
was  a  resulting  spirit  of  unrest  among  em- 
ployees, who  felt  that  they  were  not  getting 
their  full  share  of  the  results  of  their  labor. 
This  feeling  found  expression  in  frequent  strikes. 
Industries  which  had  no  share  in  these  great 
profits  felt  this  unrest  severely.  Of  this  situa- 
tion the  railroads  afford  the  best  example.  In 
1916  their  employees  demanded  the  establish- 
ment of  an  eight-hour  day  and  time  and  a  half 


LABOR  189 

pay  for  overtime.  To  avoid  a  nation-wide 
strike,  in  September  Congress  passed  the  Adam- 
son  law,  compelling  the  roads  to  make  an  eight- 
hour  day  the  standard  of  pay  and  to  pay  pro 
rata  for  overtime.  This  greatly  increased  their 
expenses  although  their  earnings  were  at  the 
time  steadily  declining.  The  government  did 
grant  them  some  relief  by  allowing  an  increase 
in  freight  rates.  This  dispute  between  the 
companies  and  their  men  threatened  trouble 
enough  for  the  country  in  times  of  peace.  It 
continued  up  almost  to  the  very  moment  of 
our  entry  into  the  war.  Similar  controversies 
were  recurring  from  time  to  time  in  other 
industries. 

When  we  entered  the  war  we  had  to  produce 
ships,  munitions,  and  food  in  unprecedented 
quantities,  and  the  continuation  of  controversies 
between  employers  and  employees  was  a  grave 
threat  to  the  success  of  our  fighting  men.  The 
control  of  the  large  employers  was  a  compara- 
tively easy  matter.  The  great  majority  of 
them  placed  their  plants  at  the  disposal  of  the 
government  and  entered  into  voluntary  agree- 
ments as  to  the  prices  they  should  receive  for 


190  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

their  products.  Any  profiteering  was  prevented 
by  tax  laws  which  took  from  them  the  largest 
part  of  their  earnings  above  what  they  had 
made  in  normal  times.  The  control  of  the  great 
army  of  labor,  organized  and  unorganized,  a 
great  deal  of  it  floating,  was  another  matter. 
But  steps  had  to  be  taken  to  prevent,  as  far  as 
possible,  any  halting  in  production. 

When  the  war-cloud  was  hanging  over  us, 
after  the  break  in  diplomatic  relations  with  Ger- 
many, the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  National  Defense  was  formed,  and  Samuel 
Gompers,  president  of  the  American  Federation 
of  Labor,  took  a  place  upon  it  as  labor's  repre- 
sentative. On  March  12  a  meeting  of  the 
representatives  of  all  the  unions  was  held  in 
Washington,  and  these  leaders  pledged  their 
loyalty  to  the  country  in  event  of  war  and 
called  on  their  fellow  workers  to  follow  their 
example.  The  day  after  war  was  declared  Mr. 
Gompers  pledged  the  support  of  the  federation 
to  the  government,  and  the  federation,  in  its 
annual  convention  on  November  12,  affirmed 
its  belief  in  the  war  as  essential  to  the  defense 
of  democracy.  So  the  representatives  of  the 


LABOR  191 

greatest  body  of  organized  laborers  have  from 
the  first  proved  themselves  loyal  and  behind 
the  government  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war, 
in  recognition  of  which  the  administration  has 
placed  a  number  of  them  in  places  of  responsi- 
bility. Mr.  Gompers  formed  a  labor  committee 
of  some  350  persons  to  act  with  the  Council 
of  National  Defense.  This  committee  included 
representatives  of  the  government,  capital,  and 
labor,  and  it  was  divided  into  eight  subcom- 
mittees, having  charge  of  the  various  phases 
of  the  problem.  The  main  work,  however, 
was  done  through  an  executive  committee  of 
fourteen,  acting  as  advisory  to  the  council. 

The  American  Federation,  which  thus  came 
so  promptly  to  the  support  of  the  war,  is  the 
largest  organized  labor  body  in  the  country, 
comprising  some  111  national  unions,  organized 
in  the  crafts  and  industries.  It  has  a  mem- 
bership of  nearly  2,500,000.  Other  so-called 
labor  bodies,  however,  did  not  prove  them- 
selves so  patriotic.  One  of  these,  the  Indus- 
trial Workers  of  the  World,  with  headquarters  in 
Chicago,  carried  on  a  campaign  to  hamper  in- 
dustry and  block  the  selective-service  law.  Its 


192  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

operations  were  largely  in  the  lumber  region? 
and  on  the  farms  of  the  West,  where  there  is 
a  large  migratory  working  population.  So  dis- 
loyal were  its  activities  that  the  government 
had  finally  to  arrest  more  than  200  of  its  leaders 
in  various  parts  of  the  country,  and  in  August 
of  this  year  the  largest  number  of  these  were 
convicted  in  the  courts  and  sentenced  to  long 
terms  in  prison. 

The  Socialist  party  of  America  is  a  political 
organization  whose  membership  comes  largely 
from  the  ranks  of  labor.  Immediately  after 
the  declaration  of  war,  it  held  a  convention  in 
St.  Louis,  went  on  record  against  the  action  of 
the  government,  and  called  on  "all  workers  to 
refuse  to  support  their  governments  in  their 
wars."  It  further  demanded  unyielding  oppo- 
sition to  the  proposed  draft  law.  The  action 
was  not  unanimous.  A  considerable  number  of 
members  withdrew  from  the  party,  and  at  a 
meeting  later  in  Chicago  formed  the  National 
party,  which,  while  its  platform  was  socialis- 
tic, declared  its  loyalty  to  the  government  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  But  the  Socialist 
party  carried  on  a  continuous  campaign,  ham- 


LABOR  193 

pering  the  government  in  many  ways,  compel- 
ling the  authorities  to  take  vigorous  action  to 
suppress  its  activities. 

We  have  seen  the  leaders  of  the  greatest  of 
the  labor  organizations  giving  the  government 
their  support  from  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
They  have  given  it  loyally.  They  have  frowned 
down  the  German-made  efforts  to  have  con- 
ferences at  The  Hague  and  Stockholm  of  inter- 
national representatives  of  the  world's  workers 
for  the  purpose  of  agitating  a  peace  which  would 
be  to  the  advantage  of  Germany.  They  have 
declared  steadily  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  to  a  finish,  to  the  end  of  German  autocracy 
and  militarism.  Their  position  has  not  been 
an  easy  one.  However  good  their  intentions, 
they  have  often  had  trouble  with  their  locals, 
which  have  used  the  necessities  of  the  govern- 
ment in  the  war  as  a  club  with  which  to  enforce 
their  demands. 

On  the  advice  of  Mr.  Gompers  the  Council 
of  National  Defense,  on  April  7,  1917,  adopted 
a  report  urging  that  no  changes  in  existing 
standards  of  labor  be  made  either  by  employers 
or  employees  during  the  war,  without  its  ap- 


194  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

proval.  A  few  days  later  this  was  modified 
by  an  exception  that  no  changes  of  wages  should 
be  sought  by  either  party  through  strikes  or 
lockouts  without  giving  the  government  an 
opportunity  to  settle  the  difficulties  without  a 
stoppage  of  work.  It  was  hoped  that  em- 
ployers and  employees  would  live  up  to  these 
arrangements,  but  the  figures  available  show 
that  the  first  year  of  the  war  was  marked  by 
a  great  number  of  strikes.  The  report  of  the 
Department  of  Labor  shows  that  between 
April  6  and  October  19,  1917,  211  strikes  had 
been  called  to  its  attention.  An  unofficial  rec- 
ord of  strikes  between  April  6  and  December 
15  shows  that  529  occurred,  involving  126,400 
employees  to  the  loss  of  3,234,446  man  days  of 
work.  In  the  shipyards  alone,  prior  to  Decem- 
ber 26  there  were  strikes  involving  596,992  lost 
man  days.  In  the  first  year  of  the  war  there 
were  referred  to  the  Department  of  Labor  for 
adjudication  936  labor  disputes,  of  which  440 
had  reached  the  strike  stage.  The  conciliators 
settled  all  of  these  but  73.  But  it  is  evident 
that  the  government's  no-strike  programme 
was  a  failure. 


LABOR  195 

The  situation  in  the  labor  world  in  the  first 
year  of  the  war  was  chaotic,  and  between  strikes 
and  a  lack  of  co-ordination  of  the  various  govern- 
ment departments,  war  work  was  greatly  ham- 
pered. There  was  no  orderly  system  of  appor- 
tioning the  available  labor.  The  army  had 
taken  millions  of  men  and  labor  was  scarce. 
One  shipyard  with  urgent  contracts  would  bid 
higher  wages  and  take  the  men  employed  in 
another  near  by.  Munition  works  would  draw 
men  from  the  shipyards,  and  shipyards  from 
the  munition  works.  Government  departments 
were  bidding  against  each  other  for  men. 
Skilled  men  were  shifting  about  the  country 
in  search  of  the  highest  pay,  and  much  valuable 
time  was  lost  in  this  turnover.  Where  disputes 
occurred  with  the  men  they  were  settled  by  the 
individual  department  or  munition  plant,  with- 
out regard  to  the  general  needs  of  the  govern- 
ment. 

It  was  evident  that  the  government  had  to 
take  cognizance  of  these  conditions,  and  late  in 
April,  1918,  the  National  War  Labor  Board 
was  constituted.  Two  of  its  members,  William 
H.  Taft  and  Frank  P,  Walsh,  represent  the 


196  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

public;  the  other  ten  represent  equally  em- 
ployers and  employees.  Its  functions  are  "to 
bring  about  a  settlement  by  mediation  and 
conciliation  of  every  controversy  between  em- 
ployers and  employees  in  the  field  of  produc- 
tion necessary  for  the  effective  conduct  of  the 
war."  This  board  since  its  formation  has  been 
kept  busy  settling  disputes.  It  has  no  real 
power  to  enforce  decisions  against  labor,  other 
than  that  of  patriotic  appeal.  In  many  cases 
this  has  proved  effective.  There  is  always  a  ten- 
dency where  disputes  over  wages  are  involved 
to  grant  a  higher  scale,  and  where  shop  regula- 
tions are  concerned  to  favor  the  demands  of 
the  union.  It  is  the  easiest  way  to  avoid  dif- 
ficulty, however  hard  it  may  be  on  the  em- 
ployer. Employees  who  are  dissatisfied  with  the 
decisions  can  strike  and  sometimes  they  have 
done  so.  Five  thousand  machinists  at  Bridge- 
port recently  went  out  because  they  objected 
to  the  board's  award  of  an  increase  in  wages 
to  all  employees  receiving  under  seventy-eight 
cents  an  hour,  but  establishing  no  increase 
above  that  rate.  This  strike  ended  only  when 
the  President  made  a  personal  appeal  to  the 


LABOR  197 

loyalty  of  the  men  and  warned  them  that 
those  who  persisted  in  striking  would  not  be 
employed  in  any  other  government  work.  This 
strike  delayed  for  two  weeks  work  on  thou- 
sands of  machine-guns  so  urgently  needed  by 
the  soldiers  who  are  fighting  our  battles.  Dis- 
satisfied employers  can  do  little.  They  cannot 
strike  and  the  government  has  power  to  take 
over  their  plants.  Recently  a  large  munition 
company  asked  the  government  to  take  over 
its  factories,  maintaining  that  it  could  not 
manage  its  business  efficiently  on  the  lines  laid 
down  by  the  board  for  the  dealings  with  the 
employees. 

As  regards  labor,  the  country  is  on  the  horns 
of  a  dilemma.  Every  rise  in  the  cost  of  living  is 
followed  by  a  demand  for — in  fact,  a  need  of — 
higher  wages.  Every  time  wages  rise  the  cost 
of  living  goes  up. 

The  railroads  are  a  case  in  point.  In  the 
years  1916  and  1917  the  railroads  increased 
wages  of  their  employees  approximately  $350,- 
000,000  a  year.  In  the  same  period  their  earn- 
ings were  strictly  limited  by  the  rate  rulings 
of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  and 


198  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

they  were  hard  put  to  it  to  find  money  for 
needed  improvements  in  lines  and  rolling-stock. 
After  we  went  to  war,  with  the  co-operation  of 
the  government,  their  operation  was  unified 
under  the  charge  of  a  committee  of  executives 
known  as  the  Railroads  War  Board.  This 
board  did  much  to  increase  the  efficiency  of 
the  roads,  but  the  demands  of  the  war  greatly 
increased  the  traffic  and  there  was  at  times 
great  congestion.  In  November  the  trainmen 
and  conductors  began  to  agitate  for  an  increase 
of  forty  per  cent  in  pay,  and  a  situation  similar 
to  that  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Adam- 
son  law  might  have  been  created,  had  not  the 
government  stepped  in,  and  acting  under  the 
authority  of  Congress,  taken  control  of  the  roads. 
This  was  done  to  insure  still  more  efficient  opera- 
tion, and  to  secure  this  the  government  had  to 
make  large  advances  in  money  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  lines.  The  President  by  proclama- 
tion took  over  the  railroads  on  December  26, 
and  placed  their  operation  in  the  hands  of 
William  G.  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
as  director-general.  The  government  was  at 
once  met  with  the  persistent  wage  problem, 


LABOR  199 

and  after  an  investigation  of  living  costs  granted 
advances  of  wages  to  all  employees  receiving  less 
than  $250  per  month.  This  added  $300,000,000 
a  year  to  the  cost  of  operating  the  roads.  The 
increase  in  other  expenses  aggregated  more  than 
$500,000,000  more.  To  meet  these  heavy  new 
charges  the  director-general  had  to  order  a 
25-per-cent  increase  in  all  freight  rates  and  an 
advance  in  passenger  rates  from  2^  to  3  cents 
per  mile.  Such  increases  added  to  the  general 
cost  of  living. 

The  government  had  to  act  to  hold  down  the 
cost  of  living,  to  stabilize  wages,  and  to  control 
labor  as  far  as  possible  that  it  might  be  used 
to  its  greatest  productive  capacity.  The  first 
it  did  through  its  system  of  price-fixing.  For 
the  better  control  of  labor  it  organized  the  War 
Labor  Policies  Board  in  the  Department  of 
Labor,  which  hr  j  the  direction  and  distribu- 
tion of  the  labor-supply  during  the  war.  An 
important  part  of  this  administration's  work  is 
done  through  the  United  States  Employment 
Service.  This  bureau  has  established  branches 
throughout  the  country  and  has  formed  the 
United  States  Public  Service  Reserve  in  which 


200  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

are  enlisted  many  thousands  of  workmen. 
When  the  army,  navy,  or  Shipping  Board  need 
workmen  they  apply  to  the  Employment  Ser- 
vice, and  the  men  are  supplied  from  the  districts 
nearest  the  plants  where  they  are  wanted,  thus 
avoiding  the  unnecessary  movement  of  men  for 
long  distances.  The  employment  bureau  has 
lists  of  nearly  every  available  man  in  the 
country  for  war  work,  and  is  kept  advised  of 
the  needs  of  the  yards  and  factories.  It  sees  to 
it  that  the  vital  industries  get  the  men  they  need 
and  its  operations  have  ended  the  old  expensive 
system  of  competitive  bidding  for  labor.  It 
has  organized  so  as  to  have  its  representatives 
in  every  county  of  the  country  hunting  up 
available  men.  It  has  encroached  heavily  on 
the  unessential  industries,  but  even  the  managers 
of  these  have  largely  given  it  patriotic  help, 
as  it  is  generally  realized  that  the  conduct  of 
the  war  industries  is  vital  to  the  nation's  safety. 
The  War  Labor  Policies  Board  decides  directly 
for  war  industries  and  indirectly  for  non-war 
industries  questions  involving  distribution  of 
labor,  wages,  hours,  and  working  conditions. 
Non-war  industries  can  be  prevented  from  using 


LABOR  201 

labor  unnecessarily  through  the  pressure  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  and  the  Fuel  Administra- 
tion which  control  the  supplies  of  raw  materials 
and  coal.  The  government  has  established  a 
grip  on  industry  that  would  not  have  been 
thought  possible  a  few  years  ago. 

One  of  the  necessities  of  the  situation  is  that 
wages  be  stabilized  as  far  as  possible.  Higher 
wages  in  one  part  of  the  country  than  another 
means  constant  migration  and  a  consequent  loss 
in  production.  To  this  end  the  Labor  Policies 
Board  has  been  bending  its  energy.  It  has  to 
consider  the  living  costs  and  conditions  in  any 
particular  locality  and  to  fix  standards  of  pay 
that  will  as  far  as  possible  discourage  migration. 
It  must  strive,  too,  to  create  such  conditions 
of  labor  as  will  make  for  contentment  and  pre- 
vent unrest.  The  function  of  the  War  Labor 
Board  is  to  mediate  in  disputes  between  em- 
ployer and  employees,  when  they  occur.  The 
function  of  the  Labor  Policies  Board  is  to  try 
to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  such  controversies. 

By  the  end  of  the  present  year  we  shall 
have  withdrawn  from  our  industries  more  than 
5,000,000  of  our  best  men  to  serve  in  our  army 


202  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

and  navy.  Immigration  has  stopped  and  our 
farms  and  factories  are  being  called  on  to  pro- 
duce as  never  before.  The  work  must  be  done 
if  our  men  at  the  front  and  our  allies  who  are 
fighting  with  them  have  what  they  need  to  crush 
the  German  menace  forever.  To  do  it  we  have 
only  the  man-power  left  within  our  own  borders. 
As  the  government  has  called  on  Americans 
to  save  food  for  our  soldiers  and  our  allies  and 
to  save  money  for  our  treasury,  so  it  has  called 
on  them  to  work.  Soon  there  will  be  few  families 
in  this  country  who  have  not  some  one  dear  to 
them  fighting  on  the  fields  of  France.  Ameri- 
cans will  as  little  brook  the  slackers  in  work 
as  they  have  those  who  have  been  slackers  in 
the  fight. 

The  vast  majority  of  the  laborers  of  the 
country  have  showed  themselves  loyal  to  the 
core.  This  means  the  vast  majority  of  Amer- 
icans, for  nearly  every  American  is  a  worker, 
no  matter  what  his  social  status.  From  rail- 
roads, farms,  and  shops,  the  stores  and  offices, 
the  men  have  gone  willingly  to  fight  in  defense 
of  our  freedom.  But  organized  labor  is  a  class 
of  labor  by  itself.  It  comprises  but  a  com- 


LABOR  203 

paratively  small  part  of  the  community,  and 
yet  it  has  always  been  the  special  pet  of  politi- 
cians of  all  parties.  They,  in  their  appeals  for 
votes,  usually  speak  of  the  class  as  though  no 
one  else  ever  worked.  They  draw  a  line  be- 
tween employer  and  employee,  which  would 
indicate  that  the  employer  was  free  from  all 
care  and  labor.  When  we  went  to  war  there 
was  much  talk  of  profiteering  by  the  makers 
of  munitions.  Yet  the  treasury  figures  show 
that  at  that  time  only  one-half  of  the  muni- 
tion-makers had  made  enough  profits  to  bring 
them  in  the  reach  of  the  drastic  excess  profits 
tax.  The  legislation  that  was  passed  to  speed 
up  our  war  industries  was  aimed  to  give  the 
government  power  solely  over  the  employers 
and  plants.  Nothing  was  done  to  insure  a 
steady  effort  by  labor,  other  than  as  it  would 
be  obtained  by  raising  wages  and  appeals  to 
patriotism.  The  principle  has  been,  if  a  de- 
mand for  higher  pay  is  made,  to  tell  the  em- 
ployer he  must  pay  more  without  telling  him 
where  is  he  to  get  the  money.  In  the  case  of 
the  railroads  it  was  easy,  because  here  the 
government  had  simply  to  take  control  and 


204  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

tax  the  public  to  find  the  needed  funds.  When 
a  dispute  arose  between  the  telegraph  com- 
panies and  their  employees,  and  the  companies' 
officers  felt  the  decision  of  the  War  Labor 
Board  to  be  unfair,  the  government  again  took 
control.  And  again  it  can  raise  wages  and  tax 
the  public.  The  position  of  a  munition-maker, 
who  is  working  for  the  government  on  a  cost, 
plus  a  commission,  basis  is  safe.  He  can  meet 
all  advances  in  wages  ordered  by  the  govern- 
ment mediators,  and  the  government  will  pay 
the  added  cost.  But  the  employer  who  has  a 
contract  to  deliver  at  a  fixed  price  may  at  times 
find  himself  in  a  way  of  losing  money  if  he 
agrees  to  an  award  of  higher  wages.  Yet,  if  he 
refuses,  he  is  likely  to  have  the  government 
take  over  his  plant,  and  worse,  to  find  himself 
called  unpatriotic. 

The  national  leaders  of  organized  labor  have 
patriotically  done  their  best  to  prevent  strikes 
and  the  consequent  interruption  of  vital  pro- 
duction. The  principle  of  mediation  by  govern- 
ment agencies  was  adopted,  as  we  have  seen; 
but  the  War  Labor  Board  has  little  power  to 
enforce  its  decrees,  excent  that  tb«  government 


LABOR  205 

can  act  directly  against  one  party  to  the  dis- 
pute in  question  and  only  indirectly  against  the 
other.  The  authority  of  the  national  labor 
leaders  cannot  be  extended  to  the  non-union 
labor,  which  is  the  largest  element,  and  their 
influence  over  organized  labor  has  sometimes 
proved  not  great.  It  is  unfortunate  that  cer- 
tain classes  of  organized  and  unorganized  labor 
should  have  seized  upon  the  country's  hour 
of  necessity  to  profiteer.  Where  the  conditions 
of  labor  are  wrong,  they  should  be  righted,  and 
the  government  has  made  every  effort  to  see 
that  this  is  done.  But  the  day  when  every 
ship  that  leaves  the  ways  means  a  nearer  end- 
ing of  the  war,  and  every  gun  that  goes  over 
the  sea  gives  protection  to  our  gallant  fighting 
men,  is  no  time  for  strikes  in  industries  essen- 
tial to  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  or  to  allow 
such  strikes. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 


of  the  most  important  elements  in 
our  mobilization  has  been  the  work  of 
the  Council  of  National  Defense.  It  is  this 
great  body  of  volunteer  workers  that  helped 
to  bring  order  out  of  chaos  in  the  early  days 
of  the  war.  Strictly  speaking,  the  council  is 
a  committee  of  six,  the  Secretaries  of  War, 
Navy,  Interior,  Agriculture,  Commerce,  and 
Labor.  Actually  it  is  more  than  that.  It  is 
a  large  body  of  men  and  women,  every  one 
possessing  special  knowledge  in  some  branch 
of  industry  or  war  work  which  they  have  placed 
at  the  service  of  the  government.  When  our 
relations  with  Germany  were  growing  strained 
in  1916,  Congress  passed  an  act  forming  the 
council.  This  act,  approved  August  29,  pro- 
vided that  the  cabinet  members  named  should 
form  a  body  to  act  for  "the  co-ordination  of 
industries  and  resources  for  national  security 

206 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE      207 

and  welfare."  It  provided  that  the  council 
should  name  an  advisory  committee  of  not 
more  than  seven  persons,  each  of  whom  had 
some  special  knowledge  that  would  be  of  ser- 
vice to  the  country  in  event  of  war.  These 
persons  were  to  serve  without  compensation. 
The  advisory  committee  was  not  organized 
until  the  following  March,  when  the  war-cloud 
was  growing  heavier.  As  formed,  its  members 
were:  Daniel  Willard,  transportation  and  com- 
munication, chairman;  Howard  E.  Coffin,  air- 
craft; Julius  Rosen wald,  supplies  (including 
clothing),  etc.;  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  raw  ma- 
terials, minerals,  and  metals;  Doctor  Hollis 
Godfrey,  engineering  and  education;  Samuel 
Gompers,  labor,  including  conservation  of  health 
and  welfare  of  workers;  Doctor  Franklin  Mar- 
tin, medicine  and  surgery,  including  general 
sanitation. 

Walter  S.  Gifford  was  made  director  and 
Grosvenor  B.  Clarkson,  secretary  of  the  coun- 
cil and  advisory  commission,  and  they  act  as 
connecting-link  between  the  two. 

The  principal  duties  of  the  council  are: 
To  supervise   and   direct   investigation,  and 


208  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

make  recommendations  to  the  President  and  the 
heads  of  executive  departments  as  to: 

The  location  of  railroads  with  reference  to 
the  frontier  of  the  United  States,  so  as  to 
render  possible  expeditious  concentration  of 
troops  and  supplies. 

The  mobilization  of  military  and  naval  re- 
sources for  defense. 

The  increase  of  domestic  production  of  ar- 
ticles and  materials  essential  to  the  support 
of  armies  and  of  the  people  during  the  inter- 
ruption of  foreign  commerce. 

The  development  of  seagoing  transportation. 

Amounts,  location,  method,  and  means  of 
production  and  availability  of  military  sup- 
plies. 

The  giving  of  information  to  producers  and 
manufacturers  as  to  the  class  of  supplies  needed 
by  the  government,  and  the  creation  of  rela- 
tions which  will  render  possible  the  immediate 
concentration  and  utilization  of  the  resources 
of  the  nation. 

Reports  to  the  President  or  to  the  heads  of 
executive  departments  upon  special  inquiries  or 
subjects  appropriate  thereto. 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE      209 

The  outbreak  of  war  brought  to  Washington 
a  great  number  of  men  and  women,  having 
special  knowledge  in  the  various  phases  of  in- 
dustry and  science,  who  volunteered  to  serve 
the  government  without  compensation.  With 
them,  under  the  direction  of  the  council,  was 
formed  a  great  organization  of  several  thou- 
sand volunteers,  which  has  been  of  the  highest 
service  to  the  country.  The  leading  railroad 
men,  manufacturers,  scientists,  and  labor  leaders 
have  been  serving  patriotically,  and  their  ad- 
vice has  been  of  incalculable  value.  There 
were  formed  committees  on  munitions,  raw 
materials,  finished  products,  coal  production, 
women's  defense  work,  labor,  scientific  research, 
surgery,  and  numerous  other  subjects,  with 
under  them  subcommittees  working  with  de- 
tails. To  give  advice  has  been  practically  their 
main  function,  but  they  have  also  generated 
many  new  ideas  which  have  been  put  into  op- 
eration with  effect.  The  advisory  commission 
and  its  subordinate  committees  have  no  man- 
datory powers.  They  merely  study  the  prob- 
lems presented  to  them  and  make  their  recom- 
mendations to^  the  council  which  acts  upon 


210  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

them.  When  any  problem  requiring  special 
knowledge  arises,  it  is  submitted  to  the  Advi- 
sory Commission  which  gives  it  to  the  special 
branch  of  the  organization  competent  to  study 
the  matter  and  make  recommendations.  The 
construction  of  the  cantonments  is  an  example. 
When  the  War  Department  was  confronted 
with  that  great  work,  it  called  on  the  council 
for  aid.  A  committee  on  emergency  construc- 
tion was  formed,  and  a  number  of  engineers 
and  builders  served  on  it,  working  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  department.  On  the  committees, 
to  secure  closer  co-ordination,  representatives  of 
the  government  departments  concerned  have 
had  representatives.  Thus,  for  the  first  year  of 
the  war  an  aircraft  programme  was  in  charge  of 
the  Aircraft  Production  Board,  acting  through 
the  Signal  Corps  of  the  army  and  the  Con- 
struction Bureau  of  the  navy. 

Under  the  council's  supervision  subsidiary 
bodies,  Councils  of  National  Defense,  have 
been  organized  in  every  State  in  the  Union. 
They  collect  information  that  is  of  service  to 
the  government  and  carry  on  campaigns  of 
education  and  patriotism. 


One  of  the  most  important  accomplishments 
of  the  council  was  the  organization  of  what  is 
now  our  great  War  Industries  Board,  which 
has  such  wide  powers  affecting  the  mobilization 
of  our  resources  for  war  purposes.  At  first 
the  work  now  done  by  this  board  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  raw  material  and  finished  ma- 
terial divisions  and  of  the  General  Munitions 
Board.  The  operations  of  these  bodies  were 
found  to  be  cumbersome,  and  in  July,  1917,  they 
were  merged  into  the  War  Industries  Board, 
with  seven  members,  representing  the  army, 
the  navy,  industry,  and  labor.  Its  duties  were 
to  assign  priorities  among  the  government  de- 
partments and  the  allied  governments  in  their 
demands  on  our  industries;  to  advise  as  to 
supplies  of  materials  and  labor;  to  advise  as 
to  prices;  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  in- 
dustry and  labor;  to  prevent  the  enhancement 
of  prices  and  confusion  of  industry.  While 
the  change  proved  beneficial,  neither  the  ad- 
ministration nor  Congress  was  satisfied  with 
the  workings  of  the  system.  Congress  pro- 
posed a  ministry  of  munitions.  To  this  the 
President  objected,  as  he  felt  that  the  powers 


HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

of  the  members  would  be  too  much  limited. 
He  asked  for  authority  to  create  bodies  which 
could  act  quickly  and  without  red  tape.  At 
his  request,  the  Overman  Bill  was  passed,  giving 
him  authority  to  form  boards  to  conduct  the 
war  work  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  the 
moment.  He  appointed  Bernard  M.  Baruch 
chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board  with 
large  powers,  and  that  board  became  at  once 
almost  a  separate  department  of  the  govern- 
ment. Mr.  Baruch  had  been  head  of  the  raw 
material  division  of  the  Defense  Council  and 
had  had  great  success  in  the  early  part  of  the 
war  on  securing  much-needed  supplies  of 
copper,  steel,  zinc,  lead,  platinum,  and  other 
metals  at  prices  far  below  the  market  levels. 
In  his  capacity  as  adviser  to  the  government 
in  the  purchase  of  these  supplies,  he  was  met 
half-way  by  the  producers.  The  heads  of  all 
the  great  producing  companies  placed  their 
plants  at  the  government's  service  and  agreed 
to  furnish  their  products  to  the  government 
at  prices  far  less  than  they  were  commanding 
in  the  open  market.  Nitrates  for  the  making  of 
explosives,  manganese  and  tungsten  for  our  steel 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE      213 

mills,  many  other  metals  and  chemicals  needed 
for  our  war  industries  he,  with  foresight,  secured 
at  reasonable  cost. 

What  the  President  established  in  the  War 
Industries  Board,  with  Mr.  Baruch  at  its  head, 
was  practically  a  clearing-house  for  all  govern- 
ment and  Allied  purchases.  The  chairman  has 
associated  with  him  eight  men,  all  experts  in 
their  particular  duties,  and  under  the  board 
has  been  built  up  a  great  business  organization, 
with  every  branch  in  charge  of  a  specialist. 
The  board  keeps  close  watch  on  all  industries 
in  the  country,  and  knows  where  all  supplies 
are  to  be  found  and  how  great  they  are.  The 
departments  no  longer  bid  against  each  other. 
They  still  make  their  own  contracts  but  not 
until  they  have  consulted  the  board  and  had 
the  supplies  allotted  to  them  in  accordance  with 
the  priority  of  their  needs.  Working  with  the 
Railroad  Administration,  the  board  decides 
what  commodities  shall  be  moved  over  the 
lines,  for  so  great  is  the  congestion  of  traffic 
that  it  is  essential  that  priority  be  given  to 
special  supplies.  It  has  to  keep  in  touch  with 
th",  War  Trade  Board,  since  the  scarcity  of 


214  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

shipping  necessitates  careful  supervision  over 
our  imports  of  raw  materials.  It  has  to  work, 
too,  in  close  co-operation  with  the  Fuel  Ad- 
ministration to  see  that  industries  vital  to  our 
war  programme  receive  coal. 

The  requirements  division  of  the  board 
meets  daily.  These  sessions  are  attended  by 
the  heads  of  all  the  chief  sections  and  repre- 
sentatives of  the  various  government  depart- 
ments and  of  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission. 
Statements  are  laid  before  it  outlining  the  needs 
of  every  branch  of  the  government  and  of  our 
allies  in  the  way  of  raw  and  finished  materials. 
The  available  supply  of  every  commodity 
concerned  can  be  quickly  ascertained  from  the 
section'  in  charge  of  it.  The  government,  if 
necessary,  takes  the  entire  supply  and  the  board 
allots  it.  In  this  manner  co-ordination  and 
rapid  action  have  been  obtained. 

The  board  has  no  specific  power  in  law  to 
fix  prices.  The  prices  to  be  paid  by  the  govern- 
ment are  agreed  on  between  the  Price  Fixing 
Committee  of  the  board  and  representatives 
of  the  producers.  The  government  only  inter- 
venes to  fix  prices  to  the  public  where  it  has 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE      215 

taken  so  large  a  part  of  any  commodity  as  to 
create  a  scarcity  for  the  civil  population.  Here 
the  price  is  also  fixed  by  agreement  with  the 
producer  and  it  must  be  the  same  for  the  gov- 
ernment, the  Allies,  and  the  civilian.  The  com- 
modity is  apportioned  among  them  according 
to  their  needs.  The  wholesaler  or  retailer  who 
gets  a  share  must  sell  it  at  the  government's 
figure.  If  he  does  not  he  goes  on  the  black  list 
and  receives  nothing  of  the  later  distributions. 
But  in  general  there  has  been  wide-spread  co- 
operation with  the  government  by  producers 
and  dealers.  The  government  has  the  power  to 
commandeer  and  operate  the  industries  essen- 
tial to  the  war,  but  with  hands  full  operating 
its  army  and  navy,  it  has  chosen  the  wiser 
method  of  trusting  to  the  patriotism  of  the 
business  men  and  securing  the  benefit  of  their 
energy  and  intelligence.  They  have  responded 
to  this  call  in  full  measure. 

As  our  industries  have  sent  their  represen- 
tatives to  Washington  to  help  the  government, 
so  have  our  sciences.  Immediately  on  the  out- 
break of  war,  the  National  Research  Council 
affiliated  itself  with  the  Council  of  National 


216  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

Defense,  as  its  agency  in  science  and  research. 
This  council  is  organized  in  a  series  of  divisions, 
which  draw  together  into  small  groups  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  various  special  committees 
dealing  with  different  branches  of  the  mathe- 
matical, physical  and  biological  sciences,  en- 
gineering, medicine,  agriculture,  and  various 
arts.  For  example,  its  engineering  division 
was  organized  with  the  co-operation  of  the 
national  engineering  societies,  who  are  rep- 
resented on  the  executive  board.  Under  this 
division  are  sections  on  metallurgy,  mechanical, 
electrical,  and  other  branches  of  engineering. 
In  order  to  avoid  unnecessary  duplication,  the 
National  Advisory  Committee  for  aeronautics 
acts  as  a  section  on  aeronautics  in  this  divi- 
sion. 

The  council  has  headquarters  in  Washing- 
ton, which  are  in  charge  of  Doctor  George  E. 
Hale,  a  well-known  astronomer.  In  this  office 
the  work  is  centralized.  Problems  are  brought 
to  it  by  the  various  depart  rnents  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  they  are  at  once  assigned  for  study 
to  the  division  of  the  council  concerned „  As 
nearly  every  scientist  of  note  in  the  country  is 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE      217 

associated  with  the  body,  the  government  has 
quickly  at  its  service  the  highest  of  ability. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board, 
the  council  has  made  public  but  little  of  the 
results  of  its  researches  and  inventions.  A 
full  report  will  not  be  made  until  after  the  war. 
It  is  permitted,  however,  to  speak  of  a  few  of 
these  which  give  an  idea  of  the  nature  of  its 
service. 

The  question  of  helmets  and  body  armor 
was  one  which  arose  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  At  the  request  of  the  War  Department 
a  special  committee  was  appointed  to  study 
this  subject,  with  Doctor  Bashford  Dean,  cura- 
tor of  armor  in  the  Metropolitan  Museum  of 
New  York,  at  its  head.  Associated  with  him 
were  engineers  and  metallurgists.  This  com- 
mittee worked  out  a  new  form  of  helmet,  in 
which  work  the  experience  of  Doctor  Dean 
and  his  knowledge  of  old  forms  proved  in- 
valuable. Doctor  Henry  M.  Howe  studied 
the  metallurgical  side  of  the  problem,  select- 
ing the  best  steel  for  the  head-piece,  and  making 
tests  with  machine-guns  on  the  steel  in  various 
forms,  both  in  sheets  and  in  the  shape  which 


218  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

it  has  been  given  in  the  helmet.  The  helmet 
thus  devised  is  being  made  in  large  numbers 
and  is  in  use  in  our  army.  From  this  problem 
the  committee  went  on  to  the  subject  of  body 
armor.  This  seems  like  harking  back  to 
mediaeval  days  and  outworn  devices.  But 
experience  has  shown  that  in  modern  fighting 
a  large  percentage  of  the  wounds  are  made  by 
low-velocity  bullets  and  bits  of  shrapnel  which 
have  nearly  spent  themselves.  To  devise  a 
steel  protection  for  the  breast  and  legs  to  resist 
these  is  not  difficult,  but  the  breastplate  and 
leg  guards  must  be  so  light  as  not  to  impede 
the  movements  of  the  soldier.  The  committee 
has  devised  such  armor  pieces  as  light  as  possi- 
ble, and  yet  sufficiently  resistant  to  low-velocity 
bullets  and  shell  fragments  to  be  effective.  It 
is  being  tried  on  the  fields  of  France  by  our 
men. 

The  problems  that  have  been  submitted  to 
the  council  for  solution  have  been  almost  in- 
numerable. This  war  has  been  one  of  science, 
and  every  branch  of  science  has  been  engaged 
in  the  combat.  One  of  the  most  difficult  of 
these  problems  has  been  to  find  means  of  locat- 


ing  submarines  under  water  and  destroying 
them.  The  headway  attained  here  has  not 
been  made  known,  but  it  is  known  that  there 
has  been  headway.  Another  complex  problem 
was  to  devise  an  accurate  method  of  dropping 
bombs  from  airplanes.  In  the  early  stages  of 
the  war,  this  was  done  in  random  fashion,  and 
it  was  difficult  to  sight  and  hit  a  target.  The 
question  involves  the  trajectory  of  the  bomb 
as  it  falls  from  a  fast-flying  plane.  The  council 
brought  into  co-operation  with  the  Signal  Corps 
and  the  Ordnance  Department,  both  of  which 
were  engaged  in  this  investigation,  various 
mathematical  physicists  whose  previous  ex- 
perience adapted  them  for  this  work.  Some 
of  the  most  interesting  results  were  obtained  by 
a  mathematical  astronomer  of  Princeton,  who 
utilized,  for  calculating  the  trajectories  of 
bombs,  certain  new  methods  which  were  de- 
veloped for  the  purpose  of  calculating  plane- 
tary orbits.  This  same  astronomer  derived  the 
quickest  known  method  of  reducing  the  ob- 
servations made  for  the  location  of  guns  by 
the  method  of  sound  ranging. 

Doctor  Hale  has  pointed  out  that  there  is 


220  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

great  similarity  between  some  of  the  problems 
of  aerial  warfare  and  astronomy.  An  example 
which  he  gives  is  the  photographing  of  trenches 
from  an  airplane.  There  is  always  more  or 
less  dust  or  haze  in  the  air  which  interferes  with 
photography.  By  using  a  color-screen  in  front 
of  the  camera,  and  thus  by  cutting  off  the  violet 
and  blue  part  of  the  light  and  letting  through 
the  red,  yellow,  green  and  light-blue  parts  of 
the  spectrum,  the  operator  is  able  to  get  in- 
creased contrast  and  make  the  trenches  show 
better;  the  best  photographs  are  made  with 
the  aid  of  color-screens.  In  astronomy,  when 
you  want  to  photograph  the  sun,  if  you  photo- 
graph it  directly,  you  get  just  what  you  see 
with  your  eye,  but  if  you  want  to  bring  out 
the  invisible  phenomena  of  the  sun's  atmos- 
phere, you  use  simply  a  refinement  of  that 
method.  You  photograph  with  a  single  line 
of  the  spectrum,  say  a  line  of  hydrogen,  and 
thus  render  visible  the  entire  hydrogen  atmos- 
phere of  the  sun,  otherwise  wholly  invisible. 
This  is  the  same  principle  that  the  man  in  the 
airplane  uses  when  he  photographs  the  trenches. 
Among  the  accomplishments  of  the  Research 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 

Council  has  been  a  new  range-finder  developed 
by  a  well-known  physicist,  and  an  ear-protec- 
tor by  the  same  scientist.  The  navy  has 
adopted  a  new  method  of  selecting  and  train- 
ing gunners  which  was  developed  by  a  psy- 
chologist. It  makes  it  possible  to  judge  how 
accurately  a  man  may  be  expected  to  point 
a  gun  and  tests  his  ability  as  a  marksman. 
The  army  has  adopted  a  system  of  psycholog- 
ical tests  to  determine  the  mental  ability  of 
the  individual  soldier,  which  was  evolved 
through  the  co-operation  of  the  Research  Coun- 
cil and  the  American  Psychological  Associa- 
tion. Another  scientist  has  devised  a  method 
of  testing  on  the  ground  the  ability  of  an  aviator 
to  rise  to  very  high  altitudes,  thus  making  it 
possible  to  judge  accurately  just  how  high  a 
man  can  fly  without  being  in  danger  of  heart- 
failure  and  fain  ting-spells,  hi  which  he  would 
plunge  to  his  death. 

The  council  has  dealt  with  many  questions 
in  chemistry,  both  in  research  on  problems  of 
importance  from  a  military  or  industrial  point 
of  view  and  in  furnishing  information  on  chem- 
ical subjects  to  the  War  Industries  Board.  Per- 


HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

haps  the  most  important  single  problem  in 
chemistry  connected  with  the  war  is  that  of 
the  fixation  of  nitrogen  from  the  air.  Nitrates 
are  needed  both  for  high  explosives  and  for 
fertilizers,  so  the  problem  has  both  military 
and  industrial  aspects.  Before  the  war  all 
nitrates  used  in  this  country  were  imported 
from  Chile,  and  that  supply  might  be  cut  off 
by  the  activities  of  German  agents  or  in  other 
ways.  Germany,  foreseeing  this  long  ago,  de- 
veloped methods  for  the  fixation  of  nitrogen, 
and  utilizing  the  cheap  water-power  of  Nor- 
way for  this  purpose,  established  very  extensive 
plants  under  German  control.  Subsequently, 
new  methods  for  the  fixation  of  nitrogen  were 
worked  out  by  the  German  chemists,  and  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war  ample  supplies  of 
nitrates  have  been  produced  in  Germany  by 
these  processes.  In  this  country,  at  the  re- 
quest of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  May,  1916, 
the  council  appointed  a  committee  to  report 
on  the  best  methods  of  nitrogen  fixation  with 
a  view  to  the  best  utilization  of  an  appropria- 
tion of  twenty  million  dollars,  which  was  made 
that  summer  by  Congress  for  the  erection  of 


COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE      223 

plants  for  this  purpose.  Since  that  time  much 
larger  appropriations  for  the  same  purpose 
have  been  made,  and  several  of  these  plants 
are  in  operation.  At  present  a  committee  of 
the  council  is  assisting  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment in  the  improvement  of  various  processes 
which  are  easily  open  to  important  develop- 
ment through  chemical  experimentation.  Here, 
as  in  all  other  cases,  the  fundamental  principle 
of  the  council  has  been  to  recommend  the  im- 
mediate adoption  of  the  best  available  process, 
and  not  to  allow  research  development  to  re- 
tard in  the  slightest  degree  the  immediate  util- 
ization of  the  best  available  methods  to  meet 
war  necessities.  At  the  same  time  research 
follows  the  application  of  these  methods,  espe- 
cially in  such  a  case  as  that  of  nitrogen  fixation, 
where  slight  improvements  might  effect  enor- 
mous savings  in  the  process  of  manufacture. 

As  the  business  men  and  scientists  of  the 
country  mobilized  themselves  for  the  service 
of  the  country,  so  did  the  medical  men.  The 
medical  section  of  the  Council  of  National  De- 
fense has  done  a  notable  work  for  the  army 
and  navy.  Through  its  medium  it  has  been 


224  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

possible  for  the  government  to  keep  in  touch 
with  the  medical  profession  over  the  entire 
country,  and  to  secure  the  thousands  of  men 
and  women  needed  as  surgeons  and  nurses. 
The  section,  too,  has  performed  a  valuable 
service  in  standardizing  instruments  and  sup- 
plies, and  in  securing  a  substitution  of  instru- 
ments for  those  for  which  we  formerly  relied 
on  Germany.  The  war  has  made  a  heavy  drain 
on  the  medical  and  nursing  professions,  and 
to  enlist  their  members  in  sufficient  numbers 
in  the  national  service,  without  unduly  en- 
dangering the  public  health,  has  not  been  one 
of  the  least  of  the  government's  problems. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
THE  RAILROADS 

IT  has  happened  that  in  its  battle  against 
autocracy,  our  government  has  become  an 
autocracy.  But  it  has  become  an  autocracy 
for  the  war  only  and  by  the  wish  of  the  people, 
as  expressed  through  their  representatives. 
This  condition  is  true  of  every  other  nation 
that  is  fighting  the  German  horror.  Unified 
action  was  necessary,  and  unified  action  could 
only  be  had  through  a  centralization  of  con- 
trol. As  the  Allies  placed  their  armies  under 
the  command  of  General  Foch,  so  America 
placed  her  industries  under  command  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  that  their  co-ordinated  powers 
might  be  used  to  the  quick  winning  of  the  war. 
We  have  seen  how  our  government  has  taken 
indirect  control  of  our  farms  and  their  prod- 
ucts through  the  activities  of  the  Food  Ad- 
ministration; how  it  controls  our  manufac- 
turing industries  through  the  War  Industries 
Board  and  Fuel  Administration.  Although  in  all 

225 


226  HOW  WE   WENT  TO  WAR 

of  these  cases  it  has  wide  powers  under  the 
law,  instead  of  using  the  force  of  the  law  to 
attain  its  ends  it  has  relied  more  on  suasion 
and  on  the  patriotism  of  the  people;  it  has 
endeavored  to  secure  its  desires  by  agreement 
instead  of  compulsion.  The  real  power  that  it 
yields  is  in  the  fact  that  it  is  the  largest  buyer 
of  commodities  in  the  world.  In  every  activity 
of  our  lives  we  see  the  hand  of  the  government. 
Economic  changes  have  been  wrought  by  the 
war  that  a  few  years  ago  we  should  have  deemed 
impossible.  Of  these  many  will  pass  away  with 
the  war.  One  change  alone  seems  likely  to 
continue,  if  not  in  all,  in  at  least  some  of  its 
phases.  It  is  that  in  our  transportation  sys- 
tem. As  the  government  had  to  take  virtual 
control  of  our  industries,  so  it  had  to  take  real 
control  of  our  railroads.  To  do  so  was  a  neces- 
sity of  war.  Troops,  food,  material  had  to  be 
moved  in  orderly  fashion.  Before  the  govern- 
ment took  this  control,  the  railroads  could  not 
attain  the  high  pitch  of  efficiency  that  was 
needed,  and  the  reasons  were  obvious. 

We  have  the  greatest  transportation  system 
in  the  world,  and  some  ten  years  ago  James 


THE  RAILROADS  227 

J.  Hill,  the  veteran  railroad  builder,  said  that 
if  our  railroads  were  to  be  kept  in  condition 
and  to  keep  pace  with  the  country's  growth, 
there  would  have  to  be  expended  on  them  one 
billion  dollars  a  year.  They  were  never  al- 
lowed to  make  that  billion.  They  were  so  reg- 
ulated by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
that  their  earnings  were  kept  to  the  lowest 
possible  point,  while  taxes  and  the  prices  of 
labor  and  material  were  steadily  rising.  They 
were  pinched  between  upper  and  nether  mill- 
stones. To  make  extensions  or  improvements 
they  had  to  borrow  money.  In  1914  and  1915 
traffic  on  them  fell  to  a  point  that  brought 
trouble  to  many  of  them  to  meet  expenses. 
They  had  no  money  with  which  to  provide 
for  future  needs.  In  the  fall  of  1915,  their 
business  began  to  increase  so  rapidly  that  there 
was  a  serious  shortage  of  rolling-stock.  While 
their  gross  operating  incomes  increased  largely, 
the  net  revenue  per  mile  for  the  whole  country 
decreased.  In  the  fall  of  1916,  the  employees 
began  to  agitate  for  an  eight-hour  day,  with 
ten  hours'  pay,  and  time  and  one-half  overtime. 
The  refusal  of  the  railroads  to  meet  this,  brought, 


228  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

as  we  have  seen,  the  passage  of  the  Adamson 
law  giving  the  men  an  eight-hour  day  and  pro 
rata  overtime,  and  caused  a  controversy  which 
continued  almost  to  the  day  of  our  entering 
the  war.  The  railroads  appealed  to  the  courts 
for  relief.  As  late  as  March  17,  the  men  were 
threatening  to  strike,  and  were  only  withheld 
by  the  efforts  of  the  government  and  the  na- 
tional labor  leaders  who  saw  war  ahead.  When 
the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  two  days 
later  upheld  the  law,  the  dispute  ended  but 
only  for  a  time.  The  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  granted  the  railroads  some  relief 
in  the  way  of  increases  in  rates  on  certain  com- 
modities in  various  sections,  but  this  proved 
inadequate.  For  several  years  there  had  been  a 
continued  depreciation  in  road-beds  and  roll- 
ing-stock, and  no  money  to  mend  the  trouble. 
Many  of  the  roads  had  failed  to  pay  the  interest 
on  money  borrowed  for  improvements,  and 
railroad  credit  was  generally  bad. 

The  war  greatly  increased  the  strain  of  our 
transportation  systems.  To  secure  co-ordina- 
tion a  Railroads  War  Board  was  formed,  com- 
posed of  six  leading  railroad  executives,  and 


THE  RAILROADS  229 

they  operated  the  roads  for  nine  months  as 
one,  as  far  as  they  could  with  the  restrictions 
placed  on  them  by  Federal  and  State  laws. 
Despite  the  fact  that  in  this  time  they  handled 
a  record-breaking  traffic,  the  congestion  became 
steadily  worse,  and  in  the  fall  of  1917  it  threat- 
ened serious  consequences.  About  this  time 
the  employees  were  again  agitating  for  more 
wages.  Some  seventy  thousand  of  them  had 
gone  into  the  army  and  navy,  further  handi- 
capping the  roads.  Labor  was  scarce  and  it 
was  hard  to  hold  the  men  when  high  pay  was 
to  be  had  in  the  shipyards  and  munition  fac- 
tories. To  end  all  these  difficulties  the  Presi- 
dent acted  under  the  powers  given  him  by  Con- 
gress in  the  Adamson  law,  which  allowed  him 
to  take  over  and  operate  the  roads  in  case  of 
military  necessity.  By  proclamation,  on  De- 
cember 26,  1917,  he  took  control  of  the  entire 
transportation  system  of  the  country,  both 
by  land  and  water. 

The  United  States  Railroad  Administration 
was  then  formed,  with  Secretary  McAdoo  at 
its  head.  The  administration  is  to  operate 
the  roads  only  for  the  period  of  the  war  and 


230  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

twenty -one  months  thereafter.  Under  the  law 
passed  on  March  21,  the  roads  must  be  main- 
tained in  as  good  repair  and  with  as  complete 
equipment  as  when  taken  over;  the  roads  must 
receive  in  compensation  a  net  income  equal 
in  every  case  to  the  average  net  income  in  the 
three  years  preceding  June  30,  1917,  which 
happened  to  be  lean  years — all  excess  going 
to  the  government;  regular  dividends  and  in- 
terest on  bonds  and  other  obligations  may  con- 
tinue to  be  paid  unless  the  director-general 
otherwise  directs.  A  contract  was  agreed  to 
between  the  government  and  the  railroads  in 
the  present  summer  covering  the  details  of 
these  points. 

To  provide  for  the  betterment  in  the  rail- 
roads' operating  facilities  so  much  needed  for 
the  purposes  of  the  war,  the  government  estab- 
lished a  revolving  fund  of  $500,000,000.  This 
fund  is  augmented  by  the  earnings  of  the  rail- 
roads in  excess  of  the  rental  paid  for  them  by 
the  government.  And  in  the  first  year  of  its 
control  the  government  arranged  to  loan  to 
the  companies  nearly  $1,000,000,000,  but  a 
small  part  of  which  was  ordered  spent  on 


THE  RAILROADS  231 

new  construction,  while  the  rest  was  divided 
between  new  equipment  and  betterment  of 
road-beds  and  terminals.  The  government 
simply  does  for  the  roads  what  was  formerly 
done  by  private  capital,  makes  them  loans 
for  which  it  takes  their  bonds  and  notes  as 
security.  Such  an  arrangement  allows  the 
government  to  make  the  improvements  that 
are  demanded  by  military  necessity.  To-day 
the  Railroad  Administration  is  operating  188 
large  railroad  systems  and  800  short  lines,  with 
a  trackage  of  260,000  miles.  It  was  quickly 
confronted  by  the  same  problems  with  which 
the  companies  had  been  so  long  wrestling,  rising 
costs  of  operations  against  low  earnings.  But 
it  could  do  what  the  companies  could  not.  It 
at  once  ordered  an  increase  of  25  per  cent  in 
all  freight  rates,  and  raised  passenger  fares 
from  2^  cents  to  3  cents  per  mile.  The  em- 
ployees were  making  heavy  demands  on  the 
companies,  and  the  Railroad  Wage  Comin:?- 
sion  was  ordered  to  investigate  this  question. 
In  its  report  the  director-general  in  August 
granted  advances  in  wages  aggregating  more 
than  $300,000,000,  and  these  advances  were 


232  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

made  retroactive  to  the  beginning  of  the 
year. 

The  operation  of  the  roads  has  remained 
practically  in  the  hands  of  the  former  operat- 
ing officers.  The  corporate  interests  of  the 
companies  owning  the  railways  are  looked  after 
by  corporations'  executive  officers,  who  have 
no  connection  with  the  administration.  They 
have  continued  in  their  places  to  guard  the 
interests  of  stockholders  and  creditors.  To 
secure  efficiency  of  operation,  the  railroad  mile- 
age of  the  country  has  been  divided  into  seven 
regional  districts,  each  in  charge  of  a  regional 
director,  an  experienced  railway  executive. 
These  districts  are  subdivided  into  smaller 
districts  under  directors.  Under  them  Federal 
managers  have  charge  of  important  single  di- 
visiors  or  groups  of  smaller  divisions.  General 
managers  direct  the  still  smaller  units.  All  of 
these  directors  and  managers  have  severed  their 
connections  with  the  corporations,  transferring 
their  allegiance  to  the  administration. 

The  effect  of  this  unified  control  has  been 
a  more  direct  routing  of  traffic  and  a  conse- 
quent saving  in  time  and  money.  Under  the 


THE  RAILROADS  233 

old  system  there  could  be  no  competition  in 
freight  or  passenger  rates;  but  there  was  com- 
petition to  get  business  by  advertising  and 
the  employment  of  solicitors.  It  is  estimated 
that  by  the  consolidation  of  ticket  offices  and 
the  abandoning  of  advertising,  many  millions 
will  be  saved.  Inasmuch  as  the  government 
receives  all  the  money  paid  in,  there  is  no  ob- 
ject in  any  company  carrying  freight  con- 
signed to  it  over  unnecessarily  long  lines.  The 
freight  can  be  rerouted  over  lines  that  carry  it 
to  its  destination  by  the  shortest  way  possible. 
Under  the  old  system  two  companies  would  have 
competing  passenger-trains  leaving  one  point  for 
another  point  at  the  same  time.  Between  large 
centres  there  were  many  duplications  of  this 
kind  which  it  has  been  possible  to  eliminate, 
with  great  saving  of  cost.  The  need  of  the 
roads  for  freight  movement,  as  well  as  for  the 
purpose  of  economy,  has  led  to  the  cutting 
down  of  unnecessary  passenger  traffic  as  far 
as  possible.  East  of  the  Mississippi  passenger- 
trains  that  travelled  more  than  25,000,000 
miles  per  year  have  been  cut  off,  while  west  of 
the  river  there  has  been  a  saving  of  more  than 


234  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

20,000,000  miles.  Other  economies  have  been 
effected  by  providing  for  the  common  use  of 
terminals  by  railways  that  were  formerly 
competing.  The  standardization  of  locomo- 
tives and  freight-cars,  will,  it  is  expected, 
make  for  increased  efficiency  and  the  saving  of 
money. 

While  the  public  has  suffered  inconvenience 
by  the  curtailment  of  passenger  service  and 
has  had  an  added  drain  put  on  its  pocket  by 
increases  in  rates,  it  has  borne  the  change  with 
patriotic  good  nature,  realizing  that  efficiency 
in  railroad  operation  was  one  of  the  factors  in 
the  winning  of  the  war.  Vast  quantities  of 
food  and  war  materials  and  large  numbers  of 
troops  had  to  be  moved  to  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board, and  this  could  only  be  done  successfully 
with  unified  control.  Government  operation 
of  the  railroads  was  a  war  measure.  Whether 
or  not  it  will  continue  as  a  peace  measure  re- 
mains to  be  seen.  If  the  roads  are  turned  back 
to  their  owners,  as  it  is  promised  they  will  be, 
some  may  find  themselves  to  have  suffered 
great  hardship,  while  others  may  have  bene- 
fitted  greatly  by  the  period  of  government 


THE  RAILROADS  235 

financing.     The   "unscrambling  of  the   eggs," 
will  be  a  difficult  problem. 

The  government  had  to  take  over  the  opera- 
tion of  the  railroads  as  a  war  measure,  because 
the  unscientific  treatment  of  them  for  so  many 
years  had  enfeebled  them  for  war-work.  They 
had  been  heckled  by  politicians  of  all  parties. 
They  had  been  hampered  in  their  growth  by 
Federal  and  State  commissions.  Radical 
politicians  always  speak  of  them  as  though 
they  were  run  for  the  benefit  of  a  few  stock- 
holders and  bondholders,  and  are,  therefore, 
fair  game  for  attack.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
number  of  those  who  have  their  money  directly 
invested  in  them  runs  into  millions.  More 
than  that,  fully  one-half  of  the  people  of  the 
country  have  an  indirect  financial  interest  in 
them.  There  are  over  10,000,000  savings-banks 
depositors  in  the  country,  and  more  than  30,- 
000,000  industrial  workers  who  carry  insurance 
against  death  and  casualty.  Through  these 
banking  and  insurance  institutions  their  money 
has  been  invested  in  what  should  be  a  security 
as  safe  as  any  in  the  world.  When  the  war  is 
over  these  millions  of  investors  will  watch  with 


236  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

concern  the  future  of  their  properties,  and  it 
is  doubtful  that  the  majority  of  Americans 
would  quietly  acquiesce  in  the  continuation  in 
times  of  peace  of  a  policy  of  railroad  control 
which  would  leave  the  finest  transportation 
systems  in  the  world  mere  shuttlecocks  for  the 
battledores  of  politics.  It  is  more  probable 
that  from  the  present  experiment  there  will 
be  worked  out  a  system  of  control  which  will 
deal  fairly  with  the  public,  the  investors,  and 
the  employees. 

This  action  of  the  government  has  been  called 
socialistic.  It  was,  but  for  the  time  there  was 
no  other  way  out  of  a  dangerous  situation. 
The  war  must  be  won.  Realizing  this,  Amer- 
icans have  faced  trainless  days  and  seatless 
trains  with  the  same  cheerful  willingness  that 
they  have  wheatless  days  and  gasless  Sundays. 


THE  COLLEGE 

A  BOOK  such  as  this,  which  seeks  to  de- 
•*  *•  scribe  briefly  America's  mobilization  for 
war,  would  not  be  complete  without  considera- 
tion of  the  splendid  part  played  by  our  uni- 
versities and  colleges  in  the  great  effort.  It 
was  to  them  that  the  government  had  to  look 
for  the  large  number  of  officers  needed  for  the 
formation  of  our  armies.  Modern  warfare  is 
a  technical  science.  The  science  of  war  in 
Napoleon's  day,  and  for  many  years  after,  was 
largely  a  matter  of  strategy  and  manoeuvre. 
The  weapons  used  were  few  and  comparatively 
simple.  To-day  every  science  is  called  to  the 
aid  of  the  armies.  The  knowledge  of  chemistry, 
of  mechanics,  of  mathematics,  and  electricity 
all  play  a  part  in  the  construction  and  opera- 
tion of  engines  of  warfare.  Officers  who  are 
to  lead  men  into  battle  must  be  experts  in  the 
use  of  special  arms  and  devices  that  were  un- 
known but  a  few  years  ago.  Not  so  long  since 

237 


238  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

artillery  fired  almost  pointblank  at  its  target, 
but  to-day  it  fires  at  an  unseen  target  miles 
away,  and  must  depend  for  accuracy  on  the 
niceties  of  mathematical  calculation  and  ob- 
servation from  airplanes  and  outlying  posts. 
Every  branch  of  army  service  requires  special- 
ists of  some  kind,  whether  on  the  fighting-line 
or  far  behind  it.  For  the  command  of  effective 
fighting  forces  trained  officers  are  essential. 
Before  the  Great  War  we  had  only  two  schools, 
West  Point  and  Annapolis,  whose  sole  purpose 
it  was  to  fit  young  men  for  command  in  event 
of  war,  and  they  graduated  yearly  but  a  few 
hundred.  When  we  entered  the  conflict,  one 
of  our  crying  needs  was  for  competent  junior 
officers. 

Fortunately,  there  had  been  held,  in  the 
summer  of  1915  and  1916,  that  series  of  camps 
for  voluntary  training  which  were  attended 
by  some  thousands  of  young  men.  Of  these 
the  great  majority  were  graduates  or  under- 
graduates of  our  universities  and  colleges  whose 
education  and  discipline  made  them  readily 
adaptable  to  the  requirements  of  military  life. 
From  the  colleges,  in  fact,  came  the  first  ef- 


THE  COLLEGE  239 

fective  movement  for  preparedness  for  war. 
Men  like  Eliot  and  Lowell  of  Harvard,  Hadley 
of  Yale,  and  Hibben  of  Princeton  early  saw 
the  danger  of  war,  and  in  their  writings  and 
speeches  urged  active  preparation  for  it.  Their 
universities  went  further  and  to  practical 
things.  They  established  courses  of  military 
training  to  fit  their  young  men  for  commis- 
sions in  the  officers'  reserve  corps.  Harvard 
and  Princeton  formed  infantry  regiments,  and 
Yale  a  field-artillery  battalion.  Similar  interest 
in  military  training  began  to  be  taken  in  in- 
stitutions of  learning  all  over  the  country.  The 
State  universities  and  colleges,  receiving  aid 
from  the  government  under  the  land -grant 
act,  had  long  had  military  tactics  as  a  part  of 
their  curricula,  but  these  courses  were  only 
rudimentary.  Now  they  broadened  their  work 
and  sought  to  fit  their  training  to  modern  needs. 
The  camps  in  the  summers  of  1915  and  1916, 
were  filled  with  hundreds  of  patriotic  under- 
graduates who  gave  up  their  vacations  to  pre- 
pare themselves  for  the  day  when  they  be- 
lieved their  country  would  need  them.  When 
the  day  did  come  many  of  them  were  ready 


240  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

for  duty.  Yale,  alone,  at  once  sent  250  men 
into  the  artillery  service.  Thousands  of  under- 
graduates abandoned  their  academic  pursuits 
and  went  to  the  flying-fields  and  training-camps. 
Of  the  40,000  men  in  the  officers'  camps  of  1917, 
fully  85  per  cent  were  college  graduates  or 
undergraduates.  Now  not  a  day  passes  but 
we  read  of  the  death  on  the  field  of  battle  of 
gallant  young  men  who  hardly  more  than  a 
year  ago  were  wandering  care-free  over  some 
college  campus.  Day  by  day  they  are  going 
overseas  in  an  ever-increasing  flow,  boys  hardly 
more  than  out  of  their  teens,  who  seemed  to 
have  before  them  all  that  was  good  in  life,  but 
now  stand  ready  to  lay  down  their  lives  that 
their  fellows  may  live  in  freedom. 

At  this  writing  it  is  impossible  to  give  ac- 
curate figures  as  to  the  number  of  college  men 
in  war  service,  but  statistics  compiled  in  mid- 
summer by  the  Western  Reserve  University 
indicate  that  they  number  more  than  100,000. 
Harvard  had  then  sent  more  than  8,000  grad- 
uates and  undergraduates  to  war;  the  Univer- 
sity of  California  2,000  and  Columbia  4,500. 
Yale  had  sent  5,800  graduates  and  927  under- 


THE  COLLEGE  241 

graduates;  the  Northwestern  University  respec- 
tively 1,071  and  370;  Purdue  1,462  and  494; 
Johns  Hopkins  500  and  235;  Massachusetts 
Institute  of  Technology  1,900  and  400;  Wil- 
liams 752  and  192;  the  University  of  Michigan 
5,000  and  2,000;  Princeton  2,423  and  532; 
Brown  700  and  300;  the  University  of  Wash- 
ington 1,587  and  1,325.  In  proportion  to  their 
size  the  smaller  colleges  have  done  as  well.  The 
record  of  all  is  one  of  honor. 

The  conduct  of  the  war  required  the  mobil- 
ization of  the  intelligence  of  the  country,  and 
when  it  accepted  the  German  challenge,  the 
government  instinctively  turned  to  the  colleges 
as  the  source  from  which  it  could  best  obtain 
the  army  of  men  of  character  and  education 
so  urgently  needed.  In  May,  following  the 
declaration  of  war,  a  conference  was  held  in 
Washington  between  representatives  of  the 
various  associations  of  the  institutions  of 
higher  learning,  the  Bureau  of  Education  and 
the  Council  of  National  Defense.  Here  plans 
were  outlined  for  patriotic  service.  All  the 
facilities  of  the  colleges  were  placed  at  the 
government's  disposal,  and  they  arranged  to 


242  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

organize  themselves  so  as  to  be  of  the  greatest 
use  in  the  crisis.  Not  only  did  they  offer  the 
country  its  finest  source  of  intelligent  man- 
power, but  their  laboratories  were  to  prove 
of  value  in  research  work,  and  their  halls  and 
dormitories  useful  for  military  schools  of  all 
kinds.  While  an  effort  has  been  made  to  halt 
as  little  as  possible  the  progress  of  higher  edu- 
cation, the  demands  of  the  war  have  been  such 
as  to  make  it  imperative  that  the  young  men 
of  the  country  train  themselves  in  military 
science  or  other  sciences  and  technical  work, 
a  knowledge  of  which  is  of  so  great  importance 
in  these  times.  To-day  nearly  all  of  our  col- 
leges are  organized  on  a  war  basis. 

Before  April  6,  1917,  there  were  in  many 
of  our  colleges  centres  of  pacifism  and  German 
propaganda.  Those  involved  were  either  con- 
scientious pacifists,  idealistic  professors  who 
opposed  war  and  held  that  the  way  to  whip 
Germany  was  to  sit  placidly  by  and  let  her 
whip  you,  or  they  were  Germans  or  German - 
trained  scholars  avowedly  partisans  of  Kultur. 
Our  neutrality  made  them  difficult  to  deal  with, 
but  when  we  went  to  war  they  were  quickly 


THE  COLLEGE  243 

stilled  or  rendered  harmless.  How  little  their 
influence,  was  shown  by  the  answer  of  both 
faculties  and  students  to  the  call  to  arms.  Hun- 
dreds of  teachers  left  their  lecture-halls  to  don 
the  uniform  or  to  take  up  research  work  for 
the  government;  thousands  of  students  of 
military  age  and  physical  fitness  hurried  to 
the  ranks  and  the  training-camps  of  the  army 
and  navy.  Seven  hundred  students  of  the 
University  of  Michigan,  and  800  of  Yale  left 
their  studies  for  the  service  before  their  school 
year  ended.  This  was  true  everywhere.  The 
institutions  found  their  faculties  and  student 
bodies  depleted.  In  the  beginning  of  the  fol- 
lowing collegiate  year,  1917-18,  the  enrolments 
of  new  and  old  students  fell  off  startlingly.  In 
the  higher  classes,  senior  and  junior,  there  was 
an  average  decrease  in  attendance  of  fully  30 
per  cent.  The  attendance  at  Harvard,  Yale, 
and  Princeton  was  cut  almost  one-third,  and 
a  like  condition  existed  in  nearly  all  the  other 
universities.  For  those  institutions,  with  small 
endowments,  which  depend  largely  on  student 
fees  for  their  support,  there  were  threatened 
financial  difficulties,  and  it  would  have  been 


244  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

easier  for  them  to  have  closed  for  the  period 
of  the  war.  But  the  government's  theory  was 
that  a  steady  supply  of  college-trained  men 
was  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and 
all  of  them  have  patriotically  faced  their  dif- 
ficulties and  continued  their  work.  They  have 
even  reached  out  with  renewed  energy  to  in- 
duce young  men  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
educational  opportunities  they  give.  The  ac- 
tion of  the  government  in  utilizing  their  facili- 
ties for  military-training  purposes  has  helped 
largely  to  relieve  many  of  them  of  the  financial 
burdens  imposed  on  them  by  the  war.  While 
they  have  been  able  to  continue  their  academic 
courses,  in  most  of  them  training  for  war  has 
become  the  major  part  of  their  business. 
Nearly  all  of  them  have  established  courses 
giving  training  in  some  phase  of  army  or  navy 
work.  In  eight  technical  institutions  there  have 
been  founded  schools  where  aspirants  for  avia- 
tion commissions  receive  instruction  in  air- 
plane mechanics  before  going  to  the  flying-fields; 
institutions  especially  equipped  for  the  teach- 
ing of  chemistry  are  being  used  for  courses  in 
chemical  warfare;  Yale  has  developed  a  fine 


THE  COLLEGE  245 

artillery  school.  The  Reserve  Officers'  Training 
Corps  of  Harvard,  Princeton,  Michigan,  Cali- 
fornia, and  other  universities  are  giving  the 
government  splendid  men  for  commissions. 

But  the  government  is  looking  to  the  col- 
leges not  only  to  develop  officers  but  to  train 
enlisted  men  for  special  duty.  Their  labora- 
tories and  shops  have  proved  of  great  value  in 
developing  mechanics  for  work  in  the  airplane 
and  motor-transport  services,  in  training  radio 
operators,  and  in  fitting  men  for  special  branches 
of  the  naval  service.  Four  hundred  of  them 
were  recently  designated  to  give  intensive 
courses  in  military  work  to  men  of  the  draft 
age.  These  colleges  are  practically  army  posts. 
Every  able-bodied  undergraduate  is  a  member 
of  the  Student  Army  Training  Corps,  while 
thousands  of  graduates,  and  non-college  men 
who  have  shown  special  intelligence,  have  in 
them  an  opportunity  to  prepare  themselves  for 
service.  These  students  are  fed  and  clothed 
at  the  government's  expense  and  receive  the 
pay  of  privates  in  the  army. 

The  study  of  the  liberal  arts  in  our  colleges 
has  been  rudely  interrupted  by  the  war.  The 


246  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

study  of  science  has  been  greatly  stimulated 
by  the  need  of  meeting  the  Hun  with  his  special 
weapon.  The  pleasant,  quiet  course  of  college 
life  has  been  disjointed  and  turned  awry  for 
a  time.  The  broad  spaces  of  the  football  and 
baseball  fields  are  crowded  with  figures  in  khaki. 
The  lecture-halls,  which  once  resounded  with 
dissertations  on  history  and  psychology,  are 
used  now  for  the  expounding  of  the  principles 
of  navigation  and  gun-fire.  We  seem  to  be 
devoting  all  our  knowledge  to  perfecting  the 
art  of  killing.  It  is  only  for  a  time.  Our  col- 
leges will  return  again  to  those  pleasant,  quiet 
ways.  Their  purpose  is  to  teach  the  art  of  liv- 
ing. But  those  whose  fortune  it  has  been  to 
acquire  knowledge  in  their  halls  saw  that  there 
could  be  no  decent  living  while  Germany  raged 
through  the  world.  Reluctantly  they  turned 
to  the  art  of  war.  And  they  have  been  proving 
themselves  gallant  soldiers  in  a  righteous  cause. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
CONCLUSION 

writer  has  endeavored  in  this  book 
to  picture  clearly  and  briefly  the  vast 
problem  faced  by  America  when  she  entered 
the  battle  for  liberty,  and  to  show  how  that 
problem  has  been  solved.  Great  difficulties 
have  been  met,  and  they  have  been  overcome 
by  the  united  efforts  of  the  people.  To-day 
the  greatest  army  that  ever  followed  our  flag 
is  fighting  in  the  distant  fields  of  France,  and 
millions  more  of  our  men  stand  ready  to  take 
their  place  on  the  battle-line.  The  mobilization 
of  our  man-power  has  been  one  of  the  marvels 
of  our  history.  It  has  been  accomplished  with 
a  speed  and  a  lack  of  friction  that  a  few  years 
ago  we  should  have  thought  impossible.  From 
the  North,  East,  South,  and  West,  the  men  have 
poured  into  our  armies,  and  those  who  but  a 
year  ago  were  working  quietly  on  our  farms 
and  in  our  shops  have  proved  themselves  as 
brave  and  resourceful  soldiers  as  ever  went 

247 


248  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

into  battle.  The  mobilization  of  our  mechan- 
ical power  has  not  been  effected  so  rapidly  and 
so  well.  Of  the  two  tasks,  that  of  finding 
the  fighting  men,  and  that  of  arming  them  and 
getting  them  overseas,  the  latter  has  proved 
the  more  difficult.  Both  tasks  are  being  ac- 
complished. Each  day  that  goes  by  and  brings 
its  long  toll  of  those  who  have  given  their 
lives  in  our  defense  makes  more  determined 
the  will  of  the  people  that  they  shall  be  accom- 
plished. There  is  no  question  as  to  the  mind 
of  America  in  this  war.  The  States  that  once 
were  most  blind  to  the  peril  that  lay  in  German 
ambition  are  to-day  retiring  to  private  life  the 
men  who  in  Congress  obstructed  the  efforts 
for  our  protection. 

Few  sane  and  patriotic  men  to-day  doubt 
the  wisdom  of  our  government  in  raising  its 
armies  by  imposing  the  obligation  to  fight  on 
every  man  capable  of  bearing  arms.  Twenty- 
five  million  men  are  on  the  rolls;  3,000,000  are 
under  arms;  more  than  a  million  and  a  half 
are  in  France,  and  each  month  the  numbers 
increase.  In  no  other  way  could  such  results 
have  been  obtained.  That  they  have  been  ob- 


CONCLUSION  249 

tained  through  the  operation  of  the  selective- 
service  law  is  due  to  the  wise  way  in  which 
those  in  charge  of  the  working  of  the  law  have 
carried  out  its  provisions.  They  have  not  used 
military  force.  They  have  trusted  to  the  pa- 
triotism of  American  men,  and  the  vast  mass 
have  shown  that  this  trust  was  warranted. 
There  have  been  slackers,  of  course ;  there  have 
been  those  who  dodged  the  registration,  and 
those  who  registered  but  sought  to  avoid  its 
obligations  by  specious  pleas.  They  have  earned 
the  country's  contempt.  The  country's  pride 
is  in  those  long-limbed,  brown  men  of  ours  who 
are  charging  over  the  steel-riddled  fields  of 
France. 

It  is  planned  next  spring  to  have  5,000,000 
men  at  the  battle-front.  Germany  has  de- 
clared contemptuously  that  it  cannot  be  done. 
She  declared  as  contemptuously  that  we  could 
not  move  a  million  there  this  year.  It  has  been 
done,  as  she  has  learned  at  Chateau-Thierry 
and  St.-Mihiel.  But  to  move  and  keep  5,000,000 
overseas  will  demand  every  ounce  of  energy 
in  the  country.  Fortunately  one  of  the  most 
difficult  of  the  problems  involved  is  fast  being 


250  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

solved.  The  submarine  is  being  beaten.  As 
we  have  seen,  it  requires  five  dead-weight 
tons  of  shipping  moving  on  the  sea  to  keep 
one  soldier  in  France.  To  carry  out  our  mili- 
tary programme  we  must  have  25,000,000  dead- 
weight tons  available  for  our  army  by  spring. 
The  energy  of  our  ship-builders  is  solving  this 
problem  for  us.  By  August  30  of  the  present 
year  the  world  rate  of  building  new  vessels 
had  exceeded  the  rate  of  their  destruction  by 
the  Germans.  The  August  production  of  our 
shipyards  was  a  world  record,  390,980  dead- 
weight tons  leaving  the  ways.  A  statement 
issued  by  the  United  States  Shipping  Board 
on  September  21  shows  that  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  world  war  until  September  1,  1918, 
the  losses  of  Allied  and  neutral  shipping  by 
German  action  were  21,404,913  dead-weight 
tons.  In  the  same  period  the  total  Allied  and 
neutral  construction  was  14,247,825  dead-weight 
tons.  There  was  added  to  the  world's  tonnage 
from  captured  enemy  vessels  3,795,000  dead- 
weight tons.  The  excess  of  losses  over  gains 
in  the  entire  period  was  3,362,088  dead-weight 
or  (dividing  by  1.6)  2,101,305  gross  tons,  the 


CONCLUSION  251 

terms  of  shipping  used  in  the  British  table  be- 
fore given.  In  the  thirteen  months  ending 
September  1,  1918,  the  American  shipyards  had 
produced  3,017,238  dead-weight  tons,  showing 
how  the  construction  was  overtaking  the  de- 
struction. It  was  unfortunate  that  we  had 
that  early  delay  in  our  ship -building  pro- 
gramme, but  in  organizing  a  gigantic  business 
it  takes  time  to  get  the  right  men  hi  the  right 
place.  To-day  we  have  them  in  charge  of  our 
shipping,  as  the  record  shows.  The  vessels  are 
coming  from  the  yards  in  ever-increasing  num- 
bers, and  our  navy  and  the  navies  of  the  Allies 
are  holding  the  undersea  pirates  in  check. 

For  the  mobilization  of  our  man-power  we 
had  a  clean-cut  law,  ably  executed  by  General 
Crowder,  provost  marshal  general,  with  the  as- 
sistance of  a  great  number  of  volunteers  and 
the  general  co-operation  of  the  people.  In 
the  mobilization  of  our  machine-power,  to  equip 
and  arm  these  newly  gathered  armies,  we  were 
less  fortunate.  There  was  at  first  procrastina- 
tion and  confusion.  Here,  too,  as  in  the  ship- 
ping matter,  it  took  time  to  get  the  right  men 
in  the  right  place.  From  the  start  the  navy 


252  HOW  WE  WENT  TO  WAR 

worked  smoothly,  because  it  had  at  its  head, 
in  charge  of  its  bureaus,  able  professional  offi- 
cers. They  knew  what  they  wanted  and  got 
it.  The  problem  of  the  Navy  Department, 
as  has  been  pointed  out,  was  not  so  difficult 
as  that  of  the  War  Department.  That  we  did 
have  irritating  delays  in  the  War  Department 
is  evident  from  the  investigations  of  the  Sen- 
ate into  the  aircraft  and  ordnance  programmes. 
These  troubles  had  been  corrected  by  the  end 
of  the  first  year  and  a  half  of  war.  Able  men 
were  in  charge  and  were  seeing  that  we  got 
for  our  armies  the  much-needed  airplanes  and 
guns  of  all  calibers.  While  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  the  way  in  which  these  problems 
were  handled  at  first,  we  can  find  cheer  to- 
day in  the  fact  that  they  are  now  being  worked 
out. 

It  has  been  argued  in  some  quarters  that 
our  war  preparations  would  have  proceeded 
more  rapidly  and  effectively  had  they  been 
in  charge  of  a  coalition  cabinet.  Certainly 
the  magnitude  of  the  crisis  called  for  the  best 
intelligences  of  the  country  without  regard 
to  political  parties.  It  has  been  contended 


CONCLUSION  253 

that  a  wiser  direction  of  the  great  departments 
of  the  government  might  have  been  seen  had 
those  in  charge  of  them  been  appointed  more 
for  their  ability  and  experience  than  out  of 
consideration  for  their  political  affiliations.  On 
this  question  there  are  differences  of  opinion. 
But  there  are  no  differences  of  opinion  among 
true  Americans  as  to  the  need  of  pushing  the 
war  to  the  utmost  of  our  power  and  to  victory. 
The  intelligence  of  the  country  has  stood  ready 
at  the  government's  call.  Whatever  the  gov- 
ernment has  asked,  the  people  have  given 
cheerfully. 

We  know  that  the  President  has  promised 
"  force — force  to  the  utmost — force  without 
stint  or  limit — the  righteous  and  triumphant 
force  which  shall  make  right  the  law  of  the 
world  and  cast  every  selfish  dominion  down 
in  the  dust !  " 

A  people  that  has  been  pouring  out  its  blood 
will  not  rest  content  until  the  world  is  freed 
from  the  horror  of  German  rule. 


DATE  DUE 


A     000669174     5 


